

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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03/19/2010

██████████, date of birth ██████████, was interviewed in a hotel room in ██████████. After being advised of the identity of the interviewing agents and the nature of the interview, he voluntarily provided the following information:

██████████ was a career Iraqi Intelligence Service officer with several overseas station assignments to include the United Kingdom, the United States and India. ██████████ progressed through the ranks of the IIS, starting as an Intelligence Officer deployed overseas. ██████████ later became a General Director within the IIS. ██████████ career encompassed approximately twenty years with the IIS.

██████████ explained that the IIS was an intelligence unit attached to the Office of the Presidency.

During the interview, ██████████ was shown several scanned copies of IRAQI INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (IIS) documents. ██████████ provided the following information:

Document 1.1-██████████ stated this document was typical of the type used by the IIS. ██████████ recognized the signature of Isam Khidthier aka Kithier (Director of Opposition Section). ██████████ explained that D-4 was the department responsible for the areas of Europe, South Asia, New Zealand and the U.S. Department D-5 was responsible for Opposition groups. ██████████ explained that the Opposition Section was traditionally a benign bureaucratic entity that did not possess much power. Before 1999 D-5 was known as D-12 and was part of the M-4, Foreign Secret Service. Later the Opposition Section was enhanced as Saddam Hussein became more fearful of opposition groups trying to overthrow him. In 1993 or 1994 D-12 was renamed D-4 and Isam Khidthier was designated D-4 Director. ██████████ knew KHIDTHIER personally and described him as a ruthless killer. ██████████ relayed a story, that ██████████ had heard, indicating KHIDTHIER was responsible for killing two hundred Iraqis on suspicion of belonging to opposition groups.

Document 1.2-██████████ stated this document was typical of the type used by the IIS. ██████████ recognized the handwriting of JABAR ABID HAMZAH from personal experience. ██████████ explained HAMZA was the Chief of Station in Vienna at one time, possibly 1990, and was sent to New York in 1994 as the Chief Of Station. HAMZA used the cover of Ambassador

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SA Thomas Lee Rankin  
SA Derick Smith

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IIS Officers. In order to appear to be a true diplomat, many IIS officers would carry out duties that a diplomat would undertake. HAMZA would often write his correspondents to the IIS Director on notebook paper and send the messages to Baghdad via Diplomatic pouch. This method would emphasize the importance, because it was personally written by HAMZA, and protected the sensitivity by sending it through Diplomatic channels. ██████████ would personally review correspondents sent via Diplomatic pouches and was familiar with HAMZA. ██████████ and HAMZA attended the same college and had worked together for approximately 20 years.

Document 1.21-██████████ stated this document was typical of the type used by the IIS. ██████████ explained this document was sent to Saddam Hussein's Office and would have likely been read by HUSSEIN's close advisors. ██████████ recognized the signature on the document was that of the Head of the IIS. ██████████ could not comment on whether or not HUSSEIN himself saw this particular letter. ██████████ explained that many IIS Directors often sought advise from the Office of the Presidency, mainly out of fear of acting without guidance. ██████████ also commented that any information about opposition groups was important to Saddam, especially information pertaining to Kurdish opposition groups.

Document 1.22-██████████ stated this document was typical of the type used by the IIS. ██████████ explained some documents were required to be handwritten due to their sensitivity. Saddam HUSSEIN was skeptical of computers or the dictation of reports. This was because those typing the reports, or computers themselves, could be compromised by foreign governments.

Document 1.40-██████████ stated this document was typical of the type used by the IIS. ██████████ explained that the IIS would often take advantage of opportunities to make contact with foreigners traveling to Iraq from other countries, especially the U.S. This document was from Baghdad to New York, NY. and it was instructing the Iraqi Mission to the United Nations (IMUN) to obtain information that will help recruit the individuals as sources.

Document 1.45-██████████ stated this document was typical of the type used by the IIS. This document was an internal memo, likely written after 1999, that lists HAMAMA as "Station's Source". ██████████ explained that according to the document, HAMAMA was a source that was accompanying the others. He commented that the document was not written on paper with the official IIS letterhead and logos because it was an internal memorandum. Internal memorandums circulating within the IIS did not have the IIS letterhead. ██████████ also commented that the D-5 Director ABDEL SALAM KHALIL MAHMU signed this document and likely never anticipated this document from being viewed by anyone outside the IIS. That is why the author listed HAMAMA's true name and revealed the fact that HAMAMA was a source.

Document-1.47-██████████ stated this document was typical of the type used by the IIS. He commented this particular document was a standardized form that he was familiar with using himself to account for expenses. Often these forms and receipts were sent to Baghdad, Iraq to justify expenses to management. ██████████ explained that he was aware that some Chief of Stations were not strict about requiring documentation for

Source payments and IIS employees were able to embezzle money from the Iraqi government. One way to embezzle money was by using fictitious source payment receipts and pocket the money. [redacted] commented that this particular source payment receipt appeared to be legitimate because it was attached to supporting documentation. The receipt was dated 01/23/2001 and signed by Dr. Jassam SHEIK, who was the COS after JABBAR HAMZA.

Document 1.52- [redacted] stated this document was typical of the type used by the IIS. [redacted] described it as a "Station Budget" list that documented source payments. [redacted] stated these documents usually had carbon copies. [redacted] commented that this budget lists a payment to 6129 on 01/23/2001 for "help". [redacted] also recognized HAMED AL-JUMELY's signature at the bottom of the ledger. [redacted] stated he personally knew HAMED MAMOOD MOHAMMED AL-JUMELY. [redacted] stated AL-JUMELY was an Intelligence Officer that worked in Washington, D.C. from 1996 through 1999. AL-JUMELY was from Mosul.

Document 1.53- [redacted] stated this document was typical of the type used by the IIS. [redacted] commented this was a list from Baghdad Headquarters listing counterespionage sources, their areas of reporting and an assessment of the information provided. [redacted] recognized several of the names on the lists as sources who [redacted] personally knew and had seen their reporting to the IIS.