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United States

vs.

Frank D. Wuterich  
SSgt, USMC  
XXX XX 3221  
HqBn, 1stMarDiv  
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CBS 60 Minutes  
Interview Outtakes

The following transcript is of the outtakes from the CBS 60  
Minutes interview of SSgt Wuterich.

**PERSONS PRESENT**

INTERVIEWER: Mr. Scott Pelley

INTERVIEWEE: SSgt Frank D. Wuterich

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[The following is Tape 1a, an outtake of the 60 Minutes interview with Mr. Scott Pelley and Staff Sergeant Wuterich.]

Q. Give me a little sense of you. Where are you from?

A. I grew up on the East Coast. I'm from Connecticut. I grew up there my whole childhood until I was 18. And then as soon as -- when I turned 17, I got a call from the recruiter. And I went down to the office and talked to him for a while, looked at some videos, and went home and talked to my parents. The recruiter came with me and I signed up that day.

Q. Why did you join the Marine Corps?

A. A couple of reasons. One, I wasn't ready to go into college at that point. I wasn't entirely sure what I wanted to do with my life, and I thought it was a great opportunity to do something.

Q. Well, you might have joined the Army or the Navy. Why the Marines?

A. Well, the Marine Corps, you know -- I had a neighbor, actually, he was a Marine and, you know, I kind of looked up to him. And you know I knew the Marines were the most prestigious, so I wanted to go with the best.

Q. When you joined the Corps, was it what you expected it to be?

A. Not entirely. You know I thought it might be a little bit harder. Before I joined, you know I was in pretty good shape. And I went to boot camp and, as far as the physical aspect of it, pretty easy, pretty simple.

Q. What have you done in the Marines?

A. Well, I started off -- well, I went with 3/11, which is infantry, and went to Parris Island, South Carolina; from there, I went to School of Infantry in North Carolina, Camp Geiger, and got orders cut to Hawaii at that point; so spent four years in Hawaii. Now, while I was in Hawaii, I did a couple of deployments: went to Guam twice; went to Okinawa twice. From Okinawa, I went to Korea, Hokkaido -- the northern island of Japan -- mainland Japan.

Q. What was your job all that time?  
A. An infantryman, a rifleman. You know I started off just kind of the bottom of the barrel, the PFC, doing what my squad leader told me to do. And you know as I kind of grew up in the Marine Corps, I -- you know I got -- my billet went higher and I started going to different schools and stuff. So eventually became squad leader and picked up sergeant within those about three and a half years I was in Hawaii.

Q. You have been in the Marines how long?  
A. Right now, it's about eight and a half years.

Q. So, the war in Afghanistan begins, followed by the war in Iraq. What are you doing all that time?  
A. Well in 2002, I reenlisted. That was the first time I reenlisted. It was December of 2002, and I got orders to School of Infantry to be an instructor over there at Camp Pendleton. So that's a non-deployable unit. You can't be deployed from there. So that was about a year before the war actually started, and I was instructing Marines who were going over to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Q. You stayed in that unit until when?  
A. At SOI?

Q. Yes.  
A. At SOI, I stayed there for three -- it was a three year, so it was May 2002 until May of 2005.

Q. 2005?  
A. Right.

Q. Now, because you were an instructor in the School of Infantry, you weren't going to go to the war?  
A. Correct.

Q. How did you end up shipping out to Iraq?  
A. Well, when I reenlisted, I reenlisted for four years, seven months to make it a full reenlistment. So after three years, they kind of kick you out of the School of Infantry, if you will. It's a B billet now, so after three years you have to go back to the fleet. And I still had a year left on my contract, so they initially sent me to 1/4.

And once I got there, they were going on deployment, but it was going to be later on, I think, or early that next year. And I didn't have enough time to deploy with them, so they asked me if I wanted to reenlist or extend to go on deployment with them. I told them no, you know, I didn't want to. Because at that point, I kind of knew I wanted to get out for different reasons, but -- so from there, they sent me to 3/1, who was going to Iraq.

Q. How did you get transferred to 3/1? Was that something that the Marines decided they wanted to do with you or is that something you decided you wanted to do?

A. Well, it was kind of -- I had a choice of either going on -- I think they were going on a MEU or a WestPac in 1/4. So I could have -- you know, I could have stayed with them; you know, gotten out a couple of months later than my original EAS; or they gave me the choice to go to 3/1, who was deploying to Iraq.

Q. The fact is you made that choice.

A. Correct.

Q. You didn't have to go.

A. Correct.

Q. Why did you want to go to Iraq? You had a free ticket. You did not have to go.

A. That's -- you know I guess you can look at it that way. At that point, I had been in the Marines for a little while. Really, I hadn't seen combat at all, hadn't done anything what they call real-world. So I didn't want to get out of the Marines without that experience, especially when I knew that there was an opportunity for me to do that.

So you know it was just a choice of mine that I wanted to do. I wouldn't have felt, I guess, complete as a Marine, you know? I knew I was getting out, but I didn't want to get out without having that experience knowing that I could have had that experience.

Q. So you transferred to a unit that you knew was going to Iraq?

A. Correct.

Q. Just so you could be there?

A. Correct.

Q. Why did you want to go so much? Help me understand that.

A. You know I talked to a lot of buddies that had been there, people that I had worked with that came back from Iraq and all this other stuff. And you know I kind of told them, you know, I would like to go there just, you know I want to be a part of this war, you know? I believe in what we were fighting for. And they kind of looked at me and said, no, you don't want to go over there. It's a mess, this sort of thing.

But it was more personal reasons for me. You know I just -- I felt like it was something that I had to do. I was just compelled to do that.

Q. You say it was personal reasons. I mean help me understand that. Help me get all the way there, I mean.

A. As far as personal reasons, all I really mean is you know like I said earlier like within myself I wouldn't have felt -- I would have kind of felt cheated to myself and probably would have regretted getting out of the Marine Corps knowing that I had an opportunity to go to serve my country and do my job in war and not take that opportunity and kind of shy away from it. It wasn't -- you know it's kind of something that I kind of look -- well, I don't want to say look down upon. But I wouldn't expect other Marines to do that. I think all Marines in my position would have done the same thing. They wouldn't have said, no, I don't want to go and just not gone.

Q. What did you tell your wife when you transferred in a unit that was going and you didn't have to?

A. Well, you know I called her when I went to 1/4 and told her, you know, my choices. She didn't want to go -- she didn't want me to go to Iraq, you know? You know I had two kids and her, and you know I was planning on getting out. She didn't want to see me go to Iraq, something happen, and then, you know, either not being able to get out or getting out in the worst condition and all that. So she wasn't the happiest with my decision, but you know

I kind of explained to her why. And you know she accepted it and eventually supported me.

Q. Come on. You said she wasn't the happiest.

A. Correct, right. You know I wouldn't say she was mad to the point where she was screaming and yelling at me, but I think she was probably more upset and kind of like, you know, why are you doing this? Why? You know that sort of thing.

Q. And you told her?

A. I told her, you know, that this is an opportunity -- you know this is my opportunity to go over there. You know I haven't done anything with my training or done anything real-life. And you know I want to go there.

Q. And it was in your mind that this was really going to be the last thing that you would do in the Marine Corps?

A. Exactly.

Q. You would go to war, you would do a tour, and then you'd be out?

A. Come back. Correct. That's right.

You know it was a decision -- even when I reenlisted the first time, you know some of the reasons I reenlisted were, you know, I wanted my wife to finish her degree. I wanted to save some money for when we got out. But you know I kind of always knew that I wasn't going to make the Marine Corps a career. But I wanted to do that, you know, one last thing just to prepare me for getting out.

Q. Tell me how you got your squad.

A. As soon as I checked into 3/1, I got sent to a company, eventually got sent to a platoon. And you know I picked up a squad pretty much immediately. And that was, you know, the choice of the platoon commander of the platoon that I was in at that point.

Q. First squad, Kilo Company?

A. First squad, Kilo Company, correct.

Q. Tell me about those guys.

A. Amazing group of guys. When -- you know when I first checked in, some of them were at school and doing other

things, so I didn't get to meet all of them initially. But you know even the guys that I had, you know, the guys that were already there had been to Iraq. And I actually, you know, looked up to them a lot; and I expected a lot from them as well, as far as you know, I knew they had combat experience. And I knew I was going to learn a lot from them.

- Q. You were the senior man in the squad, but the men you were leading had a lot more experience than you did?
- A. Exactly, right, right. You know when I was in the fleet back in Hawaii and then I came back to 3/1, it was like a whole new world to me. It was almost like starting over with all, you know, the new things that they had, the new radios, the new weapons, and all that stuff, which I never used, or even saw, back when I was in the fleet. So you know it was almost like starting over. I was going there and learning just as much as any new Marine would come to a unit and learn.
- Q. Twelve men in your squad?
- A. Twelve men -- yeah, twelve men in my squad.
- Q. How many had been in combat?
- A. In the end, seven. There were seven that had been in combat.
- Q. And what had they done?
- A. There were two of them that had been to combat twice previous, so this last deployment was their third deployment. And the other ones -- the other five of them were in Fallujah in 2004.
- Q. And Fallujah was some of the toughest fighting -- the toughest close-quarter fighting since Vietnam?
- A. Correct, that's -- yes.
- Q. These guys had been in a place called Hell House?
- A. That is correct. And I have -- you know I heard many stories about it and you know it's -- yeah, some of them good stories and some of them not so good.

Q. Tell me what those men had gone through based on what you heard?

A. You know the guys in my squad, you know, they were kind of junior. I also talked to some of the senior guys that weren't in my squad, but it was house-to-house fighting. You know they first started deployment in, I think, a place called Chahabi [ph] which was, you know, kind of calm, not too bad. And they got, you know, sent to Fallujah doing that push. And it was just constant, daily firefights, house-to-house fighting, you know, a whole bunch of stuff.

Q. These were hardened Marines?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. Combat hardened?

A. Correct. In my mind.

Q. Can you give me a sense, for the folks at home who haven't been in the Corps, what sort of bond there is among the Marines, especially the Marines who have fought together?

A. Especially with Marines that have fought together -- now, initially, any bond between Marines is going to be big, especially -- I feel -- in an infantry field because they're doing everything together. But you know being in combat, you know it puts them that much closer. They see, you know, their friends becoming casualties or whatever the case may be. They're having to save each other's lives, you know, on a daily basis, so the bond is even greater.

Q. Sort of a brotherhood?

A. Oh, absolutely.

Q. Do anything for each other?

A. They would.

Q. Tell me about Terrazas?

A. Terrazas, you know when I first got to the platoon, he was one of the men that some of the other Marines had come to me and said hey, this guy -- he should be a team leader. He's not for various reasons. But you know he was the mule of the squad. He could carry his weight times five and very respectful, listened to what you had



to say. You know he was there for you, never complained, never did any of that. And he was actually -- during the deployment -- once we got back, I was going to make him one of my team leaders.

Q. Why? What did he have that the other men didn't?

A. Well, he had -- like I said, he never gave up. He was one of those guys that never gave up, you know? I mean he was a hefty guy, you know? And like I said, he carried his weight, you know, times five. And he was always there. He always did what you said, you know, always willing to do whatever had to be done without any complaints or anything like that.

Q. What sort of personality did he have?

A. He was I guess, you know, jovial most of the time, if you will. He was a happy guy. You know he had a good attitude towards what he was doing.

Q. And he was one of the most combat experienced men that you had in the squad?

A. He was one of the Marines that -- yes, that I did have.

Q. He had been in Fallujah?

A. Yes, he did -- yes, he was.

Q. I'm going to go through the names of the other guys in the squad, and I want you to just give me sort of a snapshot of personality and what you thought of them and what kind of guy they were.

A. Okay.

Q. Tell me about Salinas.

A. Salinas, he was my right hand man. He was there for me just as much as I was there for him. You know I expected a lot from him and he came through every single time for me. You know he was one of the guys that I was confident if anything happened to me during that deployment, he could very easily just come up and take the place of me and, you know, probably do better than me. He was a good guy.

Q. Rodriguez?

A. Rodriguez, he was at times, you know, the clown of the squad. He always had something, you know, smart or witty

to say, but one of those guys that would do whatever you told them. And, you know, he was always there. You knew with Rodriguez that he had your back no matter what.

Q. Sharratt?

A. Sharratt.

Q. Let me ask the question again because I knew I was going to mispronounce the word.

Do it for me again?

A. Sharratt.

Q. Sharratt, okay.

Sharratt?

A. Sharratt, he was another kind of clown in the platoon, very smart guy, very intelligent. He knew -- he carried the squad automatic weapon for most of the deployment and, you know, he knew that weapon inside and out. Lots of times, guys would -- or Marines would complain about having to carry the weapon. It's a little heavier than some of the other things. Not a complaint from him. He loved that weapon.

And he would -- you know he was always that guy that would do kind of things that other Marines might not want to, like I remember we were patrolling down the Euphrates looking for caches, that sort of thing. There was this little, like, rowboat or dinghy out on the Euphrates, which was kind of unusual. But we couldn't see inside it. We didn't know, you know, if they were trying to smuggle things across or whatever. So Sharratt was the one that got in the water, you know knee-deep, thigh-deep, and just walked up to it and made sure there wasn't anything in there and came back.

Q. Mendoza?

A. Mendoza, he was one of the new Marines. A great Marine. You know there was sort of language barrier at times with him. He wasn't a citizen of the U.S., but a great Marine. He would always do what you said. You know again, no complaints. Quiet most of the time but he did what was expected at all times.

Q. Spanish was his first language?

A. I want to say he was from Venezuela.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So, yes.

Q. Not sure about that?

A. I'm not sure about that, yeah.

Q. Okay. But he was not a citizen of the United States. You understood it?

A. Correct.

Q. And had come from Central or South America or something like that?

A. Correct.

Q. Dela Cruz?

A. Dela Cruz, he was my second team leader, and he was kind of the enforcer in the squad. If, you know, somebody needed to kind of get their act together and move with urgency, he was the one to get it done for you. And he's also one of the Marines that had been to Iraq twice before. That was his third deployment, so you know I had full confidence in his combat ability and all that.

Q. Tatum?

A. Tatum, he was one of the older ones as far as lance corporals go. I think he was the oldest lance corporal in the platoon. He was 24, so he had a bit more maturity than some of the other ones, you know, almost sometimes like a father figure to some of the junior Marines. You know he was a good Marine, good Marine.

INT: Crossan --

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Hey, Scott.

INT: Yep.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Can you pick up on that just for a second?

INT: Yep.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: He's 24 and he is a father figure.

ACC: To some of the --

**Questions by the interviewer (continued):**

Q. Yeah, go. That's fine.

Let me just pick up on that, if I can, because it makes our editing a little easier.

So he's 24 years old?

A. Correct.

Q. And you think he's a father figure?

A. Well, he was a Marine that other Marines -- other junior Marines could look up to, you know, to kind of judge their maturity level or whatever the case may be.

Yeah, in my mind, I believe he was a little bit of a father figure.

Q. At the age of 24?

A. Right.

Q. For some of the younger Marines?

A. Well, yeah. I mean you know the junior Marines sometimes they're 17-, 18-years-old. You know he's in his mid-20s, so --

Q. He's the old man?

A. He is. And that's what they used to call him.

Q. Graviss?

A. Graviss.

Q. Graviss, thank you. Sorry, let me ask again.

Graviss?

A. Graviss, he was very smart, very intelligent, had a good head on his shoulders, and had a very even keel with his temperament. He was also another Marine that had been to Iraq twice before, you know. At times, he would also have something witty to say or something like that, but he got the job done. He was in my second team with Corporal Dela Cruz. He was a good Marine, real good. He

should have been a team leader; but because of some of the other Marines I had, you know he wasn't able to be that.

Q. You had a Navy corpsman with you named Whitt?

A. That day, we did.

He wasn't my original corpsman. My original -- the corpsman with our squad was Doc Hatch. Now, Doc Whitt was with us that day. He was normally third squad's corpsman. He came to us a little late in the game, right before we deployed. He knew his stuff. He had come from the hospital. You know he knew his stuff. He knew how to treat people.

Q. But you didn't know him well?

A. Not as well as I did Doc Hatch because I worked more closely with Doc Hatch.

Q. Why did the corpsmen get switched out on this patrol?

A. I don't remember. I'm not sure.

Q. Was --

A. It was either -- it wasn't completely unusual. Sometimes one of the other squads that was going out earlier might be short a corpsman. You know we always wanted a corpsman to go out with our squads. They might have been short a corpsman, so Doc Hatch would attach himself to that squad because Doc Whitt was out with, you know, second squad or something like that.

Q. So it's not unusual that the corpsmen would get switched out, mixed up, that sort of thing?

A. Not entirely. No. It happened from time to time.

Q. Crossan?

A. Crossan, my third team leader, he -- I think he had -- as far as the junior Marines went, I think he had the most schools under him. I remember before deployment he went to MOUT Instructor's Course, which is, you know, house-to-house fighting and how to be an instructor in that area.

Very smart, intelligent, quiet at times, but you know, another one with combat experience that you could count on.

Q. Crossan had been to school on house-to-house fighting?

A. Correct.

Q. He was sort of the squad expert?

A. Right. We relied on him a lot even before we deployed to give kind of classes to, you know, the Marines to how to clear houses properly and all that.

Q. What was his combat experience, if any?

A. Fallujah.

Q. He had been in Fallujah as well?

A. Correct.

Q. That's the toughest course in house-to-house combat you'll ever have?

A. I assume so, yes. Yes, absolutely.

Q. Guzman?

A. Guzman, he was one of the new Marines as well. He probably showed the most improvement, I think, throughout the deployment. He always started off kind of, you know, just taking in everything and learning everything that he could. Later on, you know, I could see a lot of potential in him as becoming a team leader.

Q. Tell me about Haditha. Paint that picture for me.

A. The actual city -- we got there a couple of months after we got to Iraq. You know, the intel reports and the stories that we heard about Haditha were pretty horrific. We were expecting to go into quite a dangerous place with the unit that was there before us.

Q. What were you hearing?

A. The unit that was there before us, 3/25, they got beat up pretty bad and lost a lot of men in Haditha and around the Haditha area.

Q. There was a company that was known as Lucky Lima that was in Haditha just before you?

A. Right.

and stuff. But for the most part, I don't think anyone was in charge.

Q. There was no mayor? There was no city government?

A. Not that I knew of, no.

Q. Police force?

A. No police force. The police force got wiped out. One of the things that happened -- now, with Haditha too, Marines had been in there and, you know, they left that place to go to other places. As soon as they leave, the insurgency would come in, kill the guys that helped out the Marines, the Marines would come back in, and they would leave again, same thing.

So the police force, you know a little bit before we got there, had gotten dragged to the soccer field in town and beheaded and killed. So there was no police force.

Q. So Haditha was in the hands of whom when you went in there?

A. More or less, the insurgents.

*[The footage concluded.]*

[END OF PAGE]

- Q. What happened to them?  
A. Well, you know from what I've seen and read and heard, a couple of incidences: You know the Amtrak driving down the road? IED pretty much takes out everyone in that Amtrak.
- Q. A Marine armored vehicle called an Amtrak hit by an IED killed 14 Marines?  
A. Correct. I believe so.
- Q. In one bombing?  
A. Correct.
- Q. Then what happened to them?  
A. They had an incident with six of their snipers that got ambushed by insurgents and, you know, some pretty horrific things happened to those snipers.
- Q. All six of them were killed?  
A. Correct. Eventually, yes.
- Q. Lima Company had 23 killed and 36 wounded and, at the time, it was the most casualties any company had suffered throughout the entire war?  
A. Correct.
- Q. All of that was in Haditha?  
A. Correct.
- Q. Just before you arrived?  
A. That's right.
- Q. So what did that tell you?  
A. That told me that we were going into, you know, a difficult, combat situation, scenario, place.
- Q. When you got to Haditha with your men -- when you got to Haditha with your Marines, who was in charge of the town?  
A. I would say no one. I think the insurgents took charge of that, but right before we got there, they got wind that we were coming through and either fled the town or started hiding out. And I think at that point there were a couple local sheiks that were in town, a little sects



[The following is Tape 2a, an outtake of the 60 Minutes interview with Mr. Scott Pelley and Staff Sergeant Wuterich.]

Q. I'm going to go back over a couple of things, Frank, that we've already talked about.

A. Okay.

Q. But I want to get a little bit more details. Let's just talk about the mi-zic [ph]. We hadn't talked about them before. It will seem very repetitious --

A. Okay.

Q. -- in the context of us sitting here talking together, but when we edit the video tape, it won't be.

A. Okay. Sure.

Q. Everybody settled?

[Affirmative response from the camera crew.]

Q. We don't usually have such a large studio audience for all these interviews.

[Response from one of the cameramen.]

Q. That's true. That's true. And again, let me go back and just tidy up two or three things.

A. Sure.

Q. We were talking about --

[Comment from camera crew.]

Q. Everybody really settled? Okay. We were talking about the squad.

A. Correct.

Q. And all of the personalities in the squad. You say they were an amazing group of guys. Why?

A. Because they brought with them, you know, a lot of combat experience. Seven of them had been to combat. Two of them had been to combat twice before. And the other guys that had been to combat once before were the guys that pushed through Fallujah, which, you know, I think

everyone kind of watched on the news and saw what a great job that they did.

Q. And that created a lot of respect among the Marines?

A. Absolutely

Q. If you'd been to Fallujah?

A. Absolutely.

Q. What does that mean? Help me understand it when the Marines have been through combat together, what kind of bond does that create? What was the bond within your squad?

A. It was pretty tight. You know, like I said, everyone had been to Fallujah together and I saw -- you know, going through the Marine Corps, you know, you see different bonds with -- there's always a bond with the Marines, but, you know, you could tell that these guys were a bit tighter with each other. And, you know, not to say that they were, you know, going out every weekend and, you know, partying together or whatever the case may be, but, you know, they definitely knew each other very well.

Q. Well, you had 12 men in a squad.

A. Right.

Q. In a combat patrol in an extremely hostile environment.

A. Right.

Q. These guys were looking out for each other's lives.

A. Absolutely. Yeah, absolutely.

Q. Give me a sense of what that feels like.

A. It's -- you know, it's hard to describe. It really is. You know, when you don't -- you never want anything bad to happen to your Marines. If something does bad happen to you -- or if something bad does happen to your Marines, you know, you're there to pick up the slack where they left off or, you know, get them out of the area and deal with whatever problem you need to.

Q. But you know that these guys are going to risk their lives for you.

A. Right.

Q. I mean, that's what it comes down to.

A. Correct.

Q. When you're in the firefight, you're not necessarily fighting for God and country, you're fighting for the Marine on your left and you're fighting for the Marine on your right.

A. Lot -- right. Correct. Lot -- you know, lots of times, that's what it comes down to. You know -- yup.

Q. I've heard the men describe each other as 'brothers of another mother.'

A. That was a description by one of Lance Corporal Terrazas' best friends, who was -- he was in a different squad, but they were pretty close together. And I think he described that at the memorial service we had in Iraq at the firm base.

Q. And you knew what that meant?

A. In a sense, yes. I think that was -- it's maybe kind of a street term that, you know, people use, but, yes, I did.

Q. Now, we were talking also about -- this is another thing that I wanted to go back for. We were talking about the Kilo Company that had been there before you had arrived.

A. Okay.

Q. We talked about the Amtrak being destroyed.

A. Right.

Q. I'm sorry, Lima Company.

A. It was Lima Company, right.

Q. Right. It was Lima Company. I beg your pardon? We talked about the Amtrak being destroyed. And then you mentioned also the six snipers --

A. Right.

Q. -- who were ambushed. What happened to those snipers?

A. I got shown a video tape from -- an insurgent video tape one of the Marines had gotten a hold of, I'm not sure how, and it was pretty gruesome. It started off, you know, a regular day. During the day these snipers are patrolling to what they call a hide -- hide spot to

observe and do what they do. And, you know, the video tape shows him walking by. You can tell that whoever is videotaping is kind of behind a hill or whatever the case may be.

All of a sudden you hear a whole lot of, you know, yelling and screaming like you usually do on these insurgency videos, and -- or insurgent videos. And then you see, you know, the insurgents just kind of bum rushing them, if you will; shooting at them. One of the snipers you can see kind of runs away. The other ones are pretty much killed on spot.

And then it pans off later on and shows gear, weapons, from the snipers, you know, laying on the ground, and dog tags, that sort of thing, from the snipers. And then it shows, you know, the insurgents dragging, you know, a naked body of one of the snipers through the streets.

Q. The insurgent shot that video?

A. Yes.

Q. And you saw it?

A. Yes.

Q. Before you went into Haditha?

A. Correct.

Q. What did that tell you?

A. That was -- you know, that just kind of reconfirmed what, you know, the intel reports had said that, you know, we were going into a dangerous, dangerous place.

Q. When you first rolled into Haditha you must have been pretty tight.

A. As a squad, yes. Yes, very much so.

Q. You told your men what?

A. Right before the push from Haditha I remember I got them all together and I remember my first team leader, you know, he came up to me and said, hey, you know, I think you should -- you should talk to the guys before we go in. So, you know, I brought them aside, you know, hours before we went in and I told them, you know, hey, you know, I'm not much for -- you know, I'm not much of a

speech giver but, you know, I got to let you know, when we go in there, you know, we got each other's backs.

And I also remember, very specifically, you know, telling them, hey, you guys have been to Fallujah -- you know, most of you guys have been to Fallujah, you guys -- you guys know how to do this already, but, you know, just look to me and I'm going to look to you guys. And I also wanted to let them know that there was, you know, I told them, you know, that -- no. Hold on. I'm sorry. Okay. That's pretty much -- pretty much what I said.

Q. What else did you tell them?

A. You know, just to look out for each other and, you know, we're going to go in there and do what we have to do. You know, stay alive.

Q. You know, I'm curious. There must have been -- there must have been a little bit of self doubt in the back of your mind. You're leading your squad, first time you've been in a combat situation.

A. Yeah. You know, I have to be honest, you know, and I tried not to show it and I hope I didn't, but there absolutely was. And I was relying on them just as much as I knew that -- you know, that they were going to rely on me. And I knew that -- you know, that they would be able to carry me through it, just as much as I hoped I'd be able to carry them through it.

Q. And you thought what to yourself as you were going into Haditha?

A. Honestly, it was -- I thought to myself that this is the most amazing thing that I've done. I remember it was the middle of the night, we drove up in HMMWVs, staged ourselves strategically outside the city, threw on our NVGs, and it was --

Q. Night vision goggles?

A. Night vision goggles. And it was, you know, a battalion push through the city, you know. And, you know, I can just -- I remember looking to my left and right through the night vision goggles and just being, you know, in awe pretty much. You know, it was one of the most amazing moments, I think. And I remember writing home about it too, later on.

Q. You were amazed at?  
A. Just kind of, you know, this is the real deal pretty much. You know, this is what I joined the Marine Corps for, and, you know, it was just amazing to see that battalion push, you know, through the desert going to do what we do best.

Q. There's nothing quite like that feeling is there?  
A. No, there isn't.

Q. Of rolling into a hostile situation, it's sort of strangely exhilarating.  
A. Yes, it is. Very much so. Very much so.

Q. You were glad to be able to do your job --  
A. Yes, I was.

Q. -- after all these years in the Marines.  
A. Yes, I was. I remember I turned to my radio operator, which was Lance Corporal Tatum, as we were walking through the desert and I said to him, you know, if I make out [sic] of this alive, this is probably the most amazing thing I've done.

Q. What was the mission in Haditha?  
A. Our mission was to find, capture, kill, detain any of the insurgents in there. Locate caches, which are like stock piles of weapons that the insurgents will leave around. Also, another part of it was we wanted to train the Iraqi force -- the Iraqi Army, and get them up to speed so eventually they could take over our job.

Q. Sort of a police action; was that your role?  
A. Once we actually got into the city, yes, that's what it turned into. It was more police action, more of just weeding out, you know, everyone that we could.

Q. How'd the -- excuse me. How did the Iraqis react to you?  
A. The Iraqi Army or the people of the city?

Q. The people of the city.  
A. You know, it was strange that day because, you know, there wasn't a whole lot going on. You know, I could hear a couple explosions here and there, you know, a

little bit of small arms fire here and there, but, you know, strangely it was very calm, very peaceful, you know. I remember, you know, the first door -- or the first house that we kind of entered that morning. I think it was about four in the morning, and, you know, they were having their chai, which is their tea, and eating because it was during Ramadan, so they had to eat before the sun goes up. Just, you know, strangely peaceful, I would say. And almost -- you know, they were pretty cooperative too, you know. We didn't really run into any, you know, Iraqis doing anything out of line.

Q. Give me a sense, not just on that day, but week in, week out, what was the reaction of the Iraqi citizens to your presence?

A. They were -- they were reluctant at first. They -- they were kind of happy we were there, but at the same time they knew what had happened in the past. They were expecting us to leave again, so they were kind of at the same time reluctant to give us any information about any insurgents or anything that had happened there. Just --

Q. The didn't -- they didn't want to be seen cooperating with --

A. Exactly.

Q. -- the Americans.

A. Because they assumed we were just going to leave and the insurgency would come back in.

Q. Which is what happened.

A. Which is what happened time and time again in Haditha.

Q. Would you say that the people in town were hostile to you?

A. Absolutely not. No. You know, at least, you know, in the beginning part we didn't run into any hostility. I think, you know, the first few days where we pushed through we found several -- several IEDs, you know, that had already been in the ground, that sort of thing. But, you know, none of them were command detonated by the insurgents. I don't remember any IEDs in the initial part going off and injuring Marines at all.

Q. You said you found several IEDs?  
A. Correct.

Q. What did you find?  
A. Just, you know, the bombs that are buried. They were either underneath the pavement, which means, you know, the pavement was dug up and they were put in there and repaved, or they were, you know, like on the side of the road. You know, a lot of things they use are propane tanks. They'll use 155 millimeter artillery shells.

Q. That's a big artillery shell.  
A. It's very big. And lots of times they'll double them up too. You know, they'll have two of them stacked there.

Q. And you would find these road side bombs in Haditha?  
A. Right. All over the place.

Q. They were meant for you?  
A. Oh, absolutely. Absolutely.

Q. How many did you find?  
A. I think it was somewhere -- you know, within the first couple days, I think it was somewhere within a couple dozen.

Q. A couple of dozen?  
A. Right.

Q. Within the first two days?  
A. Yup.

Q. The town was set to explode?  
A. That's what it seemed like, right.

Q. How many Arabic speaking translators did you have?  
A. To each company we had them, you know, divvyed out to -- within each company there was one, like, usually specifically for our commanding officer. Another one was for our human exploitation team, the HET team. And then we also had -- I think we had one or two other ones. Three to four in our company.

Q. In the entire company?  
A. Correct.



Q. A company of how many men?

A. 160, 150.

Q. How often did you have a translator with your squad on one of your patrols?

A. Most of the time we didn't have translators with our squad. Sometimes we went out with translators who were attached to the attachments that were with our squad. For example, if we had to escort, you know, the HET team around or the commanding officer around there would be a translator with them.

Q. But for your squad, on a combat patrol, how many translators with you?

A. None. Typically none. Every now and then we got lucky and got to take a couple out, depending on what our mission was. Sometimes, you know, our mission was to go detain a specific person at a specific house and, you know, they'd kind of push us a translator so we can get that rolling. But --

Q. How many Marines in the squad spoke Arabic?

A. I think -- you know, as far as the -- in the beginning part anyway, the ones that had been to Iraq had spoken a bit of broken Arabic, what we call it, you know, part English, part Arabic and very small phrases or words of Arabic, but no one fluent.

Q. But how did you communicate with people?

A. The best -- you know, broken Arabic. You know, we knew the basic phrases of, you know, stop, come here, go away, like, what's your name, that sort of thing. And we could say hello and good bye and that sort of stuff.

Q. But if someone was speaking to you in Arabic, you would understand what?

A. Nothing. Nothing. And that's, you know -- that's the way it was. Lots of times they would -- I mean, you know, Marines have been there before. They kind of knew the drill as far as using, like, hand motions and stuff, you know, if they wanted. Or using small words that they knew we understood to tell us, you know, that there's a bomb over here or whatever the case may be. So just very -- basically small words, small phrases.

Q. It must of been extremely difficult to operate in a city of 100,000 people when nobody on your squad speaks Arabic, no one on your squad understands Arabic, and you don't have a translator.

A. It --

Q. I mean, how's it possible?

A. It's -- you know, it really depended on a -- you know, it depended on each mission that we did. Sometimes we really didn't need to communicate with them. Or lots of times it was, you know, security patrol where, you know, we'll go around and whoever's out we'll say hello to them and stuff like that. So, you know, at times it's difficult but you get used to it. You know, you do.

Q. At the base that you were operating out of inside Haditha --

A. Right.

Q. The base that you called "Sparta."

A. Correct.

Q. There was a sign on the wall that explained how you should treat the town's people. I understand it was labeled "Habits of Thought." Do you remember that?

A. I do vaguely remember that sign. There were -- you know, there were little signs, I think, all over the firm base that had little things, but, yes, I do remember that.

Q. What did they say? What do you remember?

A. You know, as far as habits of thought, you know, something about treating them with respect, dignity. I think one of the last things it said was something to the effect of -- something about, like, being their friend but, you know, don't be -- you know, don't be too much of a friend to them. Or look at them -- you know, be their friend but be ready to kill them or take them out if you needed to.

Q. I'm told that what the sign said was: "Be polite. Be professional."

A. Okay.

Q. "Have a plan to kill everyone you meet."

A. Right. Exactly.

Q. You remember that?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. What does that mean: "Have a plan to kill everyone you meet"?

A. It means trust no one. And you really can't when you're over there. They -- you know, it's -- they hide with -- you know, amongst the population very, very easily.

Q. The enemy?

A. The enemy does. You can't tell. And, you know, you just -- you can't trust anyone over there. So, you know, I mean that's pretty much what its saying. When you're going on a patrol don't -- it's -- And also, I think the underlying thing is don't let down your guard, you know, when you're out there because lots of times, especially, you know, as the months go on you kind of get relaxed and complacent, and I think that sign was there to motivate the Marines to, you know, not let that happen.

Q. Tell me what that sign means to a Marine. What is this? Is this the commander's intent? Are these orders? How am I supposed to take it when there's a sign that says, "Be polite. Be professional. Have a plan to kill everyone you meet"?

A. It's not the commander's intent. I think -- you know, these are -- you know, like I said, just things to go by to eliminate that complacency that Marines will get as the months go on.

Q. But I mean, this was understood as what? This is a Marine Corps directive?

A. No.

Q. I'm a grunt. I'm walking down the hallway. I've got my M16 on my shoulder. I see this sign. What am I supposed to make of that? Are these my orders?

A. They're not, you know, specifically your orders, but, you know, they're there to eliminate that complacency in Marines. You know, it was there so Marines can walk in, see that sign, you know, be polite, okay. Be professional. Have a plan to kill everyone you meet. I mean, that was the thought process that our commanders wanted us to have.

Q. It is guidance.  
A. Guidance, right.

Q. Is that a fair word?  
A. Yes, very much so.

Q. And it was -- to a PFC or a lance corporal, it was official guidance.  
A. Absolutely right.

Q. As you understood them, what were the rules for using deadly force?  
A. You needed PID, which is positive identification of the target. You know, there were a couple other ones as far as, you know, if anyone was any part of Saddam's known old regime or Ba'athist party you could use deadly force. But, the biggest thing was PID, positive identification.

Q. What does that mean?  
A. It means that you need to be able to positively identify your target before, you know, you shoot to kill.

Q. And the kind of targets you were permitted to shoot to kill included what?  
A. Various things. Obviously anyone with a weapon. You know, especially pointed at you. You could kill anyone that was -- like, anyone that was setting off an IED. Any -- hostile act, hostile intent was the biggest thing that they had. So if they had used a hostile act against you, you could use deadly force. If there was hostile intent towards you, you could use deadly force.

Q. Any other circumstances? Were there any other circumstances under which you could use deadly force?  
A. No.

Q. Hostile act.  
A. Right.

Q. Hostile intent.  
A. Hostile intent, right.

Q. Positive identification --  
A. Correct.

Q. -- of what you're shooting at.

A. Correct.

Q. All the Marines understood that?

A. Yes. That was -- you know, we had several briefs on that before we went and during deployment as well.

Q. Did your superiors tell you anything else beyond that in terms of keeping your Marines alive?

A. No. No. I mean, no, they didn't.

Q. Your CO didn't take you aside at any point and say, look, when you're out there on patrol remember this. That kind of guidance. Anything like that?

A. Nothing dealing with, you know, going out and killing someone. No. No. You know, our CO -- you know, my CO was, you know, probably one of the, you know, best Marines -- or best officers that I've ever worked for. And, you know, he always had some sort of guidance that he would always say to the Marines, which -- you know, to motivate them. But nothing having to deal with shooting or killing someone. No.

Q. But what about having to do with protecting your men?

A. Well, protecting your men, that -- you know, that was -- you know, that's pretty much, you know, a given. That was assumed I think by all Marines that you need to do anything to protect your Marines. You know, if your Marines are in jeopardy of their lives, you do anything to eliminate that threat so they're not in jeopardy.

Q. And what did that mean to you as a squad leader?

A. You know, just that. You know, if -- you know, if we're under attack or whatever the case may be, you know, we need to -- or I need to make sure that those men are protected. And also, you know, a big thing is, you know, being aggressive towards whatever action was going on.

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. You know, before we went in and, you know, a lot of the training and that sort of thing the -- you know, the whole mode was to be very, you know, very aggressive. And that was to eliminate the complacency that happens amongst Marines. So for example, if you're patrolling down the street, you know, take a knee at every corner.

You know, take a knee, sight in, you know, look around, aim -- or aim -- you know, aim with your weapon, look through your ACOG or your -- which is a sight -- scope that we use on our weapons. And just, you know, different methods that we use like bumping from corner to corner.

You know where -- I know when we got -- when we first got to Iraq, you know, a lot of 3/25, the patrols that we went on, was kind of just walking around and standing around, that sort of thing, throughout the city. Which, you know, it's a bad posture to have; it's a bad posture to put out there because, you know, you don't want to be an easy target. You don't want to look weak out there.

Q. It's the posture that the Lima Company snipers had taken on that particular day?

A. Possibly. I mean, I don't really want to say that because it's a tragic event, but, yeah.

Q. But the idea was to show the population that you meant business.

A. Absolutely. Absolutely.

Q. Every patrol's a combat patrol.

A. Yes. Absolutely.

Q. And the point of that was what?

A. The point of that was to, you know, let the insurgency know whoever was out there -- you know, it was one of those, I guess control measures we could have against the insurgency. We couldn't see them. We couldn't, you know, see where they were hiding. But if we walk through -- you know, if we patrol through town, you know, every single time with an aggressive posture then, you know, the insurgency will be less likely to mess with us, per se.

Q. Give me a sense of what it's like to be in this town where dozens of Marines have been killed before you arrived, and you can't see the enemy. The enemy's not wearing a uniform.

A. It's frustrating at times. You know, when we first got into the city my squad alone was digging up, you know, cache after cache in family's back yards.

Q. Weapons caches?

A. Oh, absolutely. You know, all sorts of stuff; the Mujadin propaganda and the insurgency propaganda; you know, the uniforms that they wear and everything like that. And, you know, it's frustrating because, you know, these are just regular families, regular -- from what it appears to be, but you can never tell.

Q. And you'd find what in their back yards?

A. Well, we'd find guns; ammo; IED making material; insurgency propaganda; books; magazines; flyers; video tapes, at times; uniforms. You know, lots of times before we got in there they'd wear the uniforms so they could be identified, which was usually sneakers on their feet, black, like, sweat pants, black top, and a black mask. So I mean, one of the houses that we found caches in, that's exactly what we found. We found three uniforms.

Q. How did you identify the enemy? How'd you know who was out to kill you?

A. We didn't. I mean, unless you got -- you know, what we used was our intel reports. So you know, before we went on patrols we'd get an intel report from our intel section and they would tell us, hey, you know, we got intel on this guy. He, you know, is part of this and we got a little description on him, and he lives at this house or in this area. Go out and detain him. Get him. So that's pretty much how we knew who was bad and not was the intel.

Q. But in terms of driving down the road, seeing people --

A. No.

Q. -- standing on street corners there was no way to know --

A. No.

Q. -- who the enemy was?

A. No. You know, and that's an interesting experience within itself, you know, because, you know, you got -- you know, I have in like three different -- three different groups of Iraqis. You have, you know, the young kids who love us to death. You know, they go out there and smile and wave and we'll give them stuff and, you know, they love us, you know. And then you got

the -- like the old -- you know, the elderly Iraqis who also -- you know, I can't say they love us, but they respect us, they know why we're there, and I think that, you know, they get it. They understand. And then you got like that middle group referred to as the middle-age males or military-age males who -- you know, you drive down the road and, you know, it's dirty look after dirty look, and, you know, just that sort of thing.

Q. We have to change tapes real quick.

A. Okay.

[The footage concluded.]

[END OF PAGE]



[The following is Tape 3a, an outtake of the *60 Minutes* interview between Mr. Scott Pelley and Staff Sergeant Wuterich.]

Q. Do you remember the Amtrak video?

A. I do.

Q. Okay. I am going to tidy up that point before we move on.

A. Okay.

Q. All set everybody? All right.

You actually saw a video of the Amtrak being destroyed?

A. That is correct. Yes, I did.

Q. What did you see?

A. I think it was from a Marine in that company footage [sic], but what you see is the Amtrak driving down and just this huge, huge explosion -- just explosion, black smoke. You know -- and at that point you don't even see any part of the Amtrak that used to be there. That's pretty much it.

Q. Amtrak is a huge armored vehicle?

A. It is.

Q. Bigger than a tank?

A. Possibly. Yeah. Yeah.

Q. And when you see that destroyed in that way, you thought what?

A. It's -- wow. That is a big bomb. That could take out pretty much anything that we have, you know. And also, you know, you can tell from that, that probably no one survived.

Q. And in fact, no one did: 14 were killed.

A. Correct.

Q. What did that tell you?

A. Again, you know, that is what we were looking at going into the City of Haditha, yep.

Q. November 19, 2005, do you remember it well?

A. Very well. It is a -- you know, it's a day that I will always remember.

Q. What was your mission that day?

A. In the morning, it was a typical mission that we did every day. You know, we were part of the resupply squad that was going to go down and resupply our traffic control point. And also, we were going to switch out the Iraqi army that was down there and bring them back to their little base.

Q. Tell me what that was, that traffic control point that you were going to resupply.

A. It's -- we had taken a house on some high ground and we had the road pretty much -- it was pretty much blocked off. We were still letting traffic through, but, you know, every car was being searched that was going through.

There was what we call a serpentine with concertina wire and other things. Every vehicle was being searched. We led -- you know, we had guys on security and different ways that we set it up. But the Iraqis did most of the searching of the vehicles while the Marines held security. We also had some gun trucks down there, as well, to help us out with security.

Q. So this was essentially a roadblock?

A. Correct.

Q. That allowed the Iraqi army and the Marines to check the vehicles that were traveling through that part of town.

A. Correct.

Q. It was manned 24/7?

A. Well, in Iraq there is a curfew, you know, so technically, yes. It was manned. But after a certain time, no vehicles were going to go through or allowed to go through.

Q. So your mission that day was to take your squad to resupply that traffic control point?

A. Correct.

- Q. What were you supplying them with?
- A. We supplied them with chow, water, you know. Lots of times they will call to -- to our COC, Combat Operations Center, and tell us, hey, we need batteries or we need chem lights, which are, like, the glow sticks that we use. Or, you know, chow, water -- we need this many boxes of water; we need this many boxes of chow. And that was a daily thing.
- Q. You took your squad on a combat patrol to take breakfast to these guys?
- A. Yes, absolutely.
- Q. That is what the mission was?
- A. Absolutely, and to switch out the Iraqis.
- Q. To bring new Iraqi troops in and take the previous shift out?
- A. Correct.
- Q. Is that a good use of a Marine squad to put itself in harm's way to take breakfast to this place?
- A. Absolutely. Absolutely. I mean, you know, Marines need to be resupplied and we need to get that resupply to them any way that we can. And on top of that, you know, our company is broken down into each platoon had their own, you know, duty I guess. One platoon would be main effort, which they wouldn't be doing that sort of thing. They would be out doing the normal combat patrols out in town. You know, another platoon is on QRF, Quick Reaction Force, who are there just to support anything that happens, you know, then there is a security platoon or a rest platoon sort of thing which would take care of the little jobs like resupply.
- Q. This was as routine as it gets?
- A. Absolutely.
- Q. I mean, it was almost literally a milk run.
- A. Right. Right.

Q. Tell me about -- for lack of a better term, tell me about the package. Tell me about the vehicles, the men, et cetera, when you mustered all this together -- it must have been around 0600 that morning.

A. Right.

Q. Tell me what you put together, why you put it together that way, what did this look like as it was going out the gate?

A. Okay. You know, every time before we go, we get a daily intel brief and we go out and -- or we give a squad order. And that time, it would have been a vehicle convoy order. Two, the squad members, that would be given by me, to tell them any new intelligence that we had, you know, throughout that city. And also, it would give them the mission, give them our objective, you know, any administrative things that we needed to take care of. And once that's done, you know, we have a load plan, which is, you know, where each Marine in that squad is going to -- in what vehicle is each Marine going to be in and what their specific job is going to be. And you know, we make sure our -- we do a comm check, communications check, with our radio to make sure that's up and running. And, you know, they get on the vehicle. I will give a debrief to the COC, the watch officer in the COC, who --

Q. The combat operations center?

A. Correct. Combat -- yep. And you know, I will give a debrief to him on exactly what our route is, what we are going to do, you know, how many Marines we are taking, what kind of communications we have, what special equipment we have. And once that is done, I, you know, will get on the vehicles with them and we will roll out. Typically, we have the gun truck, what we call it, in the front, which is a hardback HMMWV, with a turret, we have a 240 mounted on that and then three high-back HMMWVs behind it.

Q. So the lead HMMWV has a medium machine gun?

A. Correct.

Q. And a turret on the top.

A. Correct.

- Q. And then the three HMMWV behind it are open back, essentially, like a pickup truck with high walls on the side for armored plating?
- A. Absolutely. Right.
- Q. And so you roll out the gate?
- A. Right.
- Q. How far do you have to go?
- A. You know, in time it is probably about -- less than ten minutes -- between five and ten minutes. Distance, I would say maybe three miles.
- Q. What happened as you were rolling out to the traffic control point?
- A. Nothing, normal day. It was a little chilly that day, but, you know, clear skies. When we rolled out, I decided to take a different route out there because, you know, it's not really the best idea to use the same route over and over again. So we kind of drove through the desert -- or dirt path a little bit and got there fine, did what we had to do, switched out the Iraqis.
- Q. What did you do at the traffic control point?
- A. Well, before you get there, you know, you request permission to enter friendly lines and they let you in. And we go -- we went up to the top. We had to drive around up to the top by where the houses that they were at. They would have some Marines come out and help us offload the chow, offload the water. The Iraqis would either be already ready for us or would be getting ready to get on the vehicles. And these Iraqis would get off. So -- and then also we would switch out, like, the Marines on security.
- Q. And so you unloaded the chow, you let off the Iraqi soldiers that you had brought in with you, the fresh troops, and you took on how many Iraqis for the trip back?
- A. There was six.
- Q. You loaded them up in the back of one of the high-backs?
- A. Correct.

Q. And off you went?

A. Correct.

Q. Tell me about the trip back.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Hey, Scott.

INT: Yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I'm sorry. Someone's got a -- do one of you two have a cell phone that's going off?

ACC: Mine's --

INT: A BlackBerry? Cell phone? I don't hear anything.

ACC: Oh, it's on silent. That still --

INT: No, that won't do.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: It effects the --

ACC: Oh, really?

INT: Yeah, if you don't mind.

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Sorry.

ACC: Yeah. No problem.

INT: Caught you. When it receives a signal, it -- the -- the wireless receivers that our microphones are attached to pick up the same signal.

ACC: Oh, okay.

INT: And it makes a little eh, eh, eh, eh, eh sound in the back of the audio.

ACC: Sorry about that. I apologize

INT: So is it off now?

ACC: It is completely off.

INT: Perfect. Okay. You wouldn't know that.

ACC: I do now.

INT: When we first started carrying Blackberries around, we were getting all this radio interference. And we couldn't figure out where it was. And it turns out that when the Blackberry gets an e-mail or something into it, it sends out a little signal that makes the thing --

ACC: Oh, oh.

INT: So, who knew?

You guys all set?

UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Yes.

INT: All right.

**Questions by the interviewer (continued):**

Q. I tell you what, since we don't have a picture of this thing, I want you to paint the picture for me, a little bit of the traffic control point --

A. Okay.

Q. What does this look like? I mean is it just a little roadblock in the road or what? I mean what does it look like?

A. You know, I don't really want to get in to tactics too much. But there's, you know, it's a two-lane road; we are letting vehicles go through both sides. One side is the vehicles are stopped from going one way. The other side is the vehicles are stopped from going the other way. And we will let -- through a serpentine -- we will let three -- three vehicles, typically at a time, come through. They would stop at a designated point. You know, we would get all of the members of the vehicle out of the vehicle, search them, then search the car, you know, top to bottom and back and forth.

- Q. And there was a house next to this control point where the Marines and the Iraqi soldiers lived?
- A. Well, we -- you know, when we figured out where we were going to put it, the traffic control point was down at the bottom of the road right next to the palm groves right next to the Euphrates River. The house that we were at was, you know, all the way up on top of a hill which was -- the hill was pretty steep so, in essence, that house, where most of the Marines stayed at, was safe from any car explosions, that sort of thing.
- Q. And you had a high observation point looking down on the traffic control point.
- A. High observation -- exactly.
- Q. So when your squad arrived with the fresh troops and the chow, you drove up to that house?
- A. Correct.
- Q. And switched out the personnel and the food there?
- A. Correct.
- Q. Tell me about the trip back.
- A. The trip back started out normal. We came down, you know, one of the main roads there in the town. And then there was another two-lane road with a median in the center, which we made a left on. And the first vehicle drove up on the right side, you know -- the right side of the road -- the right side of the median going up. We continued on. Second vehicle same thing, continued on. I was driving the third vehicle. For some reason that morning, I don't know why; but you know, I decided to drive up on the other side of the road. I did, so I was on the left side of the median, made it through. You know, as we were driving, all of a sudden I hear a huge, huge explosion, just -- I mean it rocked the truck even that I was in. I knew immediately it was an IED. I didn't know much more than that, as far as had anyone been hit, that sort of thing. We were trying to get comm checks throughout the vehicles, you know, and this was all within seconds. We see debris, you know, from our fourth vehicle hundreds of meters in the air above of us, you know, coming down, tires and all sorts of different parts. We knew the



fourth vehicle had been hit. And that's -- at that point, that's where our trip ended on the way back.

Q. Give me a sense -- I want you to take me there at the moment that the bomb explodes. What does it -- from your perspective -- look like? Feel like? Sound like? Smell like? Put me in the HMMWV with you.

A. It was the largest, just explosion -- you know, a very, you know, deep rumbling -- not a rumbling sound, but just a very deep exploding sound. Deafening. Unbelievable. Now, you know, the vehicle was behind me, so at that point I didn't really see it. But, you know, like I said, parts of the HMMWV were tumbling down from the sky.

Q. What did you do in that instant right then?

A. Got to -- got to a strategic place on the road. We herringboned our vehicles, got to that point, stopped the vehicle immediately. My A-driver, Lance Corporal Graviss, got out of the vehicle immediately and headed down towards the IED blast.

Q. You were driving your HMMWV?

A. Yes, I was.

Q. Vehicle number three?

A. Correct.

Q. So the vehicle that exploded was the one right behind you?

A. Correct.

Q. What did you do then?

A. At that point, I stepped out of my vehicle, looked back for a brief second --

Q. Stop right there.

A. Okay.

Q. What did you see?

A. Nothing but black and gray smoke. I couldn't even see the HMMWV. I couldn't -- I mean it was like a very, very dense fog. The smoke was even darker though. And that is all I saw was smoke.

Q. You didn't see the HMMWV?  
A. No.

Q. You didn't see your Marines?  
A. No.

Q. What happened then?  
A. At that point, I looked back up the road. I knew Doc Whitt, who was in my HMMWV, headed back with a casualty. And I knew Graviss did as well. I looked back up the road and I saw a white, four-door sedan that was stopped on the side -- opposite side of the street that I was on, but on the side of the road.

Q. How close?  
A. To where I was? 100 meters, 150 meters.

Q. About the length of 300 feet or so? About a football field away?  
A. About a football field away.

Q. About a football field away. You're the squad leader?  
A. Correct.

Q. You are under attack. What are you thinking?  
A. At that point, I am thinking, you know, that I need to make a decision on which way to go. Do I approach what is developing up here with the white car or do I go back down to help? I knew the casualties were in good hands at that point. I pretty much headed immediately to the car, because at that point I can hear one of my other Marines who is yelling and giving commands to the individuals in that vehicle.

Q. Why did the car attract your attention?  
A. Because the first thing you want to do is get that area secure. And I knew the casualties were already being taken care of. But I mean the first thing you do is secure that area and try to eliminate, you know, any other threat that is going to be there.

Q. Why did the car seem like a threat?  
A. Well, a couple of reasons. One, it was, you know, a hundred meters away from the IED blast. The only thing, in fact -- you know, only civilian, only vehicle that we

could see in the town. There was no one out. There was no vehicles out. It was the only thing there. And so I approached it as my team leader was giving commands.

Q. If an IED explodes -- let me ask the question this way: When the IED explodes in your convoy, you have to think about what?

A. There, you know -- there are several things that you go through. The first thing is to herringbone your vehicles. The second thing is to get out, get a perimeter, get a security, look for any other threats. And you want to get the casualties, whatever the casualties there are, out of the danger area.

Q. But the one thing you know is somebody set that bomb off?

A. Oh, absolutely. It was -- correct.

Q. There is somebody in your vicinity --

A. Right. That is one of the other things is --

Q. -- that saw the convoy and set it off?

A. Once, you know, we have security on the ground and the casualties are being attended to, you immediately want to send somebody out to search for the trigger man.

Q. And you believe there is one?

A. Absolutely.

Q. You ever been in combat before?

A. Before this deployment, no.

Q. Before that minute?

A. No.

Q. First time?

A. First time.

Q. You see the car, what happens then?

A. The first thing that goes through my mind is, you know, what's going on with this? As I am going up, you know, my team leader is giving commands to these individuals in the car. They are all getting out. And they are not responding to him. So my immediate thought is, okay, maybe this is a car bomb. Okay, maybe these guys had something to do with this IED. So as I am running up,

they are not responding to him and I start -- I open up on them, right -- I start shooting at them.

Q. Why?

A. Well, there were, you know, a couple of different reasons. One, like I said, it was the only thing in the area, you know, a car that was parked right there at the IED -- these are the things that I went through, you know, making the decision. The car was there. That was the only thing there. It was filled with -- I think it was five military-aged males. Two -- it could be, you know -- or three, you know, it could very easily be a car bomb or it could be one of the guys that set this IED off. And in my mind, that constituted, you know, enough of that positive identification to engage these individuals.

Q. What did these men do that caused you to pull the trigger on your weapon?

A. Well, as my team leader is giving commands to them -- normally, the Iraqis know the drill when you are over there. They know if something happens they need to -- they know exactly what they need to do, get down, hands up, and completely cooperate. These guys -- these individuals were doing none of that. They got out of the car, as they were going around, they started to take off. So I -- I shot at them.

Q. What do you mean they started to take off?

A. You know, like I said, they weren't listening to Dela Cruz's commands. They weren't putting their hands up. They weren't getting down on the ground. They were starting, essentially, to run away from the site.

Q. Dela Cruz was shouting at them in Arabic?

A. Broken Arabic. You know, English mixed with Arabic.

Q. There is no translator with the squad?

A. No, there is not.

Q. As you -- you were firing a variation of the M16?

A. Right. The A4. Correct.

Q. M16A4?

A. Yes.

- Q. As you are pulling the trigger, what are you aiming at and what are you seeing?
- A. I am aiming at the individuals that were outside of the car taking off.
- Q. How many of them?
- A. I believe there were five.
- Q. Did you hit them?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How many did you hit?
- A. I would assume all five. Once I started shooting at them and my other squad members knew what was going on, they started engaging as well.
- Q. So the other members of the squad were shooting at them as well?
- A. Not -- correct. Some of them.
- Q. How do these men, running away from the scene as you describe it, square with hostile action or hostile intent?
- A. Because hostile action, if they were the trigger man, would have blown up the IED, and which would also constitute hostile intent. But also, at the same time, you know, those things that I mentioned the, you know, military-aged males that were inside that car, you know, the only vehicle -- the only thing that was out that was Iraqi that was out that morning was them. They were 100 meters away from that IED. Those are the things that went through my mind before I pulled the trigger. And, you know, that was positive identification.
- Q. Frank, you had to be angry, anybody would have been.
- A. At that point, you know, I -- when I looked back, like I said, you know, I couldn't see anything. And --
- Q. Come on, you had to have known that the men in that HMMWV were, if not dead, severely wounded. You saw parts of the HMMWV raining down out of the sky.
- A. It honestly wasn't something that -- you know, it's something that I guess you have to be there to understand because with, you know, being a Marine and with the training when something like that happens, you know, your

mind kind of goes to a different place. And for me, you know, my training immediately kicked in. And, you know, I mean I feel almost bad for saying it, but I didn't have any emotion at that point. I didn't have any -- I mean, I was, essentially, like a machine I think.

Q. That different place is what this interview is all about. And it is what the events in Haditha are all about. So help me understand it. What do you mean?

A. You know, the training aspect of everything that you have done, everything that you were taught is what's filled in your head at this point. And you're, you know, doing everything that you know, according to your training, how everything should be done. And you know, emotion is kind of, you know, put on the back burner. You know, everything -- that is all you are thinking about. That's all that is going through your head.

Q. How much time has passed from the moment of the explosion to the time that you killed these five men?

A. I would say within about two minutes.

Q. And you were how far from them when you pulled the trigger?

A. Probably about 50 meters or closer.

Q. And you ran up to them after they all went down?

A. After I saw them go down and they were lying there, they were no longer a threat to my men or the squad. I turned around and headed straight back to the IED site.

Q. And what did you see?

A. As soon as I got there, I can -- you know, could hear the corpsman, Doc Whitt, saying we've got one dead. We've got one dead.

Q. He is your medic?

A. Correct.

Q. Doc Whitt?

A. Correct. You know, I don't know why, but the first thing that went through my head was, you know, an Iraqi soldier just died. And maybe that is just what I wanted to believe. But I don't know why but that is the first thing that went through my mind. You know, I got back

there. I think I saw Terrazas' body first, and then I went back and saw Crossan and Guzman.

Q. What did you see when you saw Terrazas?

A. You know, a pile of flesh, in essence. You know, I think, you know, that may be an image that I never forget. But, you know, he was missing one of his arms. His legs were completely severed from his body, but they were still attached because for some reason his cammies didn't rip completely. His face was just completely mangled. You know, you could tell some sort of shrapnel or something was in his face. His jaw was kind of sticking out from the rest of his head. And he was very black, almost burnt or charred. And just -- you know, the rest of his gear, all over the street.

Q. And he is lying in the middle of the street?

A. Correct.

Q. You move from him to Crossan?

A. Right.

Q. What do you see?

A. You know, Crossan, I thought, was doing great. You know, apparently he had been unconscious for a slight time; but by the time I got back there, he was conscious again. He was kind of lying underneath, you know, the part of the HMMWV that survived the blast, if you will. And, you know, just face just black and bloody. Doc is taking off his clothes and doing his assessment -- his triage on him, just bruises everywhere, you know, everywhere, arms and legs just dark purple, black bruises.

Q. The HMMWV landed on him?

A. That's -- I don't think it landed on him, because I think he probably wouldn't have survived. But somehow he got wedged, like, underneath the back tire, you know, somewhat. But, yeah, that is where he was.

[The footage concluded.]

[END OF PAGE]

[The following is Tape 4a, an outtake of the 60 Minutes interview between Mr. Scott Pelley and Staff Sergeant Wuterich.]

Q. Pick up the story. You have had a look at Crossan. What is happening now?

A. At this point, I notice that we start taking sporadic fire. And it's nothing, you know, there is not a high volume of it, a shot here and there. In fact, I can hear it coming from the south. I didn't see any impacts or anything like that. But, pretty much at that time, I am on the radio with the COC. QRF is driving up as I am speaking on the radio.

Q. The Combat Operations Center has sent a QRF, Quick Reaction Force, essentially your backup?

A. Correct.

Q. You placed the call to the COC?

A. The initial call. The initial call was placed, I believe, by Lance Corporal Graviss. He had the radio next to me in the vehicle. As soon as the IED went off, he called in there and said we hit an IED. Immediately QRF is, you know, they know exactly where we are because we debriefed them and immediately they send their assistance.

Q. Once you have seen Crossan, what do you do next?

A. At that point, I am on the radio. I mean I am just -- I am kind of there. I am on a knee. I am on a radio talking to Doc and the triage giving all the information that our Combat Operations Center needs for the EVAC. So at that point, I am just giving that information.

Q. And while you are on the radio, you say that you are hearing small arms fire?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell me exactly what you heard?

A. Shots. Sporadic shots. I think I probably heard two or three shots from the south and that was it.

Q. Two or three?

A. Right.



Q. And that was it?

A. Yes.

Q. Frank, how can you be sure? You have got this HMMWV, I assume, roiling on fire right next to you. All hell has broken loose. And you are telling me that you could hear two or three rounds of small arms fire in the middle of all that chaos?

A. Absolutely. You know, I mean -- and you know rounds being shot off they have a distinct sound. And you know, I mean the hundreds of ranges that we go through and all that, you can tell when a shot is being fired.

Q. What are the chances that these are rounds cooking off in The HMMWV?

A. Because there were not any. First of all, the back of the HMMWV is what survived. And it wasn't on fire. So there was -- and there was nothing, I mean the front of the HMMWV was just completely gone. And we don't keep extra ammo inside that part of the HMMWV.

Q. You heard these rounds, but you didn't see any impacts?

A. Correct.

Q. You didn't see any muzzle flashes?

A. Correct.

Q. You couldn't tell where this gunman might be?

A. I knew it was coming from the south.

Q. From the south of the road that you call Chestnut?

A. Right. You know.

Q. What was the next thing you did?

A. You know, as I am talking on the radio and our QRF pulls up, my platoon commander gets out and, you know, I immediately start debriefing him on the situation and what is going on. And he kind of demands the radio from me so he took the radio from me.

Q. And then?

A. Okay. At that point, we are trying to figure out where this fire is coming from. Myself, my platoon commander, and my first team leader are on the other side of Chestnut on a knee. I identify a house that is from the

south where this fire was coming from. And the reason why I was like -- that specific area -- lots of times in Iraq the houses are cluttered together. In that specific area, the houses were not cluttered. There was this one particular house directly to the south which had a perfect line of vision. There was another house that was off to the east a little, which I can be certain that fire wasn't coming from there. And then there were houses behind on the south, but they wouldn't have had any sort of vision or anything of where we were. So that one particular house I identified, plus it had -- like the windows were boarded up with cardboard, there were like little slits on the top of the window and on the bottom. I identified the house. My first team leader, you know, essentially told my platoon commander, hey, I want to prep that house. He had the 203, which is like a grenade launcher. You know, we got the okay, and Corporal Salinas continued to prep that house.

Q. By prep the house, you mean what?

A. Well, in training if you are receiving fire from a house, the first thing you want to do is prep that house to suppress that fire that is coming from there. So that is what he was doing. He had a 203 using high explosive rounds shooting at the house, prepping the house. And that is, you know, what you do before you go in and clear the house.

Q. He was launching grenades into the house?

A. Correct.

Q. How many?

A. It was four to five.

Q. Explain to me how you identified that house? You did not see fire coming from that house, correct?

A. I did not see muzzle flashes coming from that house, correct.

Q. You didn't hear rounds coming from that house as best as you could tell?

A. Specifically, no.

- Q. There had been, to your reckoning, how many rounds fired at your Marines after the explosion?
- A. After the explosion and all, and once QRF got there as well, I want to say maybe five to six, half a dozen.
- Q. Half a dozen rounds?
- A. Yes.
- Q. So it -- the half dozen rounds are over a period of time? Or they came all at once and that was it?
- A. Over a short period of time. It wasn't like a, you know, six round burst. Over a period of time.
- Q. If you didn't see the fire coming from this house and you weren't sure that you heard the fire coming from this house, how did you identify this house as a threat?
- A. Because that was the only logical place that the fire could come through seeing the environment there. Like I said, there was a house down to the east, which I knew the fire wasn't coming from. There were houses behind this house, which they wouldn't be firing because there was no line of sight for them to fire at us. And then there was this one house, you know, again windows were boarded up with cardboard, slits in the cardboard and all that so --
- Q. It looked suspicious to you?
- A. Absolutely. Right.
- Q. Frank, this point about whether your Marines were under small arms fire after the explosion, I think is going to be contested. I think the prosecutors are going to suggest that there was no fire coming down on your men. You've just been blasted by an IED.
- A. Right.
- Q. One of your men is cut nearly in half lying in the road.
- A. Right.
- Q. There is a huge fire. You have never been in combat before.
- A. Right.

Q. You've never had a round fired at you before. How can you be sure?

A. You know, like I said, there is a distinct sound from when a round goes off and being on ranges and that sort of thing, you know, it is just something that you know. You know when fire is going -- when rounds are going off.

Q. It couldn't have been your men firing outside of your field of vision somewhere?

A. No. Because if that were the case, then I would have heard the shots come from the north -- or not the north, but the west or the east.

Q. So the half dozen high explosive grenades go into the house?

A. They hit the house, correct.

Q. Hit the outside of the house or went through the windows?

A. Hit the outside of the house.

Q. What happened then?

A. At that point, my first team leader gathered up two other members of the squad to assist myself and him to clear the house. So, you know, once we got the guys together, went down probably about 100, maybe 200 meters away and cleared that house.

INT: Tell me about the entry.

[Footage was cut and resumed with new questioning because of a Lawyer interjection.]

Q. Frank, you were just blasted by an IED?

A. Right.

Q. One of your men is nearly cut in half?

A. Right.

Q. In the roadway?

A. Right.

Q. There is a burning HMMWV in the road and this is your first time in combat. You have never been shot at before. How can you be sure that there were rounds coming down on your Marines?

A. At the same time that I was noticing these rounds, there were other men on the ground as well that heard these rounds. And I believe even one of them had said and stated that he saw impacts.

Q. The rounds hitting --

A. The ground.

INT: Hitting the ground. Who was this person?

ACC: I shouldn't answer that

INT: Can we talk about that?

ACC: Should I answer? He said who is the person that said it?

ACC LAWYER: Well, yeah. Well, we can -- Doc Whit says he saw rounds hitting.

ACC: Okay.

INT: Let me ask the question again.

Q. Who was this person?

A. Doc Whit had heard that person -- this was -- or had heard those rounds and saw those impacts. It is something that we had gotten debriefed on at the end of the day. And also, I believe he had written a statement to that fact as well.

Q. So you heard the rounds, and Whit claims that he saw impacts?

A. Correct.

Q. From small arms fire?

A. Correct.

Q. Let us go back to the first house. Tell me about the entry into the first house.

A. A typical, you know, house clearing entry. The door was shut, kicked down the door, throw a grenade in, and enter the house after the explosion.

Q. You went in?

A. Yes.

Q. Who threw the grenade?

A. I can't remember.

Q. After the grenade explodes, you went in?

A. Correct.

Q. What happened?

A. We went in. Lots of times -- I mean -- I get the first house and second house confused because the layout seems to be the same with me. I believe we encountered someone either down the hallway or in a little area there. They were engaged, shot, they went down. We proceeded on through the house. At the same time, you know, we could -- all of us could recognize noises of -- or where noises were coming from in that house. Some had claimed that they heard AK's racking. I don't remember that specifically, but I do remember hearing noises, which were not noises of women and children or anything like that, just noises behind this closed, locked door.

Q. Did you fire on that first person in the house?

A. I did not, no.

Q. But others in your squad fired on that person and they went down?

A. Correct.

Q. You hear noises behind a closed door?

A. Correct.

Q. What happened then?

A. We finished clearing the house how we normally would, stack on each wall, got to that. Kicked in the door, threw the grenade in, grenade goes off. The first man enters the room and engages the people in the room.

Q. Who was that?

A. The first person engaging, to my best recollection, was Lance Corporal Tatum.

Q. You didn't fire any rounds in the house?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Frank, help me understand. You are in a residence. How do you crack a door open and roll a grenade into a room?

A. It's -- you know, it is -- at that point, you can't hesitate to make a decision. Hesitation equals being killed, you know, either yourself or your men. I had already lost one man -- actually I had lost a fire team but one was killed. I couldn't afford to lose any more at that point. And the decisions that I made were instant, to my best knowledge to, you know, the training that we did and that is how we always trained. If you are clearing a house that you are being fired from, you go in, you prep the room with grenades. And as soon as the grenade goes off, you go in and eliminate the targets.

Q. When you roll a grenade into a room through a crack in the door that is not positive identification. That is taking a chance on anything that could be behind that door.

A. Well, that is what we do. That is how our training goes.

Q. Help me understand here. You told me earlier in the interview that one of the things that was required for deadly force was positive identification. How does that square with rolling a grenade past a door in a room?

A. Because the big picture is eliminating that threat. We are eliminating that house as a threat and what is inside it as a threat to us and our men. It is different from what a lot of people see on COPS or anything like that. I mean, we are not policemen out there. We are not even S.W.A.T. team out there who are looking for those sort of things. We're Marines, that is how we train; that is what we do. We don't, you know, waiting -- opening up a door to look to see what is inside it can be deadly and it's a bad decision. That is how you lose men.

- Q. You didn't have any problem with the way the house was being cleared?
- A. Absolutely not. It was being cleared how we had been taught, you know, I always knew how to clear a house.
- Q. Did you step in the room?
- A. Once that room was cleared; we noticed a door to the back that was opened. And, you know, immediately I made the next decision to move on. I did glance in that room.
- Q. What did you see?
- A. It was, you know, bodies.
- Q. Civilians?
- A. Possibly. We didn't clear the house at that point. I believe we didn't really have time. We were kind of assaulting through, if you will. And at that point, I didn't know who we killed, whether there were insurgents in there or not. At that point, what was going through my head was whoever was in there got away because that back door was open.
- Q. The bodies that you saw, can you describe them?
- A. Initially? I can't initially. I remember there may have been women in there. There may have been children in there.
- Q. And you recognized that?
- A. I did.
- Q. As the squad leader, is it your responsibility at that point to say cease fire? Let us not take another step. We just killed some women and children here?
- A. My response really as a squad leader is to make sure that none of the rest of my guys died or got killed. And at that point, we were still on the assault. So no, I don't believe so.
- Q. What happened next?
- A. We exited the house and moved further down south to the next house, which was another decision that I made. The best decision I think I made, to which house these insurgents had egressed to.



Q. What was it about that second house that made you think?  
A. Because it was directly to the house, it was the easiest house to get to. The other houses you had to kind of run down a ravine or run across places. And stepping outside of the house, we saw no one. So again, that was the best decision at that time that I made. I didn't want to sit down and start thinking about, okay, where do we -- you know, start thinking about things because I knew that can -- that is just deadly.

Q. Tell me about the take down at the second house.  
A. The second house was much like the first. And that is probably why I get the two confused so much. You got the door to the front, kicked open the door, and this house I believe there was someone initially, like right in front, who was engaged. And we went through that house much the same, prepping the rooms with a grenade, going in there and eliminating the threat, engaging the targets.

Q. But there was no threat?  
A. At that time, that's -- you know, I can look back and in hindsight is always 20/20. There probably wasn't now that I look back on it. But there, in that time, yes. I believe there was a threat.

Q. Did you fire your weapon in the second house?  
A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you pull the pin on any grenades?  
A. Yes, I did.

Q. Tell me about that.  
A. At some point in that house I was the second guy in the stack. And the second man in the stack is the person that always preps and throws the grenade. So that is what I did, pulled out my grenade, prepped it, made sure everyone knew I was throwing the grenade and threw the grenade. It exploded and we entered the room.

Q. You kicked the door in to throw the grenade? Pushed the door in?  
A. From what I remember, there was no door on where I threw the grenade. It was open. And I don't believe there was anyone in there either. But, you know, you can't take

that chance. You can't say, well, I don't think there is anyone in there so let's just go in there without prepping it. So --

Q. So you threw the grenade in, it exploded. Was there anyone inside?

A. I don't believe there was anyone in that room. There was another room. Again, sometimes I get the first two houses confused, but there was another room which again was prepped with a grenade and the lead man went in there and engaged.

Q. That grenade was thrown by a different Marine, not you?

A. Yes.

Q. The second one?

A. Yes.

Q. You didn't fire your weapon in the second house?

A. No, I did not.

Q. The second house was the Yunis family, 41-year-old man, 35-year-old woman, 28-year-old woman. And the children, Noor, who was 14; Sabea, who was 9; Zainab, who was 3; and Aishea, who was 2. They were all killed by your men. How do you explain that?

A. We did what -- we reacted to how we were supposed to, react, our training. And again, right from the beginning that's -- during that day is exactly what was going through my mind was the training. And clearing that house -- clearing that house properly, making sure that none of my men die or got killed or got shot. I did that to the best of my ability. You know, and the rest of the Marines that were there, they did their job properly as well. It's -- you know, now it is something that I think about quite often. You know, certainly doesn't give me a good feeling, you know, I mean I look at my kids thinking what if that was them? What if someone was doing that to them? And when I think about that, you know, I just can't be happier that I am living in a country that isn't involved in that sort of fighting.

Q. Did you see the Yunis family after the house was cleared? Did you see those children, Frank?

A. I didn't. Again, that house, we didn't go through and search. Those individuals in there were engaged, pretty much immediately at that point I made a decision. We are not getting fired at any more. There is no reason to go any further. We went back.

Q. The two younger girls, Zainab and Aishea, were about the same age as your daughters. When you learned that these women and children had been killed, what did you think?

A. I learned later on that day. I was -- once I calmed down from everything -- I was extremely upset about that. And, you know, I go over in my head, you know, where did we go wrong? What should we have done differently? You know, try and picture myself in that same situation, same scenario. It is -- you know, I come up with pretty much the same thing that we did because that was pretty much the only option, the only choice, the only thing for us to do at that time. The civilians did get killed. At that point my main thing was I didn't want the other Marines in my squad to start feeling like they did something wrong or feeling like they should regret something or this and that. So it is not something I talked about after that, or I did nothing but praise them and tell them that they did a good job.

Q. In the cold calculation of combat, if I understand you correctly, you made a decision consciously or unconsciously, that the life of one Marine was more important than checking out who were in these houses.

A. Absolutely. When clearing these houses in a hostile environment that's -- absolutely. Did we know that civilians were in there? No. Did we go in those rooms -- you know, it would have been one thing if we went in those rooms and looked at everyone and then shot them. I mean, we cleared these houses how they were supposed to be cleared.

[The footage was concluded.]

[END OF PAGE]

[The following is Tape 5a, an outtake of the *60 Minutes* interview with Mr. Scott Pelley and Staff Sergeant Wuterich.]

- Q. Going back to the Yunis house, the second house, there was a survivor in the Yunis house, a young girl who has said in the days after that the Marines, your Marines, you, burst into the house, yelled at the people in the house. There was yelling back at the Marines and the Marines cut everybody down.
- A. That's inaccurate. I didn't hear anyone in the house speaking as far as the Iraqis that were living there. There may have been yelling between -- you know, amongst myself and the other members, but I don't remember anyone yelling or screaming or even seeing anyone except for that initial person when we went in.
- Q. Why would she say that?
- A. You know, I don't know. I mean, I can't -- you know, these -- when the investigation finally came down it was, you know, it was a few months after -- three or four months after. I don't know if they were set up by anyone to formulate some story amongst themselves or what to make us look bad or to propoganda some -- you know, something that, you know, they wanted. I don't know. The only thing I do know is that that's inaccurate.
- Q. There was no contact -- verbal contact between the Marines and the people in the house?
- A. No.
- Q. That you recall?
- A. No.
- Q. You know, I'm curious. After you cleared these two houses, and it must of been obvious to you that numbers of people had been killed, did you go back in to see what you did?
- A. Later on that day we did. There was a small -- small group of Marines that went back through the houses to do what we call a battle damage assessment.
- Q. Did you?
- A. I did not go through.

Q. Why not?

A. You know, I was -- I wanted to be there with, you know, essentially the rest of the squad that was maintaining security in that area. You know, I was up on an over watch position. There are other Marines on the ground that went through -- that were able to go through easier than I would have.

Q. Let me make sure I understand. I believe you told me that in the first house you felt that you had seen women and children in the first house after the house had been cleared?

A. Correct.

Q. In the second house you didn't see -- let me ask the question this way, in the second house you saw what?

A. I don't remember really seeing anyone except for that initial person that was in the house. You know, I still can't remember, you know, who it was or --

Q. When you came out of the second house, what happened then?

A. The second house -- we needed to get back to where the rest of our squad was and make sure everything was copacetic over there. So, you know, we did a light jog back to, you know, the main battle area, cleared a house and set up over watch on the roof of that house.

Q. This is north of Chestnut?

A. Correct.

Q. What was involved in clearing the second house? I'm sorry. What was involved in clearing the first house north of Chestnut?

A. North of Chestnut, you know, kicked down the door, entered, there was -- you know, the house was vacant so we just went through and went upstairs.

Q. And that became your observation post?

A. Correct.

Q. What happened then?

A. At that point we were sitting up there, maybe 10/15 minutes passed. We had a group of detainees, you know, on the street in front of us. They were being questioned

and that sort of thing. We were on the roof. 10/15 minutes later we -- or someone else that was on the roof with me spotted a male run across like a berm or whatever the case may be. He asked if we should engage. I gave the okay and we fired at him.

Q. Did you kill him?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was he?

A. I don't know. You know, he was -- he had -- he was dressed in black. Black robe, a military aged male, and he was running from the hostile houses that we just cleared -- or running from that area. You know, that was the positive identification in my mind to engage him.

Q. And that constituted in your mind's hostile intent?

A. Hostile intent/hostile act. I mean, you know, they -- those houses that -- or that area where he was coming from was where we had been fired from. You know, again, military age male dressed in black; indicators.

Q. And then what?

A. From there we, you know, we sat on observation for quite a while. The IED site was starting to be cleaned up, I believe. And some time later, maybe -- I don't know. An hour or two later on one corner of the house we see -- or I spot this one man, Iraqi man, he's walking back and forth between these two houses on the other side of the street. A little suspicious only because, you know, no one was out at the time and just his manner. You know, I watched him for quite some time. You know, he'd walk across, go back inside, again come back out of his house, walk back and forth, go inside.

In my mind I thought he was trying to figure out -- or one, trying to watch us, observe us; and two, trying to figure out a way to get out of there. You know, so okay maybe this -- in my mind maybe this person or whoever's there, you know, has some information on what's going on here.

So gather the rest of the guys up on the roof, we head down through the house across the street, go to the gate, knock on the gate and a woman answers. At that point,

you know, we make our way inside, like, the little courtyard and, you know, I asked her where -- you know, where's the men at? Where's the men at? And one of the women there was an English teacher or whatever. You know, maybe she understood us. You know, but we asked where's the men at? They pointed to the house next door. Okay. So we -- I had my first team leader and one of my other Marines hold those -- you know, keep those women and children there. We went to the other house, the door was wide open. We went in there, it was myself and one other member, and we started clearing that house -- not clearing it but searching the house. We weren't, you know, throwing grenades or anything like that. Searching the house.

- Q. Why not? You were throwing grenades on the south side of this street. Why didn't you do it on the North Side?
- A. Because there was -- I mean, the house wasn't hostile. You know, we were there -- you know, you kind of have to switch modes now. You know, we're there to do a knock and talk. You know, a coordinate search, which is completely different than clearing a house that is hostile.

So went in there, but when you do go in there you still have to clear each room just not with deadly force. So cleared the room, went in, I guess a sitting room. There is a couch in there it's got a suitcase on the couch that's opened up, passports, clothes, different stuff in there.

Q. Passports?

A. Yes. Identification, passports, clothes --

Q. What nationality?

A. I didn't really take the time to check. I don't know. Walked down the hallway, there is -- you know, there is another door that's kind of, I guess, diagonal. The other Marine that was with me, he was first, went inside the room, there was -- I guess, immediately, as soon as he walked inside that room there was a guy with an AK. He tried to fire his SAW, his SAW didn't go off, we backed out, as he was backing out he grabbed his side arm and went in the room and cleared that room.

Q. Killed that man?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was armed with the AK-47?

A. Correct.

Q. What did you find in the house?

A. Besides the suitcase, nothing.

Q. A suitcase that you said it had passports. Are you talking about one or two, or a stack of 25?

A. No. I remember two of the little passport books. They may have even been, like, the identification books that they have, but usually they just have their card for identification. So to my recollection they were passports. I think there were two of them and a bunch of clothes. Which, kind of -- which is what I thought earlier, that this guy was trying to get away for whatever the reason -- for whatever reason.

Q. After you cleared that house, what happened next?

A. We left that house, got back on over watch position.

Q. And spent the rest of the afternoon there?

A. We were there all day long. All day long. Because what had happened was down south probably about three to five hundred meters from where we were at further down south we had an aerial type drone that spotted Iraqis with weapons getting in and out of cars and going inside buildings. At that point, you know, they eventually called rotary wing air in.

Q. Helicopter?

A. Helicopter to take out the houses which were, you know, suspected of having these insurgents in them.

Q. And the helicopters engaged the houses with missiles?

A. Correct.

Q. And blew them up?

A. Yes.

Q. This was how far from where you were?

A. Three to five hundred meters.



- Q. So it was a separate action from what you were doing?
- A. Yes. Yes. You know, and I believe that those incidences were absolutely linked, you know. And, we, I heard those gun shots from the south, we went south and started clearing those houses. You know, a few hours later insurgents are found to the south, you know, with weapons. And eventually, you know, I think we got them with the rotary -- with the helicopters.
- Q. You think the men that were found hours later to the south might have been the men who were shooting at you?
- A. Absolutely. That's the -- that's the only thing that can explain where we were getting shot at. To my knowledge the only house that an AK was found in was the third house. So there weren't any AKs in the other two houses that we cleared. That's the only explanation.
- Q. I want to go back for a minute to the car, the very first target that you engaged after the explosion. The five men that you shot at the car, you said that they were running away.
- A. Right.
- Q. How far did they get?
- A. When I engaged them they were approximately 15 meters from the car. I mean, you know, I wasn't -- they had been giving the commands. They had been given ample time to cooperate with my team leader. You know, letting them run any further would have been deadly as well. You know, letting whoever get away.
- Q. There is word that an aerial drone was flying over at about this time, maybe somewhat later, and took a picture of the bodies of the five men next to the car.
- A. Right.
- Q. And my understanding is those men are right next to the car. They don't look like they were running.
- A. They were about 10 to 15 meters away from the car. I mean, you know, they weren't right next to the car, but they were -- you know, they were pretty close.
- Q. They were running away from you?
- A. Yes.

Q. You shot them in the back?

A. Yes.

Q. Help me understand how those men were a threat to your Marines if they were running away from the scene.

A. The positive identification indicators that I had: Number one, military age males. Number two, the, you know, only Iraqi thing out there that morning. You know, person, vehicle, anything that was out. Number three, a hundred meters away from the IED. And number four, they weren't listening to our commands.

Q. Even if they had been enemy troops, it's within the rules to shoot fleeing troops?

A. Absolutely. Hostile acts -- you know, one, if -- you know, you don't know if they had a car bomb, if they set off the IED, you know, one of them was a trigger man, which, you know, could have been very likely. Maybe almost probable. That's hostile act.

Q. When the vehicle was searched, what was found?

A. I believe nothing. I didn't -- I don't remember partaking in the search, but as far as I know there wasn't anything found.

Q. Those men weren't armed?

A. Correct.

Q. You shot all five of them?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you feel about that today knowing that they were unarmed and there was nothing in the car?

A. You know, what I did that day, and the decisions that I made, I don't -- you know, I would make those same decisions today.

Q. You can't mean that, Frank. All those dead children.

A. I'm not talking about killing, you know, women and children, or even civilians. What I'm talking about is the tactical decisions, the house clearing, you know, lack -- you know, hesitation, you know, it's just -- it's bad news, it's bad practice for your Marines. And I made the best decisions that I could that day. Absolutely. And, you know, that's something that I'll always believe.

I understand there's quite a deal of scrutiny and I even understand why. It's -- it doesn't sit well with me that women and children died that day. In a sense civilians died that day. Those are decisions that I made in a combat situation and I believe I had to make those decisions.

Q. You say it didn't sit well. You say it doesn't sit well with you. Are you sorry? Is an apology in order?

A. There -- you know, I'm a father of two kids. I have a wife, and there is nothing, nothing that I can possibly say to, you know, make up or, you know, make well the deaths of those women and children. You know, and I am absolutely sorry that, you know, that that happened that day, and it's something that I think about. It's something that I still dream about, and it's something, you know, from time to time, you know, when I look at my kids that I think about, and it, you know, it does. It -- you know, it's something that messes with your mind and I think will always mess with your mind, but those are -- those are the decisions I made that day to keep my men alive and the rest of us came back. And, you know, they did a great job. They did what they were supposed to that day. There was nothing that we did that day that was, you know, wrong or criminal or anything like that. I mean, you know, those are just the decisions I made.

Q. The accusation is made, Frank, that your men went berserk. That you'd gotten hit by an IED, one of the favorite guys in the squad was cut in half lying in the road and your guys went nuts. You dropped the five guys next to the car because they happened to be there. And then you went to the closest house and you went down the hallway throwing grenades and shooting, and you just killed everybody you could find.

A. That's, you know, absolutely untrue. You know, one, Lance Corporal Terrazas, you know, he was a good Marine. He was a good Marine. But he was a Marine. You know, he wasn't -- he wasn't my best friend. You know, he wasn't -- you know, it's -- in that situation, like I said. And maybe it was different, you know, from what the other guys felt or whatever, but my -- just, you know, my emotion was pushed back and my training came into play. You know, quick decisions, what do we do next, how do we

do this right, and just, you know, doing that. But going completely crazy and acting wild -- you know, I don't know who came up with that, but it's false.

Q. But, Frank, within minutes your team had killed nearly every living soul in the vicinity. Within minutes. That's why people think you went berserk.

A. I don't believe that's true either. I mean, there were - - a couple things. If we wanted to kill everyone that was in the area, one, the 20 detainees that we had on the street, you know, weren't killed. You know, the other houses in the area which had families in it weren't killed. The houses that we went into were the most, you know, strategic houses that we could find. You know, it was those two houses initially and then the third house, which was I believe a completely different story. But, you know, went through those two houses and came back. Not -- you know, we didn't go to the other house on each side of the street. Later on in the day we did -- you know, we went through and we did knock and talks and coordinate searches and went through other people's houses. You know, there -- it wasn't every living soul in that area.

Q. Did you lose control of your Marines?

A. I don't believe so at all, no. No.

Q. You mentioned something -- I don't think we quite have it down. The 20 detainees, help me understand where they were, how they came to be detained, how did all that go down? And give me a time reference too.

A. This was when -- after we cleared the second house as I was coming back detainees were already starting to be on the street.

Q. Other members of your squad had been rounding these people up?

A. Correct. Correct. You know, my four men that were with me clearing the houses, there was other Marines on security, there were a couple other Marines inside another house questioning some other Iraqis. So I'm not sure who rounded them up or exactly how they got there, but they were there.

- Q. And they were detained because they were in the neighborhood, you wanted to question them?
- A. Question them, correct.
- Q. Let me just look at my notes here for just a second. Once all of this was done at the end of the day, what sort of report did you file?
- A. Well, throughout the day I was giving reports. Once we cleared that second house I called immediately to the COC, reported clearing two houses, and possibly having collateral damage. They wanted to give me -- or they wanted me to give them a rough estimate, or whatever the case may be, of how many and I told them approximately 15.
- Q. 15 civilians killed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That was your initial report?
- A. I told them approximately 15 dead. Again, we hadn't gone through the bodies so we didn't really know an exact count, nor did we know if there were any insurgents also. So I just -- I gave them that number, 15.
- Q. How did you come to know at the end of the day that the women and children, civilians, had been killed?
- A. My platoon commander and at least one of my other Marines went through the houses after we cleared them to do a battle damage assessment. And they pretty much came back to me and kind of reported it to me.
- Q. And said what to you?
- A. That, you know, there were several women and kids dead.
- Q. What did you think?
- A. You know, going through the first house, I already knew that -- you know, that's what some of the civilians in there were. I was -- I was still focused on the mission. Still focused on the mission at hand. I didn't -- you know, again, I didn't want to give the impression to the rest of my guys that they had done anything wrong or that they didn't do their job right or whatever the case may be. So, at that point, you know, I just tried to be normal, you know, Sergeant Wuterich.

- Q. But when Sergeant Wuterich went to his bunk that night and was staring up at the ceiling, what did you think?
- A. That -- I'm not sure I want to go to sleep tonight because I don't know what I'm going to dream. And that was pretty much it. And it wasn't -- you know, I don't really think I got much sleep if any at all that night.
- Q. I'm told you were pretty upset.
- A. I was very upset. You know, who wouldn't be, you know?
- Q. We have to change tapes here real quick.
- A. Okay.

[The footage concluded.]

[END OF PAGE]

[The following is Tape 6a, an outtake of the *60 Minutes* interview with Mr. Scott Pelley and Staff Sergeant Wuterich.]

Q. -- about this company logbook. Is that something that you had responsibility for? Just -- this isn't for the camera.

A. Oh, okay.

Q. Just fill me in, because I'm trying to figure out if I want to ask about it or not.

A. There was a radio logbook that our radio operator would take care of. And every time someone would call in, he'd write in what they called in, this and that. Eventually, later on in the deployment, we eventually had a watch officer logbook, which the watch officer eventually also, you know, would be me filling in for that position, they also kept a logbook. But I don't think there was a logbook for the watch officer on that day or previous. I think it got started after that day. But during that day, you know, throughout the whole deployment, the only logbook that I remember being there was that radio logbook that the RO had responsibility for.

Q. All right. Okay. Everybody ready? The day after the higher headquarters at Ramadi issued a news release that said that 15 people had been killed, civilians --

A. Right.

Q. -- by the IED explosion. And that was the official Marine Corps version of events for the public. How did that happen?

A. It's -- you know, I'm familiar with that. I think the headline read 15 civilians killed by roadside bomb. At first I wasn't even -- and I remember being there with my platoon commander, you know, maybe one of my team leaders too, but, you know, at first I didn't even think that they were talking about that incident.

Q. Because that bore no resemblance to what you had experienced.

A. Exactly. I was a little confused though because, you know, in my mind I was like, you know, I thought that, you know, was the incident they were talking about. The other side, like, how could it be the incident they were talking about. So I read the actual article and the

article was kind of ambiguous as well, in the sense that, you know, it talked about Lance Corporal Terrazas who got killed by a roadside bomb in Haditha. And the same article, like, next paragraph, it started talking about another part of Iraq where a bomb had killed 15 civilians or something like that -- a car bomb had killed 15 civilians or something like that. So I just, you know, I kind of looked at my platoon commander and he looked at me like, you know, and we just shook it off and carried on.

Q. Nobody had passed that by you before it was issued?

A. No. No.

Q. And you thought -- let me make sure I understand what you thought. You thought this was a mistake in describing the incident you were involved in or you thought it was some other incident that you didn't know about?

A. Both. Initially I thought it was a mistake. When I read the article, then I said okay well, they're obviously talking about another incident.

Q. So at the end of the day -- not to put too fine a point on it, but you must of -- you must of come to a decision about whether this was a mistake or whether it was describing some other incident. Did you think it was a mistake in the way that your incident had been described?

A. It didn't -- from what I remember the actual article being -- I don't remember it actually describing our incident at all except for an IED going off and killing Lance Corporal Terrazas. The rest of the article, you know, it stated in such and such, which is a different part of Iraq, car bomb -- or roadside bomb kills 15 civilians.

So I knew the article was partly talking about the incident, but then in my mind I thought that, you know, it just switched to another incident that happened in Iraq. And it was kind of confusing and, you know, I remember mentioning it to some of the other guys. Hey, you know, you see that article? They're like yeah. What's up with that? That's kind of weird. Because none of us could tell were they talking about that incident or were they talking about something else.



Q. What was done at the end of the day to count the dead and figure out who'd been killed?

A. They sent -- they sent another squad from our company out there -- it was actually same platoon, third squad, and also some of 1st platoon going out there along with their platoon commander. Two Marines were taking pictures. They're required to by the CO to take pictures of everyone that got killed. The people that got killed to also be marked with a marker so we can get an accurate count. So the men with the -- the Marines with the camera went in first, took picture, and then we had someone else marking them with a Sharpie, and other Marines bringing them out and putting them on vehicles.

Q. So at the end of that same day, the Marines knew exactly how many had been killed, who was civilian, whether they were children, women, they knew everything?

A. Absolutely. Everything was broken down, categorized, who was women, who was children, who was a male, how many of each, and how many total.

Q. And that information went where?

A. I would -- I don't know. Honestly, I don't know where it ended up.

Q. In the chain of command that you knew -- in your chain of command, how high up did it go; the knowledge of exactly what happened at Haditha?

A. It went all the way up to the Commanding Officer, the CO, for the company in my immediate chain of command.

Q. Captain McConnell?

A. That's correct.

Q. Was the CO of the company?

A. Yes.

Q. So you know it went that high?

A. Well, it went even higher than that, but yes. Yes.

Q. How much -- how high up the chain of command did it go by your personal knowledge?

A. By my personal knowledge right now it went -- you know, it went all the way up to regiment. And from what I understand there was a briefing -- a PowerPoint

presentation that was done about the incident -- on the incident, and I believe that was -- it was either given at the battalion level or possibly the regimental level, but from what I understand it went all the way up through regiment.

Q. So even though the press release was dead wrong, the Marine Corps chain of command knew exactly what had happened?

A. Right. Absolutely.

Q. The impression that's created by the press release is that there was a massacre of civilians and an immediate attempt to cover it up.

A. And it's -- that's completely -- I mean, that's completely false. And I don't know where the disconnect was or, you know, where that information got -- you know, information lines got severed, but -- communication lines got severed, but at some point, I'm not even sure why, but, you know, someone wrote an article stating 15 civilians killed by roadside bomb.

And I know, you know, everyone in the chain of command knew what had happened, how many there were, the whole nine yards. There wasn't a cover up at all from any level that I saw. From my level, from company level, from battalion level, you know, it was just -- it was that one -- that one article, however it got mixed up that kind of has made people believe that. A misprint.

Q. You can understand how people would believe that?

A. I understand. If I was -- you know, I'm the type of guy, I look at things from both sides, you know, from both sides. And I can -- you know, from the outside, if I had no knowledge of this, and that's what I was reading, absolutely. I mean, that's probably one of the first things I would say is, wow, this unit is trying to cover something up.

Q. What was the rest of your tour like?

A. Normal. You know, we -- November was -- November was a big month. I think it was our worst month in Iraq as far as even battalion level. After that incident there was for the most part nothing. A couple things later on towards the, you know, last month or so -- or last couple

months. But, you know, especially immediately following there was no insurgent activity. There was nothing going on. And I ended up getting promoted in January and as soon as I got promoted I got switched out from my company to weapons company where they needed me.

Q. You were promoted from sergeant to staff sergeant two months after the Haditha incident?

A. Correct.

Q. Were you reprimanded for what happened at Haditha?

A. No. I was --

Q. Did anyone take you aside and say, Sergeant, this is a bad deal.

A. No. In fact, for the most part, I mean, you know, I got praised for it. You know, I had good paperwork written up about that incident for me. Everyone understood the, you know, what had happened and what was bad and good about it. But overall, you know, I was praised for that day, how I acted that day, you know, how my squad acted that day.

Q. Praised and promoted within two months?

A. Right.

Q. What was the first you heard that people were looking at this, questions were being asked, and there might be trouble?

A. You know, it was -- the first that I remember is once I -- once I got to weapons company I remember, you know, being approached saying, hey, reporters want to come out and do a story on that incident. And, you know, I was asked to kind of go over that story again with them just so if reporters wanted to talk to them they knew what they were talking about.

Q. These are the Marine public relations -- public affairs people came to you and said we have reporters who are interested in talking --

A. No. These were Marines in my chain of command, in my unit. You know, they told me that reporters wanted to come out and do a story on it. You know, run -- they pretty much said, run by me what happened again. You know, like they already knew, but they just wanted to

make sure that they weren't missing anything or knew what they were talking about. So went over that.

Eventually, nothing happened -- nothing came out of that. Those initial reporters didn't end up coming out for whatever reasons, and I've heard a couple different reasons why.

Then later on, after we found out that those reporters weren't coming out, we got told that, okay, you know, some other people want to come out and talk about this incident. That was when, you know, the Army had come out with -- just to do, like, an information kind of gathering piece on what happened exactly that day.

After that, you know, I really didn't even think much about that because why wouldn't anyone want information on what happened that day. So, you know, we gave them our side -- we gave them what happened, then NCIS decides to show up and do their own investigation on it.

Q. The Naval Criminal Investigative Service?  
A. Correct.

Q. Did you realize at that point that you might be in trouble?

A. Well, at that point, you know, being the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, and the word "criminal" in their title, yeah, I said, okay, these guys -- well, they're probably investigating something that they think is criminal. So at that point, yes.

Q. Tell me about your life today. What's it been like since you came home?

A. Coming home initially, you know, I think it was mostly like anyone else that comes home from, you know, tour in Iraq. A little apprehensive in certain areas, but, you know, I kind of got over that -- got over that quick. Got back into the swing of things. You know, I'd lost about 15 pounds while I was over in Iraq. I almost immediately probably put back on; wanted my fair share of Taco Bell and all that other stuff, but --

Q. But there came a time when you started seeing the Haditha incident in the news.

A. It was Memorial Day weekend. I won't forget that either because the day before we went on our four-days' vacation the -- my old CO from Kilo Company and the Battalion Commander got relieved. And I remember hearing the news of that, and that -- that almost -- that probably tops the worst that I've felt since that day. It devastated me.

Q. Why?

A. Because, you know, here I am, the squad leader of, you know, what they're coming out as saying a massacre, and now, you know, one of the Marines that I respected the most out of anyone -- essentially, I just got him relieved.

Q. Lost his job over it?

A. Exactly. And that was a bit hard to swallow. And then, you know, that weekend -- yeah, it was just all over the news. And what frustrated me the most was, you know, I don't know how it happened, but my name is the name that popped up as being the central suspect or however they put it for this incident. You know, my name, my picture, all over the news that entire weekend. And, you know, besides that, you know, I was the only one pretty much associated with this incident. And, you know, that was a little upset as well -- upsetting as well. So it was a rough weekend, Memorial Day weekend.

Q. How is your family holding up?

A. Right now they're -- they're doing good. We all are. We all are. And, you know, I try not to think about it as much as possible because it's not very conducive to going forward with my life, I think. You know, my daughter plays soccer, I help coach her team. My wife's finishing up her bachelor's degree online. You know, I do what I like to do; play guitar. You know, I'll play guitar with a couple of my buddies or, you know, sit at home and play guitar with one of my daughters. We go on and are living life normally.

- Q. Your daughters are pretty young. Have you said anything to them about this? Are they aware that there's something going on?
- A. They're aware that something's going on. What my wife and I have left it at is that people are interested in what daddy did in Iraq, and that's about as much as they know.
- Q. You know, Frank, you could well be facing the death penalty.
- A. I understand that. That's something that, you know, I really thought about a lot earlier. But, you know, it's -- I don't believe that's an option at this point. I think, you know, when the truth gets out there and, you know, people see the story from what actually happened on the ground that day, and -- you know, I think they're going to understand, you know, that there's, you know -- that maybe it's not how it's been portrayed as a massacre or as my lie or any of that. Something completely different.
- Q. You don't think this is a massacre?
- A. No. Absolutely not.
- Q. 24 dead civilians?
- A. It's -- a massacre in my mind by definition is a large group of people being executed. Being killed for absolutely no reason, and that's absolutely not what happened here.
- Q. But who pays for this, Frank? 24 dead civilians, somebody's got to pay don't they?
- A. You know, I think myself and probably some of my other squad probably, you know, pay for it every day in their own ways. You know I understand, you know, the pressure, I think, on, you know, the United States Marine Corps, even the United States from the Iraqi government or any other group that something has to be done with this case. You know, I wish it wouldn't become a, you know, political thing because that's -- I don't think that's how it should be looked at. But -- you know, I understand. I just -- I understand the pressure that there is to have someone pay for this.

- Q. You say that each of the Marines pays for it every day. How do you pay for it?
- A. My thoughts, my dreams, looking at my wife and kids. Knowing that, you know, there's -- that there's families out there that have -- you know, that their loved ones have been killed.
- Q. Looking back, do you think you did anything wrong?
- A. I don't think the decisions that I made that day were wrong. Absolutely not. I think, maybe, you know -- and hindsight is always 20/20, I -- you know, I wish with knowledge that I have now I may have tweaked a couple of my decisions knowing what I know now. However, you know, at the time being there, I made the best decisions that I could.
- Q. Some of your Marines rounded up people on the north side of the street for questioning.
- A. Correct.
- Q. But, Frank, everywhere you went in those first minutes -- everywhere you went --
- A. Yes.
- Q. -- people died. Why do you think that is?
- A. I don't think, you know, there's some coincidence linked to that. It was combat. We were clearing houses that we were being engaged from. It was just -- it was combat. I think, you know, whether or not I went with them or whether or not it was a different squad, a different unit, whoever was there, in that, you know, that same situation that the same thing would have been done.
- Q. You were taking the point in the hostile action.
- A. Correct.
- Q. You were the one taking the houses down that you thought were a threat.
- A. Right.
- Q. I'm curious, what do you think the American people don't understand about this war?
- A. I wouldn't say so much about the war, but I think, you know, American people expect a lot from their military, as they should. And, you know, we're there to do a good

thing and, you know, I think a lot of good things has happened there. You know, and I think, you know, at this point, the American people, you know, don't see that as much. You know, I think they should -- or it would be nice if they could kind of understand the point of view from a Marine or soldier, corpsman on the ground.

Q. And what do the American people not understand about that point of view?

A. we're not there as -- you know, we're policing the area the best we can, but when it comes down to it when it's a combat situation, a hostile situation, we're there to bring the men that are in charge -- or that we're in charge of home alive. However, we can't. That, you know, we're not per se a local police force or SWAT team who are specially trained for situations that we are not. It's -- it's a tough situation. There's a lot of young men in Iraq right now, you know, fighting and dying every day. And we want to eliminate those deaths of our own soldiers.

Q. One thing that cannot be disputed about November 19, 2005, is that you were in combat.

A. That is correct. That is correct.

Q. The first casualty was a Marine.

A. That's correct.

Q. You know, I wonder, why have you decided to talk to us about this?

A. I want to get -- I want to get the truth out there. And, you know, a couple -- couple reasons. My name was the one that was put out there initially, and I know, you know, like I said, I try to look at things from both sides. You know, I know outside looking in at me, you know, everyone visualizes me as a monster, you know, baby killer, cold-blooded, you know, that sort of thing.

It's -- you know, that's not accurate and neither is the story that most of them know about this incident. They need to know the truth. You know, they need to, you know, I think change their minds about this incident. It's a terrible tragic incident, but, you know, it's war, it's combat. The rest -- the rest of my men came home alive. They did their job and I did my job.



- Q. Congressmen Murtha said you killed those children in cold blood. Quote, in cold blood, end quote.
- A. Yes, he did. Frustrating. Unbelievable. You know, it's one thing to have political motives, it's another thing to talk about someone, you know, who he doesn't know and never knew, never met. You know, doesn't know the, you know, the service that I've done or, you know, the good things that I've done in the Marine Corps to say things like that. And, you know, he may not have necessarily put my name out there, but my name is the one that's attached to this, which is -- you know, so I'm the cold-blooded killer -- cold-blooded murder -- or kill children in cold blood.
- Q. When your face appears on the screen for the first time, people are going to say there's that Marine that killed all those children.
- A. Yes, they are. You know, I've gotten, you know, letters that weren't that great to say the least. You know, and it's just hard because I know, you know, when this gets over with, you know, I get out, I move on with my life, you know, how -- where can I live where people won't be able to associate me with that incident.

In time people will forget. In time, you know, I guess maybe the majority probably wouldn't be able to do that, but, you know, I don't need my kids going to school, you know, seeing the last name and saying, hey, is your dad Frank? Isn't he the one that killed all -- that murdered and massacred those women and children? You know, I mean, that's something that they certainly don't need to deal with and, you know, that I really care to deal with the rest of my life either. And that may be the way it is.

- Q. Terrific. We got to change tapes. I'm done with my questions but these guys have always got three or four --

[The footage concluded.]

[END OF PAGE]

[The following is Tape 7a, an outtake of the *60 Minutes* interview between Mr. Scott Pelley and Staff Sergeant Wuterich.]

Q. In these last few years there have been untold numbers of innocent Iraqi civilians that have been killed by bombs dropped from planes, missiles, artillery --

A. Right.

Q. And yet, those cases don't get prosecuted. How do you feel about that?

A. I don't think that they should. I don't think that they should get prosecuted. There are reasons why those events took place. Just like this incident. There are reasons why and I don't think they should be scrutinized or prosecuted. And I don't think there should be someone made out to be the fall guy or scapegoat or anything like that.

Q. It makes you wonder what is the difference between dropping a 500 pound bomb through the roof of a house and throwing a grenade behind a half closed door.

A. You know, I think we all know the difference is that you have troops on the ground versus someone in the air. And that is the difference that there is. People argue that, you know, troops on the ground are able to see and pick their individual targets versus a plane or a helicopter in the air. And in some instances that is true, but when you are faced with a situation where you are being attacked and you need to go clear a house that's not entirely true. You don't look before you throw a grenade in. And after that grenade is off, you don't wait for the smoke to settle and then look to see if there is anyone with an AK in there or anything like that. So that is not necessarily true either.

Q. You know, you were sent into this place, extremely hostile place, with no way to tell the difference between the local residents and the enemy?

A. Right.

Q. I mean, was this an impossible situation from the very beginning?

A. No, I don't think so. It is a very difficult situation. I think the way that our command went about it was the best way possible. And we came home with minimal

casualties or KIA's as well. It was a very small amount. Have an aggressive posture; treat every patrol as if you were going to get fired on, as if you were going to be attached, as if you were going to be ambushed. Don't let down your guard. Don't be complacent. Use the intelligence that you get to weed out the insurgents that we know of. And keep -- the biggest thing is -- keep the insurgents afraid of us. Keep the civilians happy with us and not afraid of us, and civilians will start to turn on the insurgents.

Q. What you are telling us in this interview is that you did the job you were asked to do. And you did it in the way that you were trained to do it.

A. Correct.

Q. And now you are being prosecuted.

A. Right.

Q. And potentially face the death penalty.

A. Right.

Q. How do you feel about the Marine Corps now?

A. I will never say anything bad about the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has done amazing things for me. I think the Marine Corps is an outstanding place to start for younger males or females out of high school that are not sure what to do. I have grown up so much in the Marine Corps. And I don't believe that I would be the person that I am today if I hadn't joined the Marine Corps. It is not -- I am not mad at the Marine Corps. I am not particularly mad at anyone or anything. I just want to see this through. And I think what will eventually come out of it is the truth and the people to understand.

Q. You're going to cast your luck with military justice.

A. Absolutely. And at this point it is probably not a choice of mine. It is going to happen. But, you know, may justice prevail.

INT: Thank you very much.

[Interviewer converses with film crew.]

Q. Do you feel like you are being a scapegoat in all of this?

A. I have mixed feelings about that. I think that there is pressure for something to be done about this incident. I think, I mean, sometimes it is the only thing that I can think when my name has, at least at the beginning, has been the only name put out there for this incident. And on top of that being the central suspect, which I have heard several times, for this incident. I understand that I was the senior leadership on the ground that day. And I understand that that is just the way that it goes, whoever is the senior person is the person that takes the heat for it. So in that sense I understand, but it just, what upsets me is the fact that my name is out there in American minds and the media. And I never really understood how, or even why, when charges haven't even been brought up on anyone -- any of us yet.

Q. You remind me of something. Let me ask this question. You have defended in this interview the actions that you took and the decisions you made. But let me ask you this, did any man in your squad fail you? Did any man in your squad take action that you don't believe is justifiable?

A. No. All the actions that were taken that day, all the combat, tactical, and military actions taken that day, were done how they should have been done.

Q. Nobody lost control? Nobody went berserk? You didn't lose control of anybody?

A. No.

Q. You're proud of what every man did?

A. I am. They did their job. They did it well.

INT: Thanks. I think we are done.

[The footage was concluded.]

[END OF PAGE]

[The following is Tape 8a, an outtake of the *60 Minutes* interview between Mr. Scott Pelley and Staff Sergeant Wuterich.]

Q. Show me your convoy route coming back.

A. Coming back we were coming up River Road here [indicating], going down Chestnut, all the way to the end until it branches off to the right, headed back up to Front Base Sparta.

Q. And this is the road that you call Chestnut?

A. Correct.

Q. Show me where the IED hit.

A. The IED hit right in this area [indicating]. Actually, it was exactly in that area right where that patch of road is [indicating].

Q. You can see where they patched it here [indicated] in this picture that was taken after the event.

A. Yes, you can.

Q. Go ahead and put a sticker on there for me. So that is where the explosion occurred?

A. Correct.

Q. Now show me where the white car was approaching.

A. The white car was right on the -- pretty much on the intersection of this [indicating], right where this dirt area is actually. So it was right about there [indicating].

Q. Where were you when you opened fire on the men in the white car?

B. To my best recollection, I was in front of this group of shops [indicating], or abandoned buildings, or buildings that were starting to be constructed. Right about here [indicating].

Q. And you were right about here [indicating]. And for scale, here is an automobile coming down the road right there [indicating].

A. Right.

- Q. Your HMMWV was ahead of the last HMMWV so you must have stopped in here somewhere [indicating].
- A. Correct. Yes.
- Q. And then you proceeded on foot to right about here [indicating]?
- A. Correct.
- Q. And engaged this car [indicating]?
- A. Correct.
- Q. Now, the first house that was cleared, where is that?
- A. The first house that we cleared is right here [indicating]. It is right past this little ditch or wadi [indicating].
- Q. And you approached that house from where? Did you come around this way or down this way [indicating]?
- A. No, we came straight across. Once QRF came, I think it was like behind these walls [indicating] we got some cover with my platoon commander and my first team leader discussing our next, you know, route. And this was the house that I identified [indicating].
- Q. You identified the house?
- A. Correct.
- Q. What drew your attention to it?
- A. Well, first of all, you know, it sits -- it is kind of sparse in this area [indicating] not very dense. This building was right in the line of sight of this explosion here. The windows were boarded up and, you know, that was the best knowledge that I went by to make that decision.
- Q. Something about the windows being boarded up led you to believe that it was --
- A. Right. And it seemed the most -- most, you know, accessible spot for insurgents to fire from the south side.
- Q. And then the second house you proceeded to after the first was where?
- A. The second house was right in this complex here [indicating] I believe.

- Q. So after the shooting stopped here [indicating], you proceeded down here?
- A. Correct.
- Q. The observation post you set up in the afternoon, where would that have been?
- A. The observation post was this big building right here [indicating] across the road.
- Q. And that is where your operations were conducted for the rest of the day?
- A. Yes, for the most part.
- Q. Terrazas was evacuated and Crossan were evacuated where?
- A. They were evacuated on site, on scene. So where the actual HMMWV I think ended up a little bit -- yeah, a little bit north of where the actual explosion -- or a little bit west of where the actual explosion was.
- Q. And the medevac helicopter landed where to pick them up?
- A. It landed at the -- there is a soccer field in that direction [indicating].
- Q. So they were carried by HMMWV? The wounded were carried by HMMWV up the soccer field?
- A. Correct.
- Q. And that is where the helicopters picked them up? What is this neighborhood? Had you been here -- let me ask this question again. What is this neighborhood? Had you been through here before?
- A. We had -- we had been through there several times. It was, you know, a lot of southern Haditha I guess, which is what you could consider this. Getting the intel reports that we got, it said a lot of the areas here -- a lot of the neighborhoods were somewhat, you know, shady or something of interest -- a place of interest to look at.
- Q. Well, what did intel say about them?
- A. We ended up picking up a lot of guys due to intel from this section [indicating]. Also, when we first got there, there were a couple firefights that happened from this side of Haditha, which we knew about. So it just,

you know, intelligence just pretty much told us that this was a neighborhood we need to keep an eye out for and watch out for.

Q. But if I was standing on the ground at this intersection [indicating] and I was looking around, what would I see?

A. You would see -- for the most part, you probably would see everyday activity.

Q. But these are residential houses [indicating]?

A. Correct.

Q. This is just a neighborhood over here [indicating]?

A. Correct.

Q. And the same over here, all of this is residential [indicating]?

A. Right. All of it is residential. Out here [indicating] you get into shops and that sort of thing. Mostly residential, like this area I think was [indicating] a car maintenance place that was either in the process of being built -- or no one really used it. But yeah, for the most part it is all residential, shops here and there.

Q. You know, when you were trying to figure out where the spotter was that set off this bomb --

A. Right.

Q. -- you looked here [indicating]?

A. Correct.

Q. Why not here [indicating]? Why not there [indicating]?

A. Because the -- when the insurgents use or have command detonated IEDs, they always look for specific points. I think there was -- yeah, right here [indicating] you have got a telephone pole, you got another telephone pole. So what they will do is as the vehicle is driving up [indicating] they will judge off of this telephone pole. As soon as it, like, gets in front of this [indicating] telephone pole, they will detonate it, which is right in the line of sight.



Q. They use it as a sight, essentially, the telephone pole?  
A. Correct. Correct.

Q. How fast were you going down the road?  
A. Convoy speeds were normally about 35 mph or less. So it was that -- I can't remember exactly, probably around 30 mph.

Q. And you were trained to look for sites like this telephone pole?  
A. We were made aware of that being the practices. Obviously, it would take all day if we stopped at every site to check it out. But that was one of the things -- indicators to look for when it came to IED's.

Q. So what the insurgents needed was a marker between themselves and the explosion [indicating] and to your estimation in that moment, the telephone pole would do the trick?  
A. Correct. Right.

INT: Guys, what else have we missed?

CREW MEMBER: I think that is good. Can you do it one more time sort of showing the convoys movement on River road, just trace it with your finger?

INT: Yeah. Do you want the dots to go away?

CREW MEMBER (1): Yeah. Take the dots away and then do it again and just --

CREW MEMBER (2): Leave it there, leave it there.

CREW MEMBER (3): We have another map.

INT: We've got it. We have another map. We can just leave it.

ACC: Well, there you go.

[Crew members bring in new map.]

CREW MEMBER (1): It needs to be flipped around.

INT: Yeah. It is upside down.

CREW MEMBER (1): 180 degrees.

INT: There you go.

CREW MEMBER (1): If you could follow with his finger.

CREW MEMBER (2): Yeah, I will. I still have -- have you monitored the camera?

CREW MEMBER (1): Yeah. We start production on three.

CREW MEMBER (2): Okay. Thank you. All right. Where are you going to start so I have an idea where you will start and then I will follow you?

INT: He is going to start down there in the bottom right hand corner.

CREW MEMBER (2): Okay. I got it.

CREW MEMBER (1): Do you want to get that other one out of there? The one behind it.

CREW MEMBER (3): Yeah.

INT: There you go. And Frank try -- when you do that make it kind of slow and deliberate so that the camera can follow along.

ACC: All right.

INT: All set.

CREW MEMBER (2): Do you want me to stand water shot for this one?

CREW MEMBER (1): No. I want the -- who wanted the water shot?

CREW MEMBER (2): Me. Of the front end -- front space.

CREW MEMBER (1): Yeah, sure.

CREW MEMBER (2): All right.

CREW MEMBER (1): Okay.

**Questions by the interviewer (continued):**

Q. So show me the route you were following heading back to Sparta.

A. Coming back to Sparta we came up going north on River Road down here [indicating]. Headed up and made a left on Chestnut [indicating]. The first two vehicles traveled down this side of Chestnut [indicating]. The vehicle that I was driving traveled down this side of Chestnut [indicating] and then the fourth vehicle traveled up this side [indicating]. The first two vehicles traveled without incident [indicating]. My vehicle traveled without incident [indicating]. Once I got to right about here [indicating], the huge explosion went off, which was right here [indicating].

Q. You can actually see from this where they have patched the road [indicating]?

A. Yes, you can.

Q. Judging from these cars around it, it is about the length of a car, the hole that they have patched?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Did Terrazas' HMMWV come down right about here [indicating] at the same spot?

A. Terrazas' HMMWV -- that is exactly where it exploded. The front end of the entire HMMWV was completely destroyed. We found parts from that HMMWV up in this area [indicating], all the way a couple hundred meters down the street just in all directions.

Q. It was a big bomb?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Unusually big?

A. Yes. It was probably one of the biggest I saw the entire deployment there.

INT: Gentlemen?

CREW MEMBER (1): Can he show us where the -- where they called in the air strikes?

INT: Yeah. Is that on the map?

CREW MEMBER (2): It's off the map, right?

ACC: It's right off the map. It's down -- it's right after this open area. There is a couple houses. This -- this -- it's probably right south of this.

CREW MEMBER (2): Is it worth it to get just that line of sight from the telephone pole again because I wasn't really --

CREW MEMBER (1): I think we should do the -- let's put the sticker now, back again, and then let's do once again the movement. I just want to trace -- oh no, no, no, I am sorry -- keep it with this board.

INT: Yes.

CREW MEMBER (1): And let's just do a new set of stickers.

INT: All right.

CREW MEMBER (1): Let's put the --

CREW MEMBER (2): Why don't we just use the old ones?

CREW MEMBER (1): Because they are too wide and I want to get --

INT: Katherine, will you get me another page of yellow stickers, please?

CREW MEMBER (4): Yes, sir.

INT: Just in case we end up cutting from one of the other --

CREW MEMBER (1): Just like you did right here, let's just yet again trace the movement with the stickers.

INT: All right. Got them. Got them, Katherine. Thanks.

ACC: So putting stickers like every --

INT: No, no, no. Just the same stickers we put down before. I think what Sean is trying to do now is shoot the same thing over again --

ACC: Okay.

INT: -- but tighter.

ACC: Okay.

INT: As opposed to the wider shot of us sitting here doing it, he is going to have, you know, tighter shots.

CREW MEMBER (1): That's alright. But I don't want to fake it; I want to just do it again.

INT: I understand. When you are ready.

CREW MEMBER (2): We are all ready, still rolling.

INT: Just to give you a frame of reference, the first sticker is going to end up right here [indicating].

CREW MEMBER (2): You got it.

INT: Okay.

CREW MEMBER (2): I will be right in there.

**Questions by the interviewer (continued):**

Q. So walk me through it one more time, Frank, starting with the movement from the traffic control point.

A. We came up here [indicating] going north on River Road a four vehicle convoy. The first two vehicles make a left [indicating] up Chestnut. My vehicle makes a left up Chestnut on the other side [indicating]. The fourth vehicle makes a left up Chestnut [indicating] following about 50 meters apart each vehicle. Then the explosion right here [indicating]. And you can see that patch of road right there [indicating].

Q. Okay. Go ahead and mark that for me. Now, where was the white car as it came up on your location?

A. The white car was coming up here [indicating] right where this intersection is; there is dirt patches. It was right about here [indicating].

Q. And the first house?

A. The first house coming down south -- right there [indicating].

Q. And then the second house that you cleared?

A. The second house was directly south of the first house -- right here [indicating].

Q. How much time passed from the explosion to the clearing of the second house? The whole thing.

A. The only thing I can do is estimate and, you know, my best recollection would probably be half hour, 45 minutes.

Q. But everything happened in pretty quick succession?

A. Yes, it did.

Q. The explosion happened and you saw the white car immediately?

A. Right.

Q. You engaged it immediately?

A. Right.

Q. Then you came back, you had a short conversation over here [indicating]?

A. Dealt with the casualties, called in the CAS report. Found -- my platoon commander came with QRF, had a conversation right here with him [indicating] on the next plan of action. After we were receiving fire, we decided this was the house we needed to clear [indicating].

Q. And once you cleared this one, you went straight to this one [indicating].

A. Correct.

INT: Okay.

CREW MEMBER (1): You know there is a house between house number one and house number two?

INT: Well, it's abandoned.

ACC: Yeah, it is being constructed.

CREW MEMBER (1): I see.

ACC: It's under construction.

CREW MEMBER (1): Did we ever ask you whether you think that those guys in the car actually were spotters? What is your best guess on that?

ACC: Yes. You know, initially that is exactly what I thought was that they were part of what had just happened. That was one of my first initial thoughts and then putting the other PID indicators along with that, so, yes.

INT: I'm sorry. I was just thinking something and I lost my train of thought. Well, I am sure it will come back to me. Okay. All done here?

CREW MEMBER (1): I think so, yeah.

INT: All right. Good. Good. Good. Good.

CREW MEMBER (2): Cut the tap. Am I tight?

INT: We are going to be up here [indicating].

CREW MEMBER (2): Okay.

INT: And the place of interest is going to be right there at the intersection.

CREW MEMBER (2): Okay. I am rolling.

INT: But not too terribly tight. I need the rest -- I need the perspective. Yeah, when you are set. All right.

CREW MEMBER (1): Wait, his microphone is not on. Can you turn it on?

ACC: Oh. Okay.

INT: We are back.

CREW MEMBER (1): Okay.

INT: All set then?

CREW MEMBER (1): Yes.

INT: All right.

**Questions by the interviewer (continued):**

Q. The Quick Reaction Force, your backup, came from what direction?

A. I can't remember. The first one came down River Road this way [indicating]. So it came from the north down south. That was the easiest way to get to the -- you know, to the site.

Q. And what happened to those guys as they were approaching your location?

A. They came upon an IED. They spotted it before they actually got there and conducted their IED procedures. So --

Q. So there was a second roadside bomb?

A. There was a second roadside bomb.

Q. Right here [indicating]? Right on the road that the Quick Reaction Force would have been taking?

A. Correct.

Q. What did that tell you?

A. I remember hearing it on the radio that QRF is going to be a few minutes because they just -- they hit an IED or they are at an IED. So at this point, that just kind of put into perspective exactly what was going down at this point.

Q. And what was that?

A. IED goes off, followed by a secondary IED to stop QRF and small arms ambush which is one of the biggest and worst things that we look for when we are on patrol.



Q. So you had the impression that this was a coordinated attack?

A. Absolutely. It was.

Q. Okay. Very Good. Thanks.


[The footage was concluded.]


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COURT REPORTER ATTESTATION

In accordance with R.C.M. 807(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)(D), we are qualified, certified, and sworn court reporters in the U.S. Marine Corps, assigned to Legal Services Support Section, Camp Pendleton, California, 92055.

We affirm that the preceding transcript is a true and accurate verbatim account of the CBS *60 Minutes* interview outtakes conducted between Mr. Scott Pelley and Staff Sergeant Frank D. Wuterich.

  
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J. Reveles  
Sgt, U.S. Marine Corps  
Court Reporter  
20101022  
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S. E. Milam  
Cpl U.S. Marine Corps  
Court Reporter  
22 OCT 2010  
Date