

---

d. Where the individual was treated at Government expense for injuries caused by third parties in connection with a matter being investigated for purpose 2e, above: Disclosure is voluntary, but refusal to disclose the requested information could result in a requirement for you to assign to the Government your medical care claims against third parties in connection with the incident, or authorize withholding of the records of your treatment in naval medical facilities.

e. In any other case: Disclosure is voluntary, and if you do not provide the requested information, and determinations or evaluations made as a result of the investigation will be made on the basis of the evidence that is contained in the investigative record.

*dmh* 20 Mar 2011  
(Signature and date)

20 Mar 2011

The following is a condensed transcript of an interview between Commanding Officer MWSS 373, LtCol Thomas Fahy, and LtCol Michael Van Nest, investigating officer 2D MAW(FWD). The subject of the interview was about a reported incident that took place on 18 Mar 2011, at the MWSS 373 Detachment Camp Dwyer, Afghanistan. This is not a complete transcript only information that directly pertains to this investigation is documented below.

Interview date/time: 1530 D+30 / 19 Mar 2011

Location: MWSS 373 Headquarters, Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan

Incident: An investigation has been initiated by CG 2D MAW(FWD) into the alleged allegation that Maj David Eickenhorst, DET OIC MWSS 373 detachment Camp Dwyer, un-holstered his weapon and made threatening remarks to SSgt Christopher Wilson, EAF SNCOIC MWSS 373 Camp Dwyer.

1. LtCol Fahy has known Maj Eickenhorst since Apr 2010. Maj Eickenhorst was an augment from MWSS 371 (MCAS Yuma) and slated to be the operations officer (OPSO) for MWSS 373's OEF deployment. Maj Eickenhorst completed pre-deployment training with the squadron which included supporting Enhanced Mojave Viper (EMV) and Weapons and Tactics Instructors Course (WTI) 10-2. During this timeframe the CO noticed that SNM was having difficulty multi-tasking, had poor attention to detail and dealing with stress. During both exercises the Maj was officially counseled for verbal confrontations he had with subordinate officers and unprofessional, inappropriate behavior towards subordinates. As a result SNM was twice counseled in writing, 21 July 10 and 24 August 10 (provided as separate enclosures). The second written counseling resulted in SNM being relieved of his OPSO duties and reassigned as the Det OIC, FOB Dwyer.

2. When asked to describe Maj Eickenhorst, LtCol Fahy described the Maj as a serious person who does not joke around a lot. The Maj is older (44 yrs old) and very smart cerebrally but with that said he is a Marine that "beats to his own drum." When communicating he is unusually loud and at times mumbles. The CO found that he was good at telling him what he wanted to hear but was not actually producing. He flusters easily and when stressed the Maj would lash out to subordinates (officer and enlisted) inappropriately and unprofessionally.

3. Since being deployed to Camp Dwyer, Maj Eickenhorst was ordered back to Camp Leatherneck on 6 Nov 10 for a lack of communication with the MWSS HQ and concerns the CO had on the abilities of the Maj to oversee the detachment and conduct the units mission successfully.

4. When asked about the events that transpired on the 18 Mar 11 IRT being notified and actions taken the following was given:

a. On or about 2030, 18 Mar 11, the following individuals came to my office to report a possible incident at the detachment located at FOB Dwyer.

- (1) Capt Nicol, CO Airfield Operations Company, MWSS 373
- (2) CWO2 Joseph Szewczyk, EAF/ARFF Officer, MWSS 373
- (3) SgtMaj Michael Mack, MWSS 373 SgtMaj
- (4) MSgt Sean Crowley, EAF Section SNCOIC

ENCLOSURE (5) 1/3

0039

b. The group reported that MSgt Crowley received a call from SSgt Wilson earlier in the evening about an incident that happened that day at Camp Dwyer. SSgt Wilson told the MSgt that while he was providing information to Maj Eickenhorst for a power point presentation that an altercation had occurred resulting in the Maj un-holstering his weapon. LtCol Fahy then instructed Capt Nicol to contact SSgt Wilson for more information.

c. Capt Nicol departed and returned with the following information (LtCol Fahy consulted his notes for this portion): On the afternoon of 18 Mar 11, SSgt Wilson had provided the wrong information to Maj Eickenhorst regarding some lengths of AM2 matting ISO a project. The SSgt departed the COC to go back to his shop to retrieve the correct information. When the SSgt returned two of his sergeants (Sgt Rich and Guerrero) were behind the Maj assisting in the power point presentation. The SSgt provided the updated information and then was corrected by one of the Sgts which provided the correct information. The Maj replied to the three Marines that they were (paraphrasing) "fucking" this up. Then while looking at the SSgt un-holstered his weapon, pointed it at the floor and stated (paraphrasing) "Do you want to start working on your retirement earlier?" The SSgt responded, "Sir I rather you not shoot me." Then holstered his weapon and stated (paraphrasing) "All I have to do is the paperwork." The SSgt then reported that he felt threatened and feared for his safety.

d. Once this information was discussed, LtCol Fahy discussed options with his OPSO (acting XO) Maj Lopez. The decision was to inform the chain of command and receive further guidance.

e. At approximately 2130 he contacted the AWC, 2D MAW(FWD) to report the situation. LtCol Fahy was called to the MAW HQ to brief the CG on the situation. Upon briefing the CG, LtCol Fahy was instructed to go to Dwyer, relieve Maj Eickenhorst and escort him back to Camp Leatherneck.

f. At approximately 2330 LtCol Fahy, Maj Lopez and an MP departed via MV-22 to Camp Dwyer.

g. Once at Camp Dwyer, LtCol Fahy talked to Maj Eickenhorst in his tent about a possible incident that occur earlier in the day, took his personal weapon and told him to pack a 72 hour bag because he was returning to Camp Leatherneck with him.

h. While the Maj was packing, LtCol Fahy instructed Capt Dimoh (Det XO) that until the Maj returned or the detachment returned to Leatherneck that he was now the Det CO.

i. The CO and Maj Eickenhorst returned to Leatherneck about 0130 and the Maj was escorted to the hospital.

j. The Maj was examined and deemed not a threat to himself or others and released to the command.

k. The Maj was assigned a buddy (Maj Perry) and restricted to his quarters (LSA 8), MWR tent or DFAC 2.

5. When asked what condition the pistol was in during the incident LtCol Fahy replied he was not sure but Camp Dwyer policy is to be at level 3 (magazine inserted, weapon on safe, no round in the chamber). When LtCol Fahy confiscated the Maj' weapon it was in condition 3.

6. When asked how everyone was arranged around the computer, the CO provided the following from his notes: Maj Eickenhorst was seated behind SIPR computer, SSgt Wilson was standing to his right and the two sergeants were standing behind the Maj.

7. When asked if he thought the Maj could have been joking with the SSgt, LtCol Fahy responded that he did not think so because of his personality (see para 2).

8. When asked if LtCol Fahy had heard about any other issues/incidents between Maj Eickenhorst and SSgt Wilson, the following was provided (LtCol Fahy provided the following from his notes he took during Capt Nicol's report):


ENCLOSURE (5) 2/3


0040

a. About three weeks ago during an AM2 matting project near the fuel pits at Dwyer, Maj Eickenhorst was not happy with the progress. The detachment was on a compressed timeline and SSgt Wilson told the Maj that he did not think they would make it on time. Maj Eickenhorst then apparently stated (paraphrasing) "Well I have thirty rounds." Which the SSgt responded with (paraphrasing) "Then I better start wearing a flak jacket."

9. Final topic discussed was about, in hind sight, looking back at the issues that lead to the verbal and written counselings, the decision to remove him as OPSO and the Marine's way of handling subordinates did this surprise him. The LtCol answered that though he was shocked that the incident happened looking at the Majors past performance and other issues this did not surprise him.

The above transcript was drafted using the notes taken during the interview and have been reviewed and certified, best to their knowledge, by both LtCol Fahy and Van Nest.

  
21 MAR 2011

  
21 Mar 11

ENCLOSURE ( 5 ) 3/3

0041



21 July 2010

From: Lieutenant Colonel T. M. Fahy USMC  
To: Major David I. Eickenhorst

It has been four months since you have joined the Squadron, and I feel as though I need to provide you some additional written guidance, and counseling. I am requiring you to go back and read my guidance dated 17 March 2010, and work towards my endstate, which is a finely tuned operations section that runs as a well oiled machine.

- I mentioned to you in paragraph 2 that I am relying heavily on your abilities to conduct detailed planning and ensure we have balanced requirements, and are fulfilling our mission to provide superior aviation ground support. In the past 4 months there has been more than one occasion where my expectation of attention to detail has not been met. Specifically, there were several factors revolving around the squadron's training at East Miramar that were overlooked resulting in the early termination of the exercise. These issues would have been addressed with a detailed plan that was more clear and concise.

- While at WTI, you had been working the issue of the 120 X 120 concrete pad with TTECG and MAWTS only to discover upon arrival at EMV that the bill of materials (BOM) was no where to be found. I realize there were other external agencies working with us to ensure the project was in order, but there is an expectation that loop closure on your part was done for a project of this magnitude. And when I asked the question if we were all set for the project, I was told by you that we were good to go.

- When we started discussing the Rhino Snot for dust abatement at EMV, we spent nearly 6 days searching for Rhino Snot aboard 29 Palms, and up until the 21<sup>st</sup> of July only found 5 totes of product that were all bad. I heard about 17 totes that were advertised by MAWTS early in EMV, and over the course of several days we were chasing Rhino Snot. On the 21<sup>st</sup> I walked into a planning session for the aircraft extraction exercise and asked MAWTS personnel if they had any Rhino snot. I was told they knew where 17 totes were, and I asked for the location. I was told the EAF compound, and that is where the 17 totes were located. Albeit only 5 of those totes were usable, it took me 2 or 3 questions in less than 2 minutes to find out what you were trying to discover over several days.

These are 3 examples of what I believe is a lack of attention to detail, and these three things caused unnecessary friction within the unit that was preventable. I need you to work on closing the loop on issues resident within the operations section.

I also discussed the importance of keeping me informed. During the initial establishment of the FARP at Prospect,

ENCLOSURE (6) 1/3

0042

21 July 2010

there were a couple of issues that I found out about that I was not briefed on by your or the AGSOC. Specifically I am talking about the issue with the degradation of a pump for the HERS. Although there was not a degradation in service to the point where the squadron was not operationally capable, the issue was that you did not inform me.

In my command philosophy I make it a point to tell people to "sweat the small stuff." I go on to say that I am a detailed oriented guy, and that more information is better. You have missed the mark on keeping me informed, and I will require you to do a better job of keeping me informed. For movements in and out of the wire, I require you to inform me via phone call, personal visit, text message, or email when our missions depart and return to the wire. The watch officer providing me this info is acceptable. You have got to get into the habit of keeping me informed of what is going on from an operational perspective.

- On 23 July the A/C extraction mission departed 40 minutes prior to the time I was briefed. When I questioned you about it, you told me MAWTS approved it. MAWTS does not control operations within my squadron, I DO. You did not request my approval for the mission to depart friendly lines early, and the only way I found out about it was by chance. The habits we develop here are the habits we exercise in combat. THIS IS UNACCEPTABLE, AND I AM THE ONLY ONE WHO APPROVES THE CHANGES TO TIMELINES WITHIN THIS SQUADRON.

- Right in line with keeping me informed, and on par with timelines, the majority of movements/missions during EMV have departed friendly lines late, and at no time was I either informed or asked permission for the delay. This is just another case of poor communication on your part, and your inability to adequately manage the movement of squadron missions.

I am also counseling you on your time management skills. You have been asked on several occasions to provide me with information and you have missed the deadline. You were over a week late in providing me the OPORD for EMV. I told you while we were at WTI that I wanted an OPORD for EMV. You are not effectively managing your time, and you are not effectively managing multiple tasks. As the operations officer, there are multiple competing requirements you must attend to, and you have got to do a better job of 1), delegating the tasks, and 2) completing tasks in a timely manner.

As a Marine Officer, and leader, you are in the "people business," and the importance of establishing an environment of working together towards a common goal cannot be more obvious than in the operations section. The

ENCLOSURE (6) 2/3

0043

21 July 2010

expectation I have for my Marine officers is to continuously work together with the objective of solving the challenges facing the squadron. This must be done in an environment of teamwork where the goals of the squadron outweigh the needs of the individual. I have counseled you in person on your verbal altercation with a subordinate officer, and I have been briefed by other officers in this command on your unprofessional, inappropriate behavior towards your subordinates. Your actions are not in keeping with the leadership traits and principles we espouse as Marines. I am telling you to do a better job at maintaining your bearing when dealing with others, work on handling stressful situations, and make a concerted effort to develop your relationship with other members of the staff. As the OPSO, you are the one charged with orchestrating the execution of operational and training events within the squadron.

Do not forget that the big "S" in MWSS stands for support, and it is my intent to support to the best of our abilities. We are an enabler to the MAGTF, and you are an enabler to the companies in this squadron. There is not place for dysfunctional relationships between the staff and companies.

You need to understand that at this point, I am very concerned about your abilities to successfully run the operations section. I also believe you have a weak OPS Chief, and I am planning to replace him with a stronger chief who has been hand picked to support your section. In addition, I am planning to plus up your section with a future OPS Officer, which will allow you to adequately plan missions with the goal of maximizing the use of the staff, and minimizing the friction within the companies.

I will discuss with you these issues upon return to MCAS Miramar.

  
T. M. FAMY

ENCLOSURE (6) 3/3

0044



24 August 2010

From: Lieutenant Colonel T. M. Fahy, USMC  
To: Major David I. Eickenhorst, USMC

Since we have returned from EMV, I continue to have concerns about your ways of doing business, and your complete lack of attention to detail. I am providing you the following examples of things I have observed that are of grave concern for me:

- I asked you NO LESS THAN 5 times to complete a fitness report (2ndLt Harvey) that you have been delinquent on since June of this year. My constant reminders to you regarding the basic administrative requirements expected of a Marine Officer are an indication of your lack of attention to detail. This is basic stuff that you can't seem to master. Once you finally submitted the fitness report to me, I sent it back to you immediately because of an error. You then informed me that it was fixed and sent back to me only for me to find the mistake had not been corrected. This is unacceptable.

- I am currently waiting for another fitness report (MSgt Gonzalez) that is late, and I have provided you the same number of reminders regarding the submission of this report. Your ability to perform basic tasks is lacking, and that is not what I expect of a Marine Officer of your rank.

- During a confirmation brief to me for the Group Commanding Officer's Pre-Deployment Brief I asked you specific questions regarding CMP ranges we had scheduled for the remaining Marines required to shoot the course of fire. You told me the squadron was working on scheduling a range for the last week of August to catch all remaining shooters. I found out on 16 August that your section had been working the date of 5 September for a CMP range the entire time. This tells me you don't know what is going on in your section. In addition, I told you to provide me, for signature, the LOI for the CMP shoot by 13 August. You did not provide that to me, nor did you come discuss the issue with me.

- Over the course of the past month I have continued to observe the same negative trends I counseled you for on 21 July 2010. Your inability to effectively accomplish the basic tasks, and adhere to basic timelines you are given is reason enough for me to have lost confidence in your ability to serve as my operations officer. Your perceived lackadaisical attitude towards your responsibilities and your "hands off" approach to operations is not what I need. As an operations officer, you have got to have your finger on the "pulse of the squadron," and you don't.

ENCLOSURE (7) 1/2

0045