See below. These are Michigan cases but are interesting for the Al-Ajeeb case.
Issues: Whether the defendants-officers were entitled to governmental immunity as a matter of law pursuant to MCL 691.1407 and Odom v. Wayne Cnty.; Maiden v. Rozwood; Transou v. City of Pontiac; Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing); "Scope of authority"; Backus v. Kauffman (On Rehearing); "Probable cause to arrest"; People v. Champion; A claim of false arrest or false imprisonment; Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley; "Good faith"; Burnett v. City of Adrian
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: Wilson v. McCormick
e-Journal Number: 49619
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Markey, Saad, and Gleicher
Holding that the defendants-officers were entitled to governmental immunity, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting them summary disposition. The Secret Service and a local police department conducted an investigation of a counterfeiting scheme. Plaintiff-Wilson was arrested. The plaintiffs-Chabans (a woman and her minor son) were taken to the police station, where she was questioned and they were released. The district court ruled that the prosecutor did not present sufficient evidence to bind Wilson over for trial on the counterfeiting charges. Plaintiffs sued the officers for assault and battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Defendants argued that they were entitled to governmental immunity as a matter of law pursuant to MCL 691.1407 and Odom. They maintained that there was no issue of material fact as to whether they acted in the course of their employment and scope of authority, and that their actions were discretionary and made in good faith. All of the defendants were lower-ranking governmental employees and plaintiffs pleaded intentional torts. Thus, as outlined in Odom, the court analyzed plaintiff's intentional tort claims under the test outlined in Ross. Plaintiffs argued that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest them and thus, they acted outside the scope of their authority. Plaintiffs based their argument on the trial court's decision not to bind Wilson over on charges brought by the prosecutor as to Wilson's alleged involvement in the counterfeiting ring. However, as "the trial court correctly ruled, the question of whether there was probable cause to arrest plaintiffs at the scene of the crime is an entirely different inquiry." Probable cause to arrest exists "where the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." The court held that this standard was clearly satisfied here. Defendants presented evidence that, in conjunction with a detailed investigation by the Secret Service, they observed M and other suspects purchase electronic items from store employee D, who was known to have taken a significant amount of counterfeit money in exchange for electronic merchandise. Immediately after M bought the large screen television at D's register, investigators found counterfeit bills in the register that were clearly used in the transaction. As these activities occurred, Wilson arrived in the store parking lot with the Chabans and G. Outside the store, officers saw M, Wilson, and G place the television into Wilson's car. According to the complaint, the Chabans remained in the car to protect the television while Wilson went back into the store and plaintiffs were arrested shortly thereafter. "Clearly, the evidence reported to and observed by the officers was reasonably trustworthy and more than sufficient to warrant a cautious person to believe that plaintiffs were involved in the commission of a crime." Plaintiffs "presented no evidence to establish any basis to believe that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that plaintiffs were involved in the ongoing criminal activity. It is well-settled that, if an arrest is legal, plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment." Regardless of the bindover decision, "even if an officer ultimately had no basis to arrest a suspect, so long as the officer acted in good faith, he is entitled to immunity under Ross." The officers presented evidence that they acted without malice. The evidence showed that they observed criminal activity occurring at the store, "they observed plaintiffs take possession of merchandise obtained through the use of counterfeit funds, and they properly arrested and detained plaintiffs as suspects." There was no indication that the officers acted with any improper purpose in any aspect of the investigation or arrests. Affirmed.
Full Text Opinion
Negligence & Intentional Tort
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This summary also appears under Municipal
Issues: § 1983 claims against a police officer, municipalities and various municipal officials including false arrest, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and a challenge to reduction of the jury's $1,000,000 punitive damages award; Whether the district court properly denied the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims; Whether there was "probable cause" to arrest plaintiff; Sykes v. Anderson; Pyles v. Raisor; Beck v. Ohio; United States v. Pearce; Whether evidence of a draft settlement agreement violated Fed.R.Evid. 408; Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.; Croskey v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.; United States v. Logan; Whether the district court properly permitted counsel to question defendant-Wilder if various witnesses were lying; United States v. Dickens; Appeal of the district court's reduction of her punitive damages award; Chicago Title Ins. Corp v. Magnuson; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell; Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, LLC; The "ratio component of the excessiveness inquiry"; Mendez v. County of San Bernadino (9th Cir.); Bridgeport Music, Inc.v. Justin Combs Publ'g; Argentine v. United Steel Workers of Am.
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit
Case Name: Arnold v. Wilder
e-Journal Number: 49678
Judge(s): White, Keith, and Gibbons
The court held, inter alia, the district court did not err in denying the defendants' renewed motion for a judgment as a matter of law as to plaintiff-Arnold's false arrest claim because a reasonable jury could have concluded based on the evidence presented at trial, that officer defendant-W did not have probable cause to arrest her. The case arose from an incident on 10/25/03 in Kingsley, KY. Plaintiff lived with her three children. Plaintiff said that she walked outside to tell her son and his friends to come back inside the house. Once outside, she saw officer W parking his police car across the street in defendant-Breuer's (mayor of Kingsley) driveway. She saw W go to Breuer's front porch. Several boys, including plaintiff's son, walked toward her in the driveway. W crossed the street to speak to the boys. Apparently, plaintiff knew W's purpose even before she spoke to him because Breuer had called the police several times to complain that the neighborhood children, including plaintiff's son, were "running through the yards, jumping over fences, and running through flower beds." Another local town's chief of police (R) had gone to plaintiff's house and let her know that the boys were going to have to stop doing that. On 10/25/03 Breuer had again called the police. R called W and told him to respond to the call and stop the boys from running through the yards. Plaintiff asked W if she could help while he was talking to the boys. She told them to go into her house and call their moms and told W that R had talked to her about the boys. W got very angry, moved toward plaintiff, blocked her from going to her house, and told her "Your daddy can't help you now." The next thing she remembered was W knocking her to the ground. Once she was on the ground, the children ran into her house. He put her in a chokehold and began to drag her across the street to his police car. At no point did W tell plaintiff that she was under arrest or that he was going to arrest her. Once they were at W's police car, she asked him to wait until someone came to take care of the children. Instead W shoved her in the back of the car and sprayed her with pepper spray. W locked her in the police car. One of the boys ran around to the other side of the police car, letting plaintiff out and she ran to her house. The boys called 911, plaintiff's father, and their mothers. Plaintiff's daughter had pepper spray on her. One of her son's friends testified consistently with plaintiff's account and saw her turning purple when W had her in a chokehold. Officers from another police department arrived. Sergeant B saw W by his police car, and asked him what had occurred. He told her a prisoner had escaped, went into her house, and locked the door. Finally, plaintiff's brother, a defense attorney, arrived and asked to speak to his sister. A witness heard W say "I'm going to lock up this f**king c**t up . . . . These people are going to learn to respect me." B tried to get W to "iron this out" without taking plaintiff to jail, but W refused. W responded, "Bitch, I am taking that f**king whore to jail and nobody's stopping me." W then took plaintiff to the police station. During the ride she heard him say on the telephone ". . . I'm going to teach . . . these people . . . a lesson." Plaintiff was later arraigned on disorderly conduct, third-degree assault, resisting arrest, and escape charges. She was found not guilty of reduced misdemeanor charges. Plaintiff sued. After trial, the jury awarded her $2,400 for physical injury including pain and suffering, $5,000 for legal expenses, $50,000 for mental pain and suffering and $1,000,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's post-trial motion as to plaintiff's false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, and related evidentiary claims, and the district court's grant of a judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's child's IIED claim, modified the punitive damages award to $550,000, and remanded for a judgment consistent with the court's opinion.
Full Text Opinion
This summary also appears under Municipal
Issues: Whether the defendants-officers were entitled to governmental immunity as a matter of law pursuant to MCL 691.1407 and Odom v. Wayne Cnty.; Maiden v. Rozwood; Transou v. City of Pontiac; Ross v. Consumers Power Co. (On Rehearing); "Scope of authority"; Backus v. Kauffman (On Rehearing); "Probable cause to arrest"; People v. Champion; A claim of false arrest or false imprisonment; Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley; "Good faith"; Burnett v. City of Adrian
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals (Unpublished)
Case Name: Wilson v. McCormick
e-Journal Number: 49619
Judge(s): Per Curiam – Markey, Saad, and Gleicher
Holding that the defendants-officers were entitled to governmental immunity, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting them summary disposition. The Secret Service and a local police department conducted an investigation of a counterfeiting scheme. Plaintiff-Wilson was arrested. The plaintiffs-Chabans (a woman and her minor son) were taken to the police station, where she was questioned and they were released. The district court ruled that the prosecutor did not present sufficient evidence to bind Wilson over for trial on the counterfeiting charges. Plaintiffs sued the officers for assault and battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Defendants argued that they were entitled to governmental immunity as a matter of law pursuant to MCL 691.1407 and Odom. They maintained that there was no issue of material fact as to whether they acted in the course of their employment and scope of authority, and that their actions were discretionary and made in good faith. All of the defendants were lower-ranking governmental employees and plaintiffs pleaded intentional torts. Thus, as outlined in Odom, the court analyzed plaintiff's intentional tort claims under the test outlined in Ross. Plaintiffs argued that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest them and thus, they acted outside the scope of their authority. Plaintiffs based their argument on the trial court's decision not to bind Wilson over on charges brought by the prosecutor as to Wilson's alleged involvement in the counterfeiting ring. However, as "the trial court correctly ruled, the question of whether there was probable cause to arrest plaintiffs at the scene of the crime is an entirely different inquiry." Probable cause to arrest exists "where the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." The court held that this standard was clearly satisfied here. Defendants presented evidence that, in conjunction with a detailed investigation by the Secret Service, they observed M and other suspects purchase electronic items from store employee D, who was known to have taken a significant amount of counterfeit money in exchange for electronic merchandise. Immediately after M bought the large screen television at D's register, investigators found counterfeit bills in the register that were clearly used in the transaction. As these activities occurred, Wilson arrived in the store parking lot with the Chabans and G. Outside the store, officers saw M, Wilson, and G place the television into Wilson's car. According to the complaint, the Chabans remained in the car to protect the television while Wilson went back into the store and plaintiffs were arrested shortly thereafter. "Clearly, the evidence reported to and observed by the officers was reasonably trustworthy and more than sufficient to warrant a cautious person to believe that plaintiffs were involved in the commission of a crime." Plaintiffs "presented no evidence to establish any basis to believe that the officers lacked probable cause to believe that plaintiffs were involved in the ongoing criminal activity. It is well-settled that, if an arrest is legal, plaintiffs cannot maintain a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment." Regardless of the bindover decision, "even if an officer ultimately had no basis to arrest a suspect, so long as the officer acted in good faith, he is entitled to immunity under Ross." The officers presented evidence that they acted without malice. The evidence showed that they observed criminal activity occurring at the store, "they observed plaintiffs take possession of merchandise obtained through the use of counterfeit funds, and they properly arrested and detained plaintiffs as suspects." There was no indication that the officers acted with any improper purpose in any aspect of the investigation or arrests. Affirmed.
Haytham Faraj, Esq.
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