

DEFENCE ACADEMY OF  
THE UNITED KINGDOM

# **BEHAVIOURAL CONFLICT**

FROM GENERAL TO STRATEGIC  
CORPORAL: COMPLEXITY,  
ADAPTATION AND INFLUENCE

BY

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THE SHRIVENHAM PAPERS

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# **Behavioural Conflict**

## **From General to Strategic Corporal: Complexity, Adaptation & Influence**

by

Andrew Mackay and Steve Tatham

### **Executive Summary**

This paper represents nearly two years of work and active consideration – both in the academic domain and in the field of conflict – of the problems confronting the British military in contemporary and future conflict. At its heart is the belief that future campaigns will need to focus on altering the behaviours of others, either in advance – and therefore deterring conflict – or as a coupled component in the process of combat and post combat operations. It takes the deployment of 52 Brigade to Helmand Province, Afghanistan, as its principal case study and examines the thought processes – falling outside more conventional military wisdom and training – that lay behind the Commander’s decisions to mount an influence-led deployment, one that specifically sought to reduce hard kinetic engagement and place the consent of the population at the centre of the operational design. Indeed the paper argues that success in battle will demand as much understanding of social psychology, culture and economics as it does military art and science. It examines the corporate structures available within the MoD to support that decision and, finding them lacking, suggests not only how a new strategic communication structure might evolve to meet future demands but also how the provision of education, learning, unlearning and relearning at every level, from Commander to strategic Corporal, is likely to be the pre-eminent factor in success in future conflict.

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### **Key Points**

Conflict is conducted in an information society, where perception and misperception very often outstrips and overtakes reality.

Changing individual and group behaviour before, during and after conflict is likely to become a pre-eminent factor in securing future success.

The military understanding of behavioural change is increasingly being referred to as influence.

It is not sufficient to simply incorporate influence in military doctrine without establishing structures and educational programmes to facilitate effective and practical application.

In an unpredictable world, where continual adaptation and innovation by individuals and institutions is key, the central role of influence in managing uncertain outcomes has never been more important.

Engagement in conflict is not undertaken without expenditure of *'blood and treasure'*; influence can reduce the cost of both and can make the difference between mission success and failure.

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### **Behavioural Conflict From General to Strategic Corporal: Complexity, Adaptation & Influence**

*'If the forces have to be adapted to their new missions it is just as important that the minds of the leaders and men – and this includes the civilian as well as the military – be adapted also to the special demands of counter-insurgency warfare.'*<sup>1</sup>

#### **Prelude**

In late December 2007 a troop from 40 Commando Royal Marines were patrolling in the unpopulated area south of the Kajaki Dam when they came across a lone farmer sowing seeds in a field. In the pattern of life prevailing in an area where the local population had long fled because of continual fighting, this was an event worthy of investigation. The planting season was at the very end of its cycle yet here was an individual apparently risking much to plant seed. The initial assumption was that he was planting poppy seed but nothing could have been further from the truth. He was in fact planting wheat seed, and was well aware of how late in the planting cycle he was undertaking this task. His answer to the obvious question 'why?' surprised the patrol commander. The farmer informed him that as a result of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto two or three days earlier he had calculated that the price of wheat was going to soar and he wanted to take advantage of it. So here we have an individual who probably ranked as one of the poorest in the world making a strategic – in his terms – decision based on his knowledge of world events reverberating far away. This paper seeks to examine how we will influence<sup>2</sup> individuals such as this and how we can impact upon his behaviour within the areas of conflict we find ourselves in now and will undoubtedly find ourselves in the future.

#### **Introduction**

In October 2009 the UK MoD<sup>3</sup> issued its first joint doctrine on security and stabilisation. Entitled *JDP3-40: Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution*, the doctrine sought to articulate the general priorities and challenges of stabilising fragile states. It articulates the processes that would take place during, or immediately following, conflict and set against a backdrop of a weak or failed state facing a range of serious challenges to its authority, from criminality through to a full blown insurgency. As the UK's 2008 National Security Strategy<sup>4</sup> noted: *'since the end of the Cold War, the international landscape has been transformed. The opposition between two opposing power blocs replaced by a more complex and unpredictable set of*

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*relationships*'; that *complexity may in the future manifest itself as Hybrid Warfare*.<sup>5</sup> These two documents point to the pattern and likely nature of future British military operations and the corresponding uncertainties and complexities they will face. Black swans will, it would seem, abound.<sup>6</sup>

In this paper we argue that increasing levels of unpredictability and complexity have defined the UK's military operations over the last 15 years. Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan all presented very different challenges. Yet Bosnia and Kosovo, for example, seemed hugely complex at the time but with hindsight, and in comparison to the challenge of Afghanistan, appear less so. With one obvious exception, today each former theatre of operation continues to edge towards stability, albeit imperfectly, at different levels and still with major challenges ahead. Many commentators are suggesting, however, that Afghanistan may not follow that trend.<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, each previous campaign has successively demonstrated one common thread – military force, hard kinetic power, is not by itself sufficient to resolve the conflict. This contrasts sharply with the 1982 Falklands War (the last campaign that directly threatened Britain's territorial integrity and, arguably, the last one in which British politicians across government were utterly immersed in its conduct and campaign planning) and the 1991 Gulf War – which we would argue was the last conflict, for the British Military at least, of the industrial age.

Today conflict is undertaken in the information age, where every action is open to immediate scrutiny and where events in the tactical domain can have an immediate and often unplanned consequence for strategy. It is what US Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, the former Director of the US Office of Force Transformation, declared to be "*the most important transformation we [the US military] are facing*".<sup>8</sup> The likely extent of the British military role in information age conflict is debatable – so too the level of political and public attention they may garner – however contemporary experience suggests to us that the role of the Armed Forces will continue to be sizeable. As disciplined and organised entities, with a vast range of capabilities, armed forces have an unparalleled ability to intervene in societies where it is difficult for civilian agencies and NGOs<sup>9</sup> to function or where they choose not to function effectively because of restrictions on duty of care, for example. But military intervention does not have to be overly kinetic, indeed we believe that non-kinetic effect will become increasingly important in influencing people's behaviour but to do so successfully will need more judicious and effective application than has thus far been the case.

The aim of this paper therefore is to highlight specific changes in strategy, command concepts and education necessary for the conduct of behavioural conflict. In particular we believe the military will need to understand how to effectively couple kinetic (physical effects) and non-kinetic activity (psychological and social effects) to facilitate meaningful behavioural



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change if desired outcomes are to be made more, rather than less, likely. It would be disingenuous to suggest that this is not already recognised in UK military doctrine. Chapter 1 of JDP0-01: *British Defence Doctrine*, for example, notes the definition of Hard and Soft Power<sup>10</sup> and in particular states that: '*History has shown that Soft Power is generally slower, more diffuse and more cumbersome to wield than Hard Power, although it is often cheaper and its effects may be more enduring. The two [Hard & Soft Power] may need to be used together*'. So too JDP3-40. Yet whilst this may be articulated in theory we are concerned that it does not yet exist in practice and we believe that substantial transformative and adaptive change is now required to turn Soft Power theory into structured military influence activity that is relevant to ongoing and future operations.

### **Influence & Perception**

*'For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill.  
To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.'*

Sun Tzu

Central to our thesis is the need to move influence from the periphery of the command's thinking to its very epicentre. Australian COIN<sup>11</sup> expert David Kilcullen explains: '*(W)e typically design physical operations first, then craft supporting information operations to explain our actions. This is the reverse of al-Qaida's approach. For all our professionalism, compared to the enemy's, our public information is an afterthought. In military terms, for al-Qaida the "main effort" is information; for us, information is a 'supporting effort'*'.<sup>12</sup> French COIN strategist David Galula is perhaps more succinct: '*If there was a field in which we were definitely and infinitely more stupid than our opponents, it was propaganda*'.<sup>13</sup> To be clear, we are not suggesting that propaganda is the key to success to future conflict. The word itself is highly contentious and probably inextricably linked to both totalitarian regimes of the 20th century and an era when even a non-totalitarian state could effectively control public discussion (or, at least, effectively suppress certain elements of it). However we are attracted to Galula's words because firstly it is clear that the challenges that face the British military in 2009 are similar to those that faced the French military in the Algerian civil war over 50 years ago – i.e. an adaptive and highly organised insurgency – and secondly because in its root, the Latin term '*propagare*' means the pinning of fresh shoots of a plant into the earth to reproduce and take on a life of their own. We believe that this is a not unreasonable analogy for promoting and growing new ideas and values – and in particular harnessing the potential of influence to achieve objectives. Cynicism abounds but that it should be attached to a process that seeks to reduce the need for hard military force is, we believe,

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illogical and particularly so in environments where collateral damage is so obviously damaging to the mission and where body bags, be they friendly or hostile, are a corrupt and distasteful measure of progress. As Johnson-Cartee and Copeland observe: '*such nonsensical bias obscures the frequently constructive role of social influence in contemporary life. Consider public information campaigns associated with the ICRC.*<sup>14</sup> Surely no one would suggest that these worthy causes should go unprompted in society?'<sup>15</sup> We also note the passion that communication can engender. As Johnson-Cartee and Copeland note: '*Facts inform; emotions inspire*<sup>16</sup>'. Or in other words, the emotions triggered by Soft Power can be extremely persuasive when applied in the right conditions and to the right audiences.

What relevance is that to the contemporary military environment? Simply this. In current and future complex environments we believe it abundantly clear that the British military must now learn – and urgently – how to properly and thoughtfully apply influence to the operational environment it finds itself in. Contemporary conflict demands that we are able to initiate behavioural change in combatants, in the populations from which they garner their support and with those who, or who may in the future, exercise or seek to obtain power. We make three justifications for this assertion.

Firstly, defence forces are expensive assets and the British taxpayer rightly demands best value for money. In a highly challenging fiscal environment, with competing demands from across the spectrum of public services, defence needs to be realistic. It may be that in the future the defence settlement will not sustain a capability to conduct the full spectrum of military operations that have been undertaken in the past. The MoD can bemoan and bewail, or it can adapt. We believe it must adapt and that it will be necessary, nay desirable, to be thinking now of perhaps hither too non-military ways of deterring and defeating an adversary. The issue of deterrence will be touched upon later but it is a *sine qua non* that preventing conflict is infinitely more desirable than engaging within it. Influence, and its role in changing behaviour, can have a direct impact on the nature of how a conflict is planned, fought and sustained and therefore must be regarded as being central to campaigning.

Secondly, public perception can have long term and decisive effect upon the nature and success of foreign policy and military operations.<sup>17</sup> Conveying information messages to specific audiences, in order to influence behavioural change for specific political objectives, may well prove more decisive in future conflicts than just the placement of bullets and bombs upon a target. Neither civilian nor military leaders can afford to take a passive view of public opinion, for in foreign policy in particular it can constrain and limit action. As a result of opinion, which for many in the world will form perceptions of reality, people will make choices. Our preference should be that people make the '*right*' choice. In Afghanistan, and perhaps in future conflicts, the task of nudging people towards that choice, either by design or

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consequence, should become a function that the military perform in conjunction with civil actors.

Thirdly, influence is a concept well understood by other government departments (OGDs). All Departments of State have an interest in influence and it might be seen as a tool for unifying cross-governmental activity, one that is far less intimidating than conventional military tools. This is important, for whilst the military will continue to have a seminal role in future complex operations, as we noted earlier, lasting solutions do not come at the end of a gun barrel. Former British Ambassador Sir Christopher Meyer has noted: *'there has been scant joined-up government between the soldier, the aid worker and the diplomat'*<sup>18</sup> – which suggests that the so-called Comprehensive Approach<sup>19</sup> has not yet become a workable methodology. *The allure of the Comprehensive Approach – what it promises – has not been matched by an effective outcome. Indeed its ability to create competitive tensions across OGDs rather than creative tensions has resulted in levels of bureaucracy being attached to it that actively inhibits adaptation rather than encourages it.* This is largely down to each department having differing aims, different cultures, applying alternative solutions and each suffering the inadequacies of the other. By making the role of Influence far more central to ways, means and ends it might encourage departments of state to deal more effectively with those competitive institutional tensions that abound and in its place look to creative tension being a more effective catalyst to decision making. Experience tells us that perceptions are formed from a complex mix of sources. Sometimes they may be based upon first hand experience – very often they are not. They may be formed as a result of interaction within complex societal networks, family, tribe, ethnic group, religion. They may perhaps be formed as a result of interaction within the new informational environment of bloggers, YouTube and social network sites. Or, as we have learned from Afghanistan, they may emanate from other stimuli – some centuries old, such as Shuras, Loya Yirga, story telling and codes of conduct such as Pashtunwali.<sup>20</sup> What we do know is that Afghans are fundamentally pragmatists, an attitude forged through conflict, geography and sacred values. Few have any wish to return to the excesses of the pre-2001 Taliban government. Thus Afghanistan, at its heart, is about stopping a deeply unpopular former government returning to power – for Afghan interests, for UK interests and for regional and global security interests. Indeed the insurgency is unique in that is probably the only one ever to be conducted by the previous government of the country. Inherently this should make the West's task conceptually easier since all that has to be done is to deny the Taliban popular support. Yet set against the reality of the environment it is of course hugely complex. In a land so scarred by conflict, nudging pragmatists in a specific direction by getting them to make better choices is far easier said than done. Subsequently we have also learnt that our enemy (in Afghanistan we have perhaps unhelpfully conflated it into one group which we call Taliban) also

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make choices. For the die-hard ideologist, removing the *'infidel crusader from Muslim lands'* may be the single goal of the conflict. Yet the *'Taliban'* are not all ideologues; dispossessed young men, drug barons and criminal elements are all in this mix and all make choices on a range of issues from repelling foreigners to poverty, to drugs or seeking out power. In the grinding poverty and hopelessness of Afghanistan such people will make any number of choices – pragmatism – if what is offered is better than what they have. Perception is a powerful and motivating aspect of making choices. This is important. What might seem to coalition forces as profoundly irrational behaviour may actually be entirely rational to an indigenous population.<sup>21</sup> Equally that same indigenous population behaving in an entirely rational manner to them may appear to us as entirely irrational. The subsequent consequences are obvious – our own perceptions can be profoundly wrong, which in turn can lead to poor decision-making.<sup>22</sup>

For the committed and long term ideologues we know that Taliban commanders are very good at intuitive decisions. They have honed their skills on years of experience of fighting one enemy after another. Since the ISAF<sup>23</sup> coalition is not, in essence, presenting significantly new military challenges from those of the Soviet Army they can afford to rely on intuition and agile decision making rather than long term strategic plans. Yet if we consider the idea of presenting complex choices to Taliban commanders as part of our operational design we may be able slow down their decision making process, perhaps force group decisions, perhaps indecision, and therefore begin to drive wedges between the reconcilable and the irreconcilable. This is a concept that has occasionally been referred to as reflexive control – where the enemy is presented a range of thought through options and steered towards a calculated decision, one that might be predicted in advance and therefore utilised to best advantage.<sup>24</sup> Coupled to this will be an ability to slow down or cease the Taliban's ability to adapt. As author Joshua Cooper Ramo observed of Hizbollah, they paid scant regard to success but obsessed over failures. The key to constant adaptation therefore lies in recognising failure or poor performance, not self-satisfaction with gaining or winning. Similarly Ramo relates the story of Michael Moritz, a phenomenally successful venture capitalist (who invested \$12.5m into Google very early on) and how he constantly pushed for quick pivots because no plan should last longer than was necessary. We argue that the role of Influence is central to this approach as it ensures that the fundamental requirement of context is addressed provided commanders, at all levels, are prepared to revisit time and time again.

It is clear that understanding societal landscapes is important and the British Army has made substantial improvements in its cultural understanding and, more importantly, turning that into useful training for deploying soldiers. What we wonder, however, is whether we are making the necessary commensurate investment in education, for in conducting wars amongst the people,<sup>25</sup> what Kipling in 1899 referred to as *'the savage wars of peace'*,

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Commanders will need to make a substantial investment in their own cerebral appreciation of not just the tactical environment but also the strategic and cognitive one. We are concerned that this is not currently placed at the forefront of military thinking nor are we convinced that the MoD – indeed the whole of government – is philosophically, culturally and organisationally able to assist in its development. 52 Brigade's deployment to Helmand presents an interesting case study.

### 52 Brigade: A Case Study

*'Do not believe what you want to believe until you know what it is  
you need to know'*

R V Jones

The deployment, and the retaking of the strategically important town of Musa Qala, has been well documented;<sup>26</sup> perhaps less so has been the development of the command thought process that proceeded it – and why. 52's was the fourth Brigade-size deployment to Helmand province. It deployed at the 18-month point of the UK's commitment to Helmand and was conscious that the end of its tour would mark the two-year point. Each successive brigade had fought a differing campaign. 16 Air Assault Brigade's first tour, with limited resources, was highly kinetic. 3 Commando Brigade, because of force levels, went raiding and created manoeuvre outreach groups to disrupt and interdict. 12 Mechanised Brigade engaged in a more industrial scale of conflict which involved large clearances but without the force levels to subsequently hold and build in those areas. Each of these deployments had a significant effect upon the local population who were, inevitably, constrained in making appropriate choices through either lack of ISAF presence or an inability to do so without fear of the Taliban returning. An early decision was therefore made in the 52 Brigade planning process to place the population at the forefront of the operational design. It was determined that 52 Brigade would *Clear, Hold* and *Build* where it could and concurrently *Disrupt, Interdict* and *Defeat* where it could not. Underpinning this would be a commitment to ensure a singular focus on influencing the population of Helmand in order that the brigade could retain, gain and win their consent.

This was an easy enough order to state but what did it actually mean for the soldier on the ground? How does it differ from the cultural familiarity training that they will have undertaken and how is it actually achieved? One of the problems is appreciating the heterogeneous nature of the term '*population*'; it covers '*good*', '*bad*' and just plain '*indifferent*' attitudes, ethnic grouping, tribal grouping, educated, uneducated, wealthy, poor, literate, illiterate, religious moderates, religious zealots, government supporters, government enemies *et al.*

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It is, in essence, a conflict ecosystem where the actions of one actor have an impact on the others – for good or for bad, and where each actor is seeking some degree or level of advantage over other actors. Critically the military, the diplomat and the aid worker are all actors in that system and each can impact positively and negatively on each other as much as on those they are directly or indirectly seeking to influence. Is it realistic to place such an apparently nebulous construct at the centre of the commander's thinking? We would argue that in counterinsurgency the commander actually has no choice but to place such ideas at the core of his thinking. To do so otherwise would be to ignore the population who are the ultimate determinants in who wins or who loses a counterinsurgency campaign. However we are also of the view that whilst placing the population at the centre of thinking is easy enough to say, it is not enough to then pursue a largely kinetic approach or to think that killing increasing number of insurgents guarantees success. Whilst this last point is now widely understood and by and large commanders – at all levels – seek to avoid its consequences (predominantly civilian casualties and collateral damage) what has not been applied effectively is the means by which that same population will be cajoled, persuaded, informed, reassured and convinced. Or to put it another way, the choices made by the population ultimately determine success or failure. The same argument might also be applied to the insurgent. Reconciliation, for instance, is only possible when the insurgent has decided it is the more pragmatic choice given the prevailing circumstances. We should be in no doubt though that if we do not shape the prevailing circumstances the enemy most surely will. Influence operations are therefore at the very core of '*shaping*' but their role is too often relegated to the fringes of operational thinking. In the current contemporary operating environment this is akin to placing form before substance and quantity before quality. Neither will do.

In planning 52's deployment, the MoD's lack of corporate understanding of this challenge soon became an issue. The Staff Colleges could provide no corpus of text or body of military experts to provide appropriate advice. The initial expectation that support could be sourced from the MoD's Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations (DTIO) was dashed when it became clear they saw themselves as providing generic strategic messaging, whereas what the Brigade needed was dynamic influence at the tactical level.<sup>27</sup> Dr Dave Sloggett, a visiting researcher at the Defence Academy, was finally able to assist with the development of the Brigade's thinking, as were members of the Academy's small (now defunct) Advanced Research and Assessment Group, although both met with ardent resistance from DTIO who despite being able to offer no substantive support themselves were reluctant to see others working '*in their area*'. Sloggett identified very clearly why the DTIO and cross-governmental products were of very little use at a tactical level:

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*'Any relatively simplistic analysis of the audiences that one is trying to reach in Iraq would quickly realise that it would not be right to have a simple set of messages for the Sunni and Shia communities. The same point applies in some areas of Afghanistan. Whilst there may well be some aspects of the messages to these community based audiences, which try to resonate with the communities as a whole, there will be elements that will also need to be highly localised. These must attempt to recognise specific local issues and grievances on the ground. Such ideas of balanced messages into communities at the regional and local level are clearly an element of a way forward. They must also be set in context with what one may refer to as strategic attempts to communicate to a much wider audiences on the international stage as to the intent and objectives of the ongoing operations.'*<sup>28</sup>

To both authors, with collective experience drawn from seven theatres of operation, it is clear that not only are Whitehall messages a diluted and distant memory by the time they reach the tactical level but they may actually have no relevance at ground level anyway.<sup>29</sup> This is not because they are unimportant (indeed we recognise that for domestic and coalition audiences they may be vital) but that they have little or no relevance – to either a soldier or local – during, for example, a patrol one kilometre outside a Forward Operating Base. The art therefore becomes how to ensure that the message is tuned to local events, local perceptions, while retaining awareness of the operational context. There must be primacy given to local dynamics and this can only be achieved by striking a delicate balance between consistency and flexibility to fit local circumstances. So for instance, what 52 Brigade could not allow was two patrols, one in the Upper Gereshk Valley and one in the Upper Sangin Valley, to say something different about narcotics – saying in the one case “*don't worry, we won't eradicate because we don't want the insurgency to grow as a result*”, and then in another valley saying “*we are going to eradicate*”. There has to be a degree of consistency across the board whilst allowing for local variation – and this is a very challenging area in which to operate. 52 Brigade referred to this as applying ‘*dynamic influence*’. In essence it involved delegating to the lowest levels the ability to apply Influence and to take account of local events, incidents and personalities. And to enable this an Influence organisational architecture was created at Brigade, Battalion and Company level for just as we organise for the management of say ISTAR<sup>30</sup> processes we must organise for those processes related to Influence.<sup>31</sup> Such granular understanding we argue allows COIN situational awareness and thus understanding to prosper. Each compound, street, village, district or town contains a mass of ever-evolving contradictions, dichotomies, hopes and fears. Tapping into and turning this to our advantage is,

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by necessity, local in nature and cannot be achieved by generic messaging from afar. An integral part of this is trust and we must empower our people, particularly the strategic corporals and privates, and our observation is that this empowerment, in any meaningful manner, is rarely forthcoming.

Influence operations have been described as: '*information operations plus targeted kinetic operations*'.<sup>32</sup> This is, we believe, too narrow a description. It seems to endorse a raiding approach to counterinsurgency. A raiding approach cedes the initiative and battleground of perception to the enemy. As a consequence actions associated with a raiding approach tend to reinforce rather than counter the enemy's propaganda. Similarly clearing without holding cedes advantages to an enemy that can quickly exploit such a limited approach.<sup>33</sup> But with the experience of 52 Brigade's deployment we believe a broader definition is required. One of the earliest conclusions 52 Brigade reached was that the MoD was unhelpfully stove-piped into not only information operations, but also psychological operations, media operations, consent-winning activities, profile and posture activities. Yet all of these are actually subsets of what 52 wished to call Influence. They are all key enablers of what is effectively one and the same thing. This may be a symptom of information operations concepts not having evolved as quickly as our other concepts of operations. During the Cold War, responsibility for information operations could not be decentralised. Sensitivities about whether you were into the realms of propaganda, black ops and deception led to retaining control at the highest level because the consequences of getting it wrong were so severe. But in counterinsurgency, we argue that decentralisation is absolutely essential. Indeed it should be taken to the point of discomfort.<sup>34</sup> In their book *The Starfish and the Spider* Ori Brafman and Rod Beckstrom identify the requirement for hybrid organisations where hierarchy and central control sit comfortably with autonomy and delegation. More authority and responsibility has to be devolved to platoon and company commanders – they know the population, local life, its tempo and what influences it. They know how strong, or not, the insurgent may be in a specific area. They understand the context that a local population views its circumstances and can therefore empathise – or should at least try to no matter how hard it is in reality. And taking responsibility for local influence includes living with the consequences. Brafman and Beckstrom also identified the requirement for identifying the '*decentralised sweet spot*' where dependant on the organisation being considered the point along the centralised-decentralised continuum that was just about right. To achieve this individuals at the sweet spot of decentralisation need to be enabled, and to be given responsibility. For the Armed Forces to achieve this we need to formalise what is corporately understood by the term '*influence*'.

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### **Academics & Theorists: Shaping Command Thinking**

Quite aside from the normal preparation that a Commander routinely makes before taking men into battle, be it logistics, personnel, political, legal, personal *et al*, in advance of 52 Brigade's deployment a surprising amount of time had to be devoted to self-study of key texts, not just on the well trodden path of counter insurgency theory – which is relatively well understood within staff colleges – but on the considerably less well known military arena of behavioural psychology, economics and, as this thinking broadened, some philosophy. This path of learning lasted throughout the deployment and indeed post deployment has continued to inform our thinking on this subject. Neither share any time on military staff courses or in pre-deployment training packages. Yet it is here, amongst dusty textbooks, that we believe the key to formalising influence within organisations and delegating it to as low as level as possible lies. 52's Command team carefully considered a number of conceptual ideas in their preparation (we might, perhaps, call this pre-deployment education), and much of that work was later incorporated into the operational design. In essence the Command Team sought to set aside conventional thinking – unlearn – and re-think the nature of the problems that the deployment would face. The starting point, perhaps unusually, was to conceptualise what motivated people and the first model that was considered was *Homo Economicus* ('economic man').

*Homo Economicus* is a caricature of what, for some time, economists generally assume people to be. The model suggests that humans are rational and broadly self-interested – although what constitutes or defines the notion of 'acting rationally' is debatable, What really attracted 52 Brigade's interest was that *Homo Economicus* had proved hugely influential in public policy circles because it suggested that influencing human behaviour was actually rather simple. To fight crime, for example, politicians need only make punishments tougher. '*When the potential costs of crime outweigh the potential benefits, would be criminals would calculate that the crime no longer advanced their interests and so they would not commit it*'.<sup>35</sup> A derivative of *Homo Economicus* is rational choice theory which at its simplest level contended that a person reasons before taking rational action. As Mathew Taylor noted:

*'For some time the model of Homo economicus seemed to serve well enough: offer people choice and they will act in their own interest and in so doing will make the system work better for everyone. It is not a complete view of human action but it was a useful shortcut, and it had become the prevailing view of most policymakers in the US and Britain.'*<sup>36</sup>

Would this help the Brigade form a workable basis for its influence strategy? As 52 progressed its planning it seemed so – although it was keenly recognised that all these theorists had both supporters and detractors. Much

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later, and with the benefit of hindsight, we are not so sure:

*‘Over the past two decades, economists have been rediscovering human behaviour—real, irrational, confusing human behaviour, that is, rather than the predictable actions of the “economic man” who used to be pressed into service whenever modelling was to be done.’<sup>37</sup>*

But, preparation needed to start somewhere, and in the absence of wider support it became a journey of discovery for the 52 Brigade Command. That journey next led to the work of Daniel Kahneman<sup>38</sup> and Amos Tversky<sup>39</sup>, who wrote a paper entitled *Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases*. This series of articles initiated a debate between economists, philosophers and psychologists alike and laid the foundation stones for the conceptual thinking that has subsequently developed into behavioural economics. The critical issue in their debate was the acceptance of human fallibility in making judgements and decisions. Heuristics are nothing more than commonsense ‘rules of thumb’, shortcuts or ‘intuitive judgements’ that are utilised by individuals to arrive at a choice – or a decision. Kahneman's and Tversky's paper made the point: *‘that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors’*. In other words, heuristics lead to bias and bias can be exploited in the manner in which choices are framed or presented. For example, consider the following problem. A bat and a ball cost £1.10. The bat costs £1 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? Most people, at least for a few moments, decide incorrectly that the ball costs 10p. Kahneman and Tversky argue that the reason for this is that we use two systems for judgment and decision making. One is intuitive and fast – gut – and often provides the right answer, but it can lead to errors (for the ball in this example actually costs 5p<sup>40</sup>). The second system for judgement and decision making is a slower and more deliberate set of thought processes – the head. Whilst more likely to come up with the correct response they are also more demanding on our cognitive resources hence the bias towards intuitive guesswork – and the wrong answer. Decisions of this nature – particularly in a conflict environment – also require continual reassessment.

But what relevance is this to our view that Behavioural Conflict deserves greater resonance and involvement in the contemporary operating environment? Our contention is that in the realm of both Strategic Communication<sup>41</sup> and Information Operations we have for several decades applied the equivalent of ‘Economic Man’ to our information operations policy rather than genuinely applying psychology to the behavioural aspects and then drawing different conclusions to how our messaging and framing of choices can be applied. If we

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seek to influence behaviour in order to determine more appropriate choices then we will have to radically change both our approach and methodologies. The recent book *Supereconomics*<sup>42</sup> states boldly that: 'People aren't 'good' or 'bad.' People are people, and they respond to incentives. They can nearly always be manipulated — for good or ill— if only you find the right levers'. Influence is all about learning what the right levers are and how to apply them. For 52 that meant investigating further concepts – notably ideas about choice. For the purpose of this paper though we highlight five key ideas and concepts from the world of behavioural economics (there are many more but these, we believe, are the most directly relevant to Behavioural Conflict).

### **Prospect Theory**

In the late 1970s Kahneman and Tversky developed '*prospect theory*' to explain how people behave when dealing with risk and uncertainty. Of particular interest were findings about what economists call our '*discount rate*' – the fact that we value owning something today much more than a larger quantity of the same thing in the future. This theory assumes that people are more motivated by losses than by gains and as a result will devote more energy to avoiding loss than to achieving gain. There are clear and obvious implications here for how we might communicate with a population that has suffered several decades of conflict. We would argue that the here and the now becomes critical with the '*discount rate*' amplified by a perfectly understandable reluctance to consider '*next week*' when getting through '*today*' is the value attached and the prism through which any messaging is viewed. An example of how Prospect Theory can be distorted in conflict is a tendency by both the military and development specialists to over-promise but subsequently under-deliver. Hopes are raised and subsequently dashed causing individuals to mistrust longer-term development plans with the consequence that they seek to avoid further loss rather than buy in to overstated '*gains*'. Another example are claims made on behalf of the benefits to be accrued if the Kajaki Dam in Helmand is made fully operational and power generation efficiency dramatically improved. For most Afghans the perceived benefits – or Prospect – of a more efficient dam are so far away that they can not possibly consider it to be a factor that might alter their behaviour or seek to limit insurgent activity around the dam. The lesson here for Influence is that it must be relate to something that is tangible and apparent and not fuzzy and indistinct regardless of how strategically important a project such as the Kajaki Dam really is. Influence must address context.

### **Anchoring**

Kahneman's and Tversky's work demonstrated that individuals when conflicted between '*gut*' and '*head*' can be easily manipulated by

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'anchoring' their choice to a pre-determined value. They demonstrated that people make estimates starting from an initial value which is adjusted to yield the final answer. The initial value can be suggested in the formulation of the problem or it could be the result of a partial computation. It was this phenomenon that they called anchoring. It is best illustrated by quoting directly from their paper:

*'In a demonstration of the anchoring effect, subjects were asked to estimate various quantities, stated in percentages (e.g., the percentage of African countries in the U.N). For each question a starting value between 0 and 100 was determined by spinning a wheel of fortune in the subjects' presence. The subjects were instructed to indicate whether the given (arbitrary) starting value was too high or too low, and then to reach their estimate by moving upwards or downwards from that value. Different groups were given different starting values for each problem. These arbitrary values had a marked effect on the estimates. For example, the median estimates of the African countries in the UN were 25% and 45%, respectively, for groups which received 10% and 65% starting points.'*

In other words, the arbitrarily chosen figure had a profound effect on the decisions that an individual subsequently made. We believe this principle offers considerable utility in how the military can influence behaviour in conflict and that it may have profound implications for the way the military's actions can be shaped and influenced by an opponent. For example, does a leaflet drop depicting brutal images of the Taliban inflicting casualties on innocent civilians lead individuals to make a choice not to support the Taliban or does it, in fact, 'anchor' their belief that support to the Taliban is a better choice in order to avoid the outcome depicted on the leaflet?

### **The Wisdom of Crowds**

This considers how important the opinion of individuals in influencing the activity of a crowd can be. The theory holds that members of a crowd are too conscious of the opinions of others, indeed they may even begin to emulate each other and conform, rather than to think differently. Afghan society tends not to arrive at individual but at collective decision making. Consider a roomful of people in Afghanistan, a shura, considering a number of difficult issues related to a key question – how do we reject the Taliban in our area? If they do it badly, the Taliban will come back and kill them. If they speak out too loudly as an individual, they run the risk of being murdered. So how do you influence those individuals? How does the wisdom of that crowd come

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through into that decision? How can we assist in the right choice being made? Sometimes in an Afghan context it can be that a single individual has so much charisma, weight, and such power, that everybody does what he wants anyway, and it is not so much collective decision making as a polite way of endorsing his decision. So in this case, the influence effort is subtly different – how do you empower the individuals in that shura who have the right ideas but the least amount of authority?

### **The Framing of Choices**

Kahneman and Tversky also conducted in depth research into how choices can be framed. In terms of applying Influence this is of significant importance as it relates specifically to how messaging might be framed. An example is instructive. One group of subjects, were told the US was preparing for an outbreak of a disease that would kill 600 people. Two alternative programmes to combat it are then suggested – which one should be chosen? Programme A, which will guarantee 200 people will be saved or Programme B which offers a 1:3 probability that all 600 would be saved and a 2:3 probability that no one would be saved. They then asked the group which option they favoured. A second group of subjects were given the same preamble but offered these choices. Programme C would, if adopted, see 400 people perish and programme D a 1:3 probability that no one will die and a 2:3 probability that 600 people will die Again they were asked which of the two programmes they would choose. Clearly the choice between A and B is exactly the same as the choices presented in C and D and yet the subjects provided different answers depending upon the manner in which their choices were framed.<sup>43</sup>

In Afghanistan we believe the coalition has struggled to frame the choices we are asking a war-torn nation to consider. The simplest example would be the offer of democracy. Whilst well understood in liberal western countries it requires far greater explanation and framing in low income, conflict ridden countries when the decision to vote or who to vote for is largely irrelevant when compared with choices presented by the Taliban, or just by social circumstance, of life and death. We would contend that, to date in Afghanistan, we have paid little attention to how choices might be appropriately framed to change individual and collective behaviour. Many of the choices that are currently presented are too stark: poppy bad/wheat good; Taliban evil/ISAF good and so on. The reality is that we have consistently failed to understand that what seems to us as irrational behaviour is entirely rational to the individual facing tough choices.

### **Libertarian Paternalism**

This idea uses behavioural nudges to influence choices in positive ways, while still leaving individuals options. Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler in their book

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Nudge,<sup>44</sup> write: *'In the past three decades, psychologists and behavioural economists have learnt that people's choices can be dramatically affected by subtle features of social situations'*. Findings of this kind suggest that even when people have freedom of choice they are influenced, or nudged, by the context in which their decisions are made. Much like the previous example this idea considers the *'architecture of choice'*, altering the way choices are presented in order to *'nudge'* people towards a beneficial action, without actually banning anything or creating incentives. Again it is worth asking whether there is room on a field of conflict for such high minded ideas. Is it possible to introduce such concepts as *'nudging'* the population of a village to resist Taliban influence? What would the choice architecture look like? One early example of *'choice'* architecture being utilised in Afghanistan was the National Solidarity Programme which in 2004 sought to nudge thousands of village communities into managing their own reconstruction process. Critically the programme sought to decentralise decision-making and to localise authority and responsibility. Block grants were allocated provided three simple criteria were met. The village was required to elect its leadership by secret ballot, hold communal meetings to design its reconstruction plan and to post its accounts in a public place. The rest was left to the community. Simple nudges were applied, that were not explicit in determining specific outcomes or targets, and which in order to work were very local in nature.<sup>45</sup>

Why is all of this relevant to the British military presence in Afghanistan and to future conflicts? We argue that such understanding is absolutely seminal to how we might conduct Influence operations in an era of hybrid conflict. All of the examples above seek to influence behaviour and the choices that are made but within the context that they find themselves in not the circumstances that we wish might prevail. But we also recognise that such ideas do not exist in a vacuum and that they must be set in the relevant social, cultural and economic environment. This is vital to success – applying these ideas through the prism of western liberal democracy will end in failure and a Commander's appreciation needs to extend into other areas of expertise. In the case of Afghanistan 52's command realised that grasping some of the straightforward economic considerations for a country listed as 181 out of 182 in the United Nation's Human Development index<sup>46</sup> would also affect the success of the influence mission.

### **Economics**

In applying Influence effectively to behavioural conflict there is little point in seeking to apply it solely to fixing security or a lessening of violence. Any political settlement – of the sort we seek in Afghanistan – requires governance (alongside its bedfellow of Rule of Law), security and economic development to be brought along in tandem not sequentially. In his book *'The Bottom Billion'*, Paul Collier outlines the four traps that ensure divergence and prevent

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development for the billion bottom people of the world's population: conflict, natural resources, landlocked countries and bad governance. He argues that the presence of one or more of those traps features in every country caught in the Bottom Billion. Afghanistan features in all four traps.

Conflict causes poverty, and low income contributes to tension. Low growth means high unemployment and thus plenty of angry young men ready to fight. Conflict destroys infrastructure and scares away investors, further reducing opportunity.

Natural Resources: aside from opium Afghanistan has small reserves of coal, natural gas and some minerals. Copper deposits have been discovered but not developed because of the dual consequence of security and formidable logistical problems. However such is the scale of devastation after so many years of conflict that none are today capable of being commercially exploited for the benefit of the country. And even if they were, Collier's work highlights that it is rare for natural resource wealth to come back to the people.

The issue of being land-locked poses a real problem for social development and it can be largely out of the control of the country itself. If your neighbours do not like you, there is no way you can export. Whilst Switzerland can export via Italy or Germany – neither presents a problem – Uganda must work with Kenya, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, The Congo, and Tanzania. For Afghanistan the choice is equally as troublesome, either Iran or Pakistan – the northern '*Stans*' are ruled out for their own remoteness – and without dependable ways to export, land-locked countries are unable to participate in the global economy. In this instance the application of soft power and Influence - on a regional basis - is the only means of realising the value of mineral wealth or seeking out food export markets. Mangetout being packed, frozen, flown out and arriving in supermarkets in the UK from Kenya is viable. Seeking to achieve the same in Afghanistan is not which is why its food markets will be local (in a regional sense) provided it can wield the right levels of Influence to make this so.

Finally, bad governance: three-quarters of the bottom billion live in countries that are either failing, or recently were failed states. Most current conflicts are occurring in that bottom billion. The recent Afghan election has damagingly illustrated the limitations of Afghan governance and capacity. Collier also provides convincing analysis of how low income countries struggle to absorb democracy and it is only in middle income countries that democracy can take root. Afghanistan is set to remain low income for many years ahead.

Such considerations, and we accept that there are many more, should, we believe, form part of the pre-deployment educational process for both current and future operations. Many of 52's soldiers had experience of Iraq and whilst there were some areas of read-across, there could have been a real danger that the two arenas would be conflated in thinking. Indeed if we accepted Collier's argument<sup>47</sup> then we may conclude that Iraq is not a good model for the insurgency in Afghanistan. Iraq, we might argue, is pre-disposed to succeed,<sup>48</sup>

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conceptually Afghanistan is pre-disposed to failure. Yet with different choices Afghanistan could choose to develop its infrastructure, to feed its own population and perhaps to grow as an economy. Conventional wisdom suggests that this is impossible whilst the insurgency continues, but experience suggests you cannot sustain a COIN campaign when it is being fought from the bottom up. A political settlement has to meet it from the top down at some point or the bar that can measure success is set too low.

### **Making Influence Mainstream**

*'The old saying 'live and learn' must be reversed in war, for there we 'learn and live'; otherwise we die.'*<sup>49</sup>

It is not enough just to write about influence in military doctrine. Influence as a concept, in the way 52 Brigade sought to define it in Helmand, does not have a clearly visible academic or doctrinal background. When 52 identified the need to introduce thinking about influence operations during pre-deployment training, it became clear that there was a significant lack of previous writing on the subject. There is a great deal of doctrine available regarding the application of information operations, psychological operations and similar concepts. It was generally agreed within the Brigade that this was of little value at the tactical level; it did not tell soldiers how to execute influence. What was needed was tactical non-kinetic effects doctrine, that would explain how a company, battle group and brigade deliver non-kinetic effect. It is very much more than simply passing a message. Influence is achieved using a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic activity. For it to stand any chance of enduring success it needs thorough understanding of audiences. Successful Information operations, on the other hand, are those (generally non-kinetic) actions that are focused on exploiting the effect of military or civil activity or explaining why we are conducting that activity. Influence, therefore, differs from information operations, is more holistic in approach, and has a higher purpose.<sup>50</sup> Quite simply it is a way of thinking, and in an operational context it is multi-dimensional – necessitating second and third order consequence thinking. This involves consideration of what is to the left, to the right, above and below your immediate target. It must also include an absolute recognition that conflict remains an extension of politics and that all military effort and activity must contribute to the achievement of politically generated policy goals. And it can be difficult to navigate these choppy waters given the high stakes and the obvious consequences of getting it wrong. David Galula observed that in counterinsurgency operations:

*'(P)olitics becomes an active instrument of operation. And so intricate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary,*



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*every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects and vice versa.'*

An influence strategy is therefore central to any political strategy which in turn must provide the foundation for an effective means of conducting influence at the tactical and operational levels without necessarily seeking to constantly control or direct that effort. In Iraq in 2007, for example, the higher influence strategy was designed to move the various communities towards a political accommodation that would reduce communal violence. At a lower level it was about jobs, economic development and isolating the insurgent from the population. No one would suggest that in this multi-dimensional layering of applying coherent influence that generic messaging was either workable or appropriate.<sup>51</sup>

One of the reasons why this was so problematic for 52 Brigade, and why this concept is relatively new, is that traditional army training points commanders towards kinetic solutions. Perhaps of more relevance is that successful military careers – particularly at the junior officer level – are laid on hard power. As Norvell De Atkine notes: *'The death knell of a career is to be identified by the career makers and breakers as being out of the mainstream'*.<sup>52</sup> Thus the UK Armed Forces have no professional information operations practitioners, no media operators or professional psychological specialists. In their place, well meaning and enthusiastic amateurs are seconded from every branch of the military for two- or three-year tours, who do their best with minimal training but who are unlikely to return to such duties again. To make matters worse many of those who fill these appointments are, in fact, *'individual augmentees'* (IA) and often make their first appearance in a Brigade or Divisions preparation at the Mission Rehearsal Exercise. In other words a few weeks prior to deployment. We argue that no commander would accept his COS or DCOS, for instance, appearing at this stage and neither should he accept IAs appearing either. Whilst ideas of soft power are raised at staff colleges, what to do with those ideas are not. Hard power retains supremacy, reinforced by professional training courses throughout a soldier's career and by core texts such as the Principles of War (for example, tenacity in the face of the enemy, moral and physical courage). Yet in today's multi-polar and highly complex world winning kinetic battles is comparatively easy, but losing the peace is even easier.

The work of Ivan Arreguin-Tofts on the nature of conflict is widely respected. He has shown that the outcome of conflict will in the future not be so much a function of a stronger actor defeating a weaker one but of an actor that uses the most strategically useful techniques of battle – be they soft, hard, or asymmetric – that will prevail, and he demonstrates that since 1800 the results of conflicts are increasingly favouring the actor willing to make conceptual jumps in thinking. This places considerable emphasis on a willingness to continually refine, reorganise, adapt and transform contingent on how the

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character and dynamics of a particular conflict evolve over time.<sup>53</sup> What does this mean for the British Army? Essentially it calls into question the basis of the educational process that underpins its training. For example, in a typical senior army Officer's career spanning 30 years a General may, after completing basic training, spend around two years in staff colleges. As a junior Major they are required to attend the recently introduced 9-month Initial Staff Course. Again as a Major or Lieutenant Colonel they *may* be selected for the 40-week Advanced Staff Course, and as a one-star they *may* attend either the twelve-week Higher Command and Staff Course and/or the longer Royal College of Defence Studies programme. Yet almost none are guaranteed and almost all are dependent upon operational tasking and the perception of career needs. In between these comparatively short periods of intellectual broadening lie long and extended periods of either operations, support to operations, training or protracted periods in the MoD central staff fighting political wars of budget attrition and programme procurement. Now in comparison to the Civil Service or indeed to the commercial sector this is actually quite a long period of education. However, unlike industry, the Army's success is measured either by its lack of use (its deterrent value) or it is defined by its ability to respond quickly and successfully to an instability, noting that every instability is different, invariably in different parts of the world and involving people with a myriad of different values, beliefs, cultures *et al.* How then do the Commanders of tomorrow, **and** their troops, prepare themselves for the challenges of a post JDP3-40 environment? There is no quick fix solution but as we note later, life long learning and education must be considered key. However it is not sufficient to simply send people on courses, we have to send them onto the right courses and we question if the existing Staff Colleges are able to adapt quickly enough to meet the needs of their students. We also note that such course are expensive and, in a world increasingly driven by balance sheets, difficult to assign a monetary figure to their 'value'. We note with great disappointment the cutting of the Joint Services Warrant Officer's Education course at the Defence Academy and the intended cessation, for the Royal Navy, of M Phil courses – both taken as 'cost savings measures'.

The words of US futurist Alvin Tofler ring true: '*The illiterate of the future are not those that cannot read or write. They are those that cannot learn, unlearn and relearn*'.<sup>54</sup> Tofler speaks of the western world's educational system being designed to meet an industrial discipline of a past age, one unprepared for the future. We fear that the British Armed Forces may be similarly pre-disposed and from the top of the MoD through to the Army's Staff Colleges, the structures, despite the best will in the world, are institutionally incapable of keeping pace with rapid change and the associated willingness to adapt - and quickly - at the same time. Numerous examples illustrate the point. In 2009 the soon to be Chief of the General Staff (CGS) returned the British Army to a campaigning philosophy with the issuing of the Op Entirety Op Order.<sup>55</sup> This is a quantum change in the way that the British Army

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conducts its operations abroad but at the time of writing its implications (for the Army, for the other services and across government) receives almost no attention on staff course syllabuses. A second example is the absence of proper research within the MoD. Research forms the basis of education and learning, education and learning the basis of training. Yet even at the senior most levels education is wrongly seen as a '*luxury*' and second to training. We believe that training develops an individual's knowledge, skills and behaviour for particular roles through regular practice and instruction but that education develops an individual's intellectual capacity, knowledge and understanding; it equips them to come to reasoned decisions, judgements and conclusions, including in unpredictable and complex circumstances and situations. The British military rightly prides itself on the quality of its training but we fear that careers are increasingly built on budgetary and management competence in place of the necessary education to conceptualise tomorrow's challenges. An analogy may be helpful. A patient requiring surgery will take more confidence from being operated upon by a surgeon with recent surgical experience than one who last undertook the procedure some years past. But in the case of a rare condition the patient will be happy to be operated on by anyone qualified to remedy the malaise. The military, if the UK's foreign policy works, should be the surgeon that works every few years, not continuously. But that '*surgeon*' needs to retain currency, and capability, for future difficult operations, not past ones. And in doing so it needs to inspire confidence in the patient that it will perform to the best of its abilities by being cognisant of the latest thinking and research. This is the role of education and the provider, for the military, must be the Defence Academy. Of course in conflict we know that the military is seldom the sole participant so education needs to extend across government and to politicians. Thus organisations such as the National School of Government need to be intimately coupled.

The issue of '*Lessons Learned*' (LL) presents an interesting case study. The military places great stock in generating Lessons Identified (LI) after each operation or exercise. A classified database is maintained at the Development Concepts & Doctrine Centre, Shrivenham, and lists all the past LIs including those from operations in Iraq (which the British referred to as Operation Telic) and Afghanistan (Operation Herrick). Yet their detail is classified; this means that their distribution is necessarily limited to those that have the necessary clearances and mechanisms to read, store and protect the data. We are not arguing for the wholesale release of classified documents (many of which are, we believe, over-classified, to prevent criticism becoming public) but we do wish to see a better connection between LIs and the military education process – such that LIs (if they are the right lessons, and we note the disparity between the ability to collect LIs and the ability to analyse Lis<sup>56</sup>) are genuinely turned into LLs. We contend that in the important area of influence this does not currently happen. For example, the major tools of military influence are media, information and

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psychological operations. A casual search of the database suggests that, for whatever reason, LIs do not appear to make the transition to LLs. Exercise Gibraltar Forum was conducted in 2002 and the LIs commented on *'the paucity of understanding of media operations'*. Operation Kingower (Kosovo –1999) reported that *'the UK Information Operations capability was inadequate'*, Operation Veritas (Afghanistan 2001) suggested that *'UK IO and PsyOps have been under-resourced for some time. Much of the thinking and experience dates from World War 2'*. At the end of 2003 the first set of LIs from Iraq were compiled. Here we saw very similar commentary: *'the UK does not have a robust PsyOps capability'* and *'this op demonstrated once again the paucity of media ops capability'*. The issue then is how, and who, will turn those LIs into Lessons Learned (LL)? For we contend that if we had truly learned and not just identified lessons, we would not see the same reports emanating from Afghanistan in 2009 as we did from Kosovo ten years previously. This would appear to be evidence of a more general malaise, a point endorsed by General Graeme Lamb at the Cillcott enquiry when he was asked *"what lessons have been learned from Iraq?"* His reply: *"a raft of lessons – few of them learnt, I sense"*.<sup>57</sup> These points are indicative of the problems of innovating and facilitating change in a highly complex organisation, particularly one where budgets have become a key driver and where process very often prevents innovative thought, but this is an explanation of, not an excuse for lack of action. This is entirely counter to Toft's research that shows winners will often be those best able to make conceptual jumps in thinking - innovation - in complex environments.<sup>58</sup> A final comment from the LIs database is illuminating: *'IO is critical in the information Age'*. As Lt Gen William Caldwell, Commander US Combined Arms Center US Army, observed in a recent article on the *Small Wars Journal* website: *'We need to educate Soldiers... and how their actions can have strategic implications. They need to know what the second and third order effects of their actions are. There are very few soldiers out there who would intentionally harm the mission... when many of these incidents occur it is because they just don't know that it is going to have that kind of effect and cause that kind of damage'*.<sup>59</sup> Or, as Rosen notes, the speed of change in the information age aggravates militaries' *'procedural conservatism'*.<sup>60</sup> With so much clear evidence available that soft power is a force multiplier, we make the suggestions detailed in the following sections of the paper.

### **Winning Tomorrow's Conflicts**

*'If the mind is to survive this constant battle with the unexpected, two qualities are indispensable: first, an intellect that even in this moment of intense darkness retains some trace of the inner light that will lead it to the truth, and second, the courage to go where that faint light leads'.*

Carl Von Clausewitz

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In his book *The Age of the Unthinkable*,<sup>61</sup> Joshua Cooper Ramo describes a world of inherent unpredictability and constant ‘newness’. To Ramo it is a world where those that we entrust with the management of its problems will constantly fail, indeed their endeavours may actually achieve the opposite to that which was intended at inception, *unless* they are prepared to adapt; We do not have to ‘*watch whilst history collides with our lives but can step forward and change history*,<sup>62</sup> although, Ramo argues, to do so we must be prepared. From our shared experience of military operations and of working within intractable environments, both military, governmental and civilian, we believe that there is one fundamental certainty confronting the armed forces: uncertainty. The question we must therefore address is how do we prepare our people for the kind of challenge that such uncertainty will bring? We called our paper ‘*Behavioural Conflict*’ because it is our unequivocal view that changing behaviour of individuals, groups, governments and societies will be key to future success. When the armed forces dealt in heavy attrition or manoeuvre warfare the attitude and behaviour of the enemy was largely placed at the periphery of a Commander’s thinking. But heavy attrition and manoeuvre warfare does not, we believe, characterise future conflict – although we also accept that it cannot be ruled out. In behavioural conflict – particularly in the information age – we will need to confront very cerebral issues. For example, we may have to reassess notions of victory. What does ‘*victory*’ in Afghanistan look like? Have we achieved ‘*victory*’ in Iraq?<sup>63</sup> We would not presume to have an answer to either question but we do have an observation; we believe that ‘*victory*’ today, and in the future, will look very different to signature ceremonies on Lüneburg Heath in 1945 or Port Stanley in 1982. Indeed ‘*victory*’ may not even be immediately apparent in current and future conflict. During 52 Brigade’s deployment we chose to avoid using words such as ‘*winning*’ or ‘*victory*’ as they are too absolute and do not engender confidence when considering, for example reconciliation initiatives. We settled instead on ‘*succeed*’ or ‘*success*’ as everyone can interpret their role in success. Success has many fathers, but failure is an orphan. Also if we accept from the outset that victory may prove illusory, then we may also have to ask questions of our objectives and what is, or more specifically what is not, achievable. In short we will have to come to terms with an absence of absolutes.

To accelerate our preparedness we believe that three key areas of work need to be undertaken if we are to expect the UK’s Armed Forces to succeed in what Alvin Tofler calls the third revolution to befall mankind (the first two being the agricultural and industrial revolutions) - the information revolution. First, and foremost, we need to broaden and expand the minds of all our people, from the strategic corporal to those that will command and lead. We therefore propose a wholesale broadening of military education programmes. Secondly, we wish to see the expansion and professionalisation of certain key information age enablers – notably information, media and

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psychological operations practitioners and, of equal importance, their directing and command arrangements within the MoD. Finally we believe an expansion of the MoD's own organic research capability is vital if we are to respond meaningfully to future Rumsfeldian '*unknown unknowns*'.<sup>64</sup>

### **Education**

As we have already noted the MoD is deservedly a world-renowned training organisation, welcoming each year thousands of British and international students to its many courses and programmes. We do not denigrate their value. However, we are concerned that education is the poor relation of training, and an easy cost saving measure to take – we believe we must prepare our people for the complexities of the future and that life-long learning is the key. There are many ways that this can be achieved, in both macro and micro levels. Some examples illustrate the point. At the macro level, we would wish to see a return of the Strategic Estimate process, which was effectively dismantled in 1994. The corporate appreciation of world events has we believe been hindered by the reduction in the Defence Intelligence Staff, by the removal of many Defence Attaché (DA) posts, and by an absence of deep specialist expertise. For example, during operations in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan the MoD had to surge personnel through language training courses – a process that in some instances can take years. Whilst we recognise it is impossible to retain a corps of global linguists it is possible through proper research to determine these areas of the world where the probability of future conflict or intervention is highest and to properly prepare at least a small seed-corn cadre of individuals. This may mean linking such expertise to the DA circuit, which is currently regarded as the preserve of older officers nearing retirement. For young officers the DA circuit is seen as a hindrance to career development; we believe this notion to be wrong. The UK Defence Academy currently welcomes students from over 40 nations to its courses but sends British Officers to considerably less than half that number of international staff colleges – it being regarded as an expensive luxury. We believe that this too is unhelpful and we note the very positive experiences and life-long relationships that are built through such attachments. These do not necessarily have to be abroad. We welcome the placement of senior OGD personnel on military staff courses and would wish to see this expanded and reciprocated – particularly in DFID and the FCO. On the subject of the Defence Academy we wish to see Officers returning from theatre routinely being posted to the Academy staff to mentor those on courses and to codify the knowledge that they have gained. In many training schools recent operational experience is keenly sought but this appears less the case in educational environments. Such a move would help provide a bridge between operational adaptation and deeper institutional learning. Indeed learning and the acquisition of knowledge – by both individuals and groups – is, we believe,

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an issue paid only scant attention. It is not helped by regulations that prevent senior officers from sharing information and ideas through external new media such as blogs and websites, and the architecture of internal MoD computer networks that do not facilitate blog type discussion. We would also add a word of caution over too prescriptive reliance upon operational experience; operational experience can be invaluable – but only if it is right. We have observed US efforts to develop ‘*wiki-doctrine*’,<sup>65</sup> an initiative that envisages web-based Army doctrine being updated directly by certain forward based units and formations, therein negating the necessity of time consuming referral to higher level command through a tortuous staffing process. This is not perfect but it does facilitate comparatively immediate exchanges, by practitioners in operational theatres, and will allow the ‘*right*’ operational experience to rise to prominence.

We also note with envy the freedom senior US Officers enjoy to engage with both external and internal communities in their decision-making processes.<sup>66</sup> Indeed the inclusion of external organisations – particularly academic ones – is we believe vital. We welcome the recent decision of the MoD’s strategy unit to post on King’s College London *Kings of War* blog<sup>67</sup> – inviting comments and views on future strategic threats. The quality, range and number of replies they received were indicative of the huge pool of talent that the MoD can tap into. We also note that the US publishes many of its military students’ thesis and staff papers on line, making them freely available to the general public and, more particularly, to each other for reference, comment and debate. The UK does not share Defence Research Papers, and key journals such as the *British Army Review* do not even have an online intranet presence, let alone an external site.

In his 2009 lecture to the Royal United Services Institution the Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Jock Stirrup commented that: “*we have lost an institutional capacity for and culture of strategic thought*”.<sup>68</sup> We contend that expanding the UK Armed Forces educational and learning programme, which in many instances does not need large scale capital investment but instead a shedding of the shackles of process management and ‘*conventional wisdom*’, will contribute to this significantly.

### **Professionalisation**

We believe we have demonstrated that whilst the job of the IO or Media Operations Officer is extremely hard – it is also, potentially, one of the most important appointments to any battle group or staff. That it should be routinely filled by an augmentee with little or no experience is ridiculous. We propose that IO, PsyOps and Media Ops are professionalised under the banner of a Strategic Communication organisation – one that embraces the current departments of TIO<sup>69</sup> and DMC<sup>70</sup> and which reaches across government. Intrinsic to this restructuring should be recognition that in complex societies the MoD may well not hold all the answers and outside assistance will need to

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be sought. For example, despite all of 52 Brigade's research and learning the various ideas presented above still did not properly prepare the Brigade for its deployment because the motivators and opinions of the population were still not clearly and scientifically understood. Although the MoD and OGDs have commissioned countless surveys and opinions polls these did not identify the real psychological drivers and influence levers for the very diverse nature of Afghan society. Indeed their findings were often counter-productive. Only in late 2009 has this seminal requirement been properly funded and undertaken, and by the US and we note the work of the UK based Behavioural Dynamics Institute with the US DoD and the State Department in its proven Target Audience Analysis programme. But we also note the use of many other contractors – some good, some considerably less so – in units, commands and departments – invariably without any correlation to each other and often providing conflicting advice. Professionalisation will facilitate proper understanding and scrutiny of contractor support. Simultaneously we question the efficacy of continuing to combine hard power targeting with soft power information deployment under the same organisation. We note that the creation of any new manning structure is often fraught with difficulty – the Royal Navy has resisted for many years the creation of a bespoke intelligence specialisation – the only one of the three Services not to be so equipped – despite seemingly compelling evidence of its need. We envisage resistance to a broader information specialisation would be just as strong, however we also note that with some small degree of innovation it might be achieved without any cost. Military officers typically change their appointments (postings) every 2-3 years. At least once on every rank and often more they move away from their core specialisation for a broadening appointment. We believe that with clever manning processes it should be possible to grow selected individuals on a twin career ladder, where the broadening appointment is replaced by information related one. The model for this already exists with Royal Navy Barristers who are mainly Logistics Officers by training but who focus their out of specialisation time on legal appointments. This process simultaneously grows lawyers and logisticians, providing them experience training and increasing seniority and allows them to hold down positions of great responsibility in either domain. Even with professionalisation, and external support, we recognise that in the field Commanders often have to make difficult and time critical decisions. We note the US use of deployed Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) – deployed psychologists and anthropologists – able to advise the command on cultural and human behavioural issues. The UK has no such model, and we would like to see urgent attention paid to its development and deployment. We note that HTTs have not been without controversy, and we understand many of the objections that have been raised.<sup>71</sup> However, we firmly believe that any process that reduces the need for hard kinetic power is worthy of trial. It cannot be appropriate that



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individual commanders have to engage in detailed, self-initiated, self-study – there must be the same level of external support as there is for any other aspect of conflict.

### Research

We are firmly convinced that only through research will the UK military be prepared for the future. At the macro level, the MoD's in-house research capacity was almost eliminated by the privatisation of DERA<sup>72</sup> to QinetiQ in 2001. Although detailed discussion of this point is beyond the remit of this paper, we cannot help but note that the change occurred at the exact same time that the nature and complexity of the problems the UK military will face, and the need for equipment to meet those challenges, changed for ever. At the micro-level we are concerned that the fundamental understanding of the need for the Defence Academy may be to provide selection courses for promotion rather than embracing new concepts, innovating and researching. We note that UK staff courses are, at their core, '*taught*' courses, whilst US staff courses are significantly more research-based – the sheer volume of highly original research undertaken and published by US students is indicative of this, so too the huge number of US military officers that gain PhDs. We note that the Defence budget at one time funded seven research chairs in UK universities; there are none today. Although the UK Defence Community nominally has access to a large number of King's College Academics based at the Defence Academy we also note that the Academy has no ability or remit to direct their research. We note the 2009 dissolution of the Defence Academy's Advanced Research Group – as a cost saving measure – which in 2006 was the **only** organisation across the MoD able to support 52 Brigade's operational design. Research, we believe, needs a champion and in the US we see just such a vehicle: the establishment of the US Centre for Complex Operations (CCO) at the National Defence University (roughly analogous to the UK's Defence Academy) networks together civilian and military educators, trainers and lesson's learned practitioners dedicated to preparing for complex operations including stability operations, COIN and irregular warfare. We believe that a similar capability is urgently required here in the UK. This is not to say that we see all the answers lie in the US; the UK has its own rich tradition of innovation – the Political Warfare Executive and Special Operations Executive provide good historical examples. Australia too has been particularly proactive in its development of complexity understanding.<sup>73</sup> However the US, with its vast budgets, seems increasingly willing to speculate and then invest in research. The nature of the '*special relationship*' should allow us to quickly learn rather than begin a long and costly, development process of our own.

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### Conclusion

Our paper accepts, at its very heart, the Clausewitzian premise that conflict is a clash of wills. We have sought to advance the idea that alongside kinetic power there is potentially a more behaviourist approach which, we believe, can affect the enemy's will and be as, or arguably more, effective than kinetic power in future conflict. The success of 52 Brigade in recapturing the town of Musa Qala – a key Taliban stronghold – indicates that this does not have to be at the expense of military effectiveness. We believe there to be multiple benefits to such an approach. Although we cannot prove causality (the absence of figures for enemy and civilian deaths preventing more granular analysis) there appears a strong correlation between the nature of a deploying Commander's operational design and its effect upon both UK and wider coalition casualty figures in Afghanistan:

<b>Deployment Bde</b>	<b>Size of deployment in personnel</b>	<b>UK Deaths during deployment</b>	<b>% UK deaths to size of deployment</b>	<b>% Coalition deaths to size of deployment</b>
16 Air Asslt	4500	33	0.73	2.8
3 Cdo	5200	13	0.25	1.5
12 Mech	6500	28	0.43	2.6
52 Bde	7750	13	0.16	0.8
16 Air Asslt	8530	26	0.30	2.49
3 Cdo	8300	32	0.38	1.75

Intuitively this seems obvious, however the absence of contemporary research and the capacity to undertake it means we cannot prove this. In order to do so there needs to be proper research and education and our view is that this does not currently exist nor, if current trends prevail, will it do so. What we are advocating in this paper cannot be realised within the current structure of the MoD which has to adopt an adaptive capacity. How this may be achieved is outside the scope of this paper but it is self-evident that you cannot develop individual capabilities without having corporate structures to support them. As the Commanding General of US Training and Doctrine, General Martin Dempsey, recently opined, that Military Power, in the future, will be measured in terms of the '*Ability to Adapt*'.<sup>74</sup> We regard it as essential that the capacity to do so is now given serious attention by the MoD if we are to meet CDS' idea of becoming '*nurturers*' of strategic thinking rather than '*hunter gatherers*'.<sup>75</sup>

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### Notes

1. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory & Practice*, Prager, 2006, p 66
2. The power or ability to affect someone's beliefs or actions.
3. Ministry of Defence.
4. [http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national\\_security\\_strategy.aspx](http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_security_strategy.aspx)
5. Hybrid Warfare is defined by the MoD as the exploitation of all modes of war, simultaneously using advanced conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and disruptive criminality to destabilise an existing order.
6. 'First, it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility. Second, it carries an extreme impact. Third, in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable.' N Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*, Penguin, 2008.
7. The following examples refer:
  - a. The resignation letter of Matthew P Hoh, Senior US Civil Representative to Zabol Province, Afghanistan dated 10/9/09.
  - b. *End State Afghanistan* by Jo Colemont. Royal Institute for International Relations March 2009.
  - c. *The Levin Plan : A wrong approach in Afghanistan*, Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Sept 2009.
  - d. *End State Afghanistan : How the US Will Win or Lose the War*, Anthony Cordesman, CSIS Sept 2009.
  - e. Afghanistan: The Growing Threat of Failure. *The Economist* 22 Aug 09.
8. David J Lonsdale, *The Nature of War in the Information Age Clausewitzian Future*, Frank Cass, 2004, p 1.
9. Non Governmental Organisations.
10. Defined by its originator, Professor Joseph Nye, as: 'the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcomes one wants'.
11. Counter Insurgency.
12. David Kilcullen, *Countering the Terrorist Mentality: New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict*.
13. David Galula, *Pacification in Algeria 1956 – 1958*, referring to the critical importance in a counterinsurgency of an effective information operations campaign:
14. ICRC : The International Committee of the Red Cross.
15. Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, *Strategic Political Communication: Rethinking Social Influence, Persuasion and Propaganda*, Rowman & Littlefield, 28 Oct 2003.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Examples are plentiful. The US failure to act against the genocide in Rwanda is widely seen by many sources to have been a direct result of the very public loss of US servicemen in Somalia. Another example is the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. US Secretary of State James Baker famously declared that "we have no dog in the fight". The US however was to subsequently become the 'biggest dog' in the fight when public opinion called for greater US intervention.

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18. <http://entertainment.timesonline.co.uk/tol/artsandentertainment/books/bookextracts/article6879258.ece>
19. Defined by the UK MoD as: '*Commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation*'.
20. A concept of living or philosophy for the Pashtun people. It is regarded as both an honour code and a non-written law for the people.
21. The authors note the work of Professor Herb Simon and his work on bounded rationality. Essentially Simon posited that an individual's actions are driven by a desire to rationalise and make logical decisions but recognises that individuals do not have the capacity to understand everything and that decision making is often limited by time. Thus decisions may not be fully thought through and can be conceived as rational only within limits. Such determinations are normally made with the benefit of hindsight. Taken from Simon H, *Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting*, (Wiley Press, 1957).
22. Dan Ariely, *Predictably Irrational*, Harper-Collins, 2008; See also: R Steten & G Gigerenzer *Bounded Rationality, the Adaptive Toolbox*, MIT Press 2002.
23. International Security & Assistance Force.
24. An example of the contemporary use of reflexive control is discussed in Charles Blandy's paper: '*Provocation, Deception, Entrapment: The Russo-Georgian Five Day War*', UK Defence Academy, March 2009.
25. '*War amongst the people*' is the term coined by General Sir Rupert Smith (UK), former deputy commander of NATO (DSACEUR). The UK Defence Academy's Senior Fellow, Chris Donnelly, refers to it as '*hot peace*'.
26. See Steve Tatham, Tactical Strategic Communication! *British Army Review*, Summer 2009
27. During discussions 52 received the impression that the 'T' in DTIO meant they were preoccupied with kinetic activity, rules of engagement and similar issues. It has to be asked whether, given the manner in which counterinsurgency activity has evolved, having information operations dominated by these considerations is still appropriate.
28. Unpublished paper: Dr Dave Sloggett, *Influence Operations: A Nexus of Sociological, Anthropological, Psychological and Cultural Perspectives*.
29. The Iraq experience is covered in some detail in the author's publication, *Losing Arab Hearts & Minds: The Coalition, Al-Jazeera & Muslim Public Opinion*, Hurst & Co, 2006, p130.
30. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance.
31. Some of the organisational architecture included the creation of Non-Kinetic effects Teams at the Company level, and Military Stabilisation Teams at the Task Force and Battle Group level. Within the Task Force HQ it included formal Influence Steering and Coordination groups some of which met three or four times a day.
32. David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Theory and Practice 2007*, available at <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com>
33. The authors are grateful for Brigadier General HR McMaster's observation on this point.

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34. Association of the US Army 2009 Chapter Presidents' Dinner, 4 Oct 09, Renaissance Hotel, Washington DC see: <http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/10/04/28312-gen-martin-dempsey-delivers-keynote-during-the-ausa-chapter-presidents-dinner/>
35. Dan Gardner. *Risk*, Page 46.
36. Mathew Taylor. *Left Brain, Right Brain: Human nature and political values*. Talk at RSA, 29 Oct 2009.
37. Tom Chatfield, The Bestselling Persuaders, *Prospect*, Nov 2009. .
38. Kahneman was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2002 for his pioneering work integrating insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty. Interestingly, Kahneman won the Economics prize even though he had never attended a single class on economics.
39. Tversky died in 1996. Kahneman is clear that had he lived the award would have been shared between the two.
40. If the ball cost 10p the bat would have to cost £1.10 in order to cost £1 more.
41. Still without an agreed definition, the term '*Strategic Communication*' is gaining increasing use as a mechanism for bounding information provision, ensuring consistency of message across domains and from different sources. Whilst we argue that this is a highly desirable function we believe that Strategic Communication should have a more seminal role than just an administrative function – that recognition and harnessing of informational effect should be a centre piece of information age strategy.
42. Steven D Levitt and Stephen J Dubner *SuperFreakonomics: Global Cooling, Patriotic Prostitutes, and Why Suicide Bombers Should Buy Life Insurance*, William Morrow Publishing, 2009.
43. Most subjects preferred to save one-third of the people for certain (Programme A), rather than taking a gamble to save everyone (Programme B). But change the framing and the choice changed, too: most subjects would accept a two-thirds risk of killing everyone (Programme D) rather than be certain that two-thirds of victims would die (programme C). This preference reversal is clearly irrational because nothing about the costs and benefits of the two treatments changed, but people's choices did.
44. C Sunstein & R Thaler, *Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and Happiness*, Penguin, 2009.
45. Claire Lockhart and Ashraf Ghani, *Fixing Failed States*.
46. The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy, education and standards of living for countries worldwide.
47. And it is recognised by the authors that Collier's work has by no means been universally accepted.
48. It has a resource – oil; it is not landlocked; conflict is diminishing and a political settlement, albeit nascent, is visible. It clearly has some way to go but it could yet succeed.
49. US War Dept, 1945. Taken from *Perspectives on Military Learning*.
50. We understand that this distinction is perhaps not doctrinally correct, but it is how the command articulated the difference in headquarters of 52 Brigade. Furthermore we would not pretend that we have developed the concept of influence in a strict academic

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sense – neither of the authors professes so to be but we are interested in searching for applications of academic research in real operational situations.

51. This point is also made in Brigadier General H R McMaster's draft paper, *Centralization vs. Decentralization: Preparing For and Practising Mission Command in Counterinsurgency Operations*.

52. N DeAtkine, *Soldier Scholar or Cocktail Commando?* See: <http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/ADIssues/amdipl10/atkine.html>

53. Arreguin-Tofts, I: *How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, Harvard Press.

54. <http://spreadartnotes2.blogspot.com/2009/01/learn-unlearn-re-learn.html>

55. Op Entirety, issued by the then Commander in Chief UK Land Forces, General Sir David Richards, is the strategic direction to move the British Army to a campaign footing. The document states that the Army should: *'be resourced, structured and prepared – conceptually, morally and physically – for success in Afghanistan... through sustaining and improving Afghan campaign capability'*. On 24 June 2009, an Army Briefing Note was issued which provided the army's personnel with greater detail on what Op Entirety meant: *'The measures involve short-term (1-5 years) reversible, re-rolling, re-equipping, restructuring and training changes'*.

56. This in itself is a complex issue. When can we determine that an LI is right? Conventional wisdom sees LIs being communicated comparatively quickly after combat but we contend that in some instances it may take extended periods of time to make a proper determination.

57. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk\\_politics/8403950.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/8403950.stm)

58. In many respects the MoD does have a history for such innovation. One of the most interesting examples is the Falkland's Conflict in 1982. The loss of the Type 42 Destroyer HMS *Sheffield* on 4 May 1982 vividly demonstrated the absence of an Airborne Early Warning capability. The speed with which the existing Nimrod aircraft-mounted *'Searchwater'* radar was installed in two *Sea King* helicopters, and deployed, was an example of what can be achieved when driven by necessity. Although the two aircraft arrived in theatre just as the conflict ended the process led to full-scale production and six aircraft were subsequently converted.

59. Lt Gen William B Caldwell IV, *Changing the Organisational Culture*, Jan 2008, available at <http://www.smallwarsjournal.com>

60. S P Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation & the Modern Military*, 1991.

61. J Ramo, *The Age of the Unthinkable*, Hachette Book Group, 2009.

62. Interview with Ramo available to download at: <http://www.hachettebookgroup.com/features/unthinkable/index.html>

63. A quote from former US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld is insightful: *"We know we're killing a lot, capturing a lot, collecting arms... We just don't know yet whether that's the same as winning"*.

64. Donald Rumsfeld commented in February 2002 that *"There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we now know we don't know. But there are also unknown unknowns. These are things we do not know we don't know"*. Although widely

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criticised at the time both authors subscribe the idea that in the future there are highly likely to be problems and complexities with which we have no advance comprehension.

65. *Care to write Army Doctrine? With ID, Log On* by Noam Cohen, *The New York Times*, 13 August 2009 <http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/whyiserve/archive/2009/07/01/want-to-change-army-doctrine-do-something.aspx>

66. For example see : <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/Blog.php>

67. <http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/09/24/uk-strategy-and-defence-policy-where-should-it-go-have-our-say/>

68. CDS lecture to RUSI 3 December 2009. Available to download at: <http://www.rusi.org/cdslectures>

69. Targeting and Information Operations, formerly DTIO.

70. Directorate of Media & Communications, formerly DGMC.

71. See *The Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual* by The Network of Concerned Anthropologists, Prickly Paradigm Press, 2009.

72. Defence Evaluation and Research Agency.

73. See: <http://www.dodccrp.org/events/12thICCRTS/CD/html/presentations/198.pdf>

74. Association of the US Army 2009 Chapter Presidents' Dinner, 4 Oct 09, Renaissance Hotel, Washington DC see: <http://www.army.mil/-news/2009/10/04/28312-gen-martin-dempsey-delivers-keynote-during-the-ausa-chapter-presidents-dinner/>.

75. 2009 lecture to the Royal United Services Institution by Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup.

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