

21 Mar 2011

The following is a condensed transcript of an interview between LtCol Michael Van Nest, investigating officer 2D MAW(FWD) and Capt Dimoh, Executive Officer, MWSS 373 Det FOB Dwyer. The purpose of the interview is to get a first witness account on the reported incident that took place on 18 Mar 2011, at the MWSS 373 Detachment FOB Dwyer, Afghanistan. This is not a complete transcript, only information that was not covered by SNM's statement or information that needed more clarity is documented below.

Interview date/time: 1330 D+30 / 20 Mar 2011

Location: MWSS 373 Det COC, FOB Dwyer

Incident: An investigation has been initiated by CG 2D MAW(FWD) into the alleged allegation that Maj David Eickenhorst, DET OIC MWSS 373 detachment FOB Dwyer, un-holstered his weapon and made threatening remarks to SSgt Christopher Wilson, EAF SNCOIC MWSS 373 Camp Dwyer.

1. Capt Dimoh is a Military Police Officer (MOS 5803) currently filling the billet of Executive Officer MWSS 373 Det Det FOB Dwyer. The Capt is SSgt Wilson's reviewing senior (RS). Capt Dimoh was originally slated to deploy with a transition team but requirement went away and he deployed with his own unit.
2. The following are key extracts from Capt Dimoh's account of the incident (only information not already in his statement is provided):
  - a. When asked about the timeframe with which the incident happened the Capt replied that once the SSgt and two Sgts were assisting the Maj he put his ear phones back on and turned up the music IOT block out the conversation so he could concentrate on writing FITREPs.
  - b. The Capt knew the Maj was frustrated and tone of the conversation was louder than normal, but he did not see any movement that would suggest that a pistol was drawn. He was used to seeing the Maj get animated when upset so seeing movement in his peripheral vision was common.
  - c. Capt Dimoh stated that if he had seen, or been made aware of the incident, he would have intervened and taken the necessary actions through de-escalation and then reporting.
3. When asked if about his perception of Maj Eickenhorst the following was provided:

ENCLOSURE (15) 1/2

a. The day of the incident he could tell that the Maj was upset and stress had been high the last couple weeks with the turnover in progress and projects that they were trying to complete.

b. Capt Dimoh described the Maj as a loud talker with a very boisterous tone that was very direct and up front with the Marines. The Maj was very hard on the Marines and was a perfectionist. When the Maj was upset his demeanor was harsh and he was not afraid to verbally reprimand the Marines.

c. When trying to summarize his perception of the Maj, Capt Dimoh used the following analogy based on the 7 months being his XO and living in the same tent: "the Maj's motives were clear but his method at times were not clear." Capt Dimoh truly believes that the Maj's intentions were good and that his sole intent was mission accomplishment.

d. When asked about the morale of the detachment he stated that it cycled but overall good. During major projects Maj was very demanding on the Marines with which his frustration would come out and he could be harsh in nature. Once the project was complete he was quick to congratulate the Marines and slap them on back.

4. When asked about SSgt Wilson, the Capt replied that he was a good Marine and that his last FITREP (Dec 10) was above average.

5. The final item discussed was about Maj Eickenhorst and his chain of command. Capt Dimoh stated that Maj Eickenhorst had made comments in the past while they were in their living quarters (tent) about how he felt the command was treating him. Capt Dimoh stated that he heard Maj Eickenhorst make comments like (paraphrasing) "after all that I have done for this command this is how they treat me by sending me here."

6. Post interview, Capt Dimoh came back and said he had one other comment to make and it was IRT the Maj pulling out his side arm. He stated that he had seen the Maj pull his weapon multiple times while casually talking to other Marines, point it in a safe direction IOT reinforce a learning point. I.e., while talking to Marines at a security post he would pull his weapon and point in the direction that he thought the enemy would approach. Capt Dimoh stated that each time he saw it that was never in threatening way and more like a "dry fire" situation.

The above transcript was drafted using the notes taken during the interview and have been reviewed and certified, best to their knowledge, by both LtCol Van Nest and Capt Dimoh.

  
25 Mar 10

Sign:

  
Capt Dimoh Patrick

ENCLOSURE (15) 2/2

Statement ICO the incident between Maj Eickenhorst and SSgt Wilson at DWR

On the evening of 18 March 2011 at approximately 2000, CWO2 Szewczyk called me and asked me to come by the EAF shop on the LNK MWSS-373 compound. He and MSgt Crowley told me that Maj Eickenhorst pulled a weapon out and made a threatening remark to SSgt Wilson. The 3 of us went to the LtCol Fahy's office and briefed him. He directed me to call SSgt Wilson and ask some questions to find out what happened.

I called SSgt Wilson at the DWR EAF shop and questioned him on the events that occurred. He told me that on the afternoon of 18 March, he gave Maj Eickenhorst some incorrect information regarding the linear feet of an AM2 expanse. He then left the COC and went to get the correct numbers. When he returned, he gave him incorrect information again and Sgt's Rich and Guerrero corrected the SSgt on his information. SSgt Wilson then informed me that Maj Eickenhorst said "You're fucking this up" and drew his pistol, pointing it at the floor. Maj Eickenhorst then said, "Do you want to start working on your retirement plan early". SSgt Wilson said "Sir, I would prefer you not shoot me". SSgt Wilson then told me the Maj holstered his pistol and said, "All I have to do is the paperwork". At this time SSgt Wilson said he faded away from him and left the room. SSgt Wilson stated he was to the right of the Major, both Sergeants were behind him, and Capt Dimoh was to his left at another computer with his headphones on.


SSgt Wilson said about 3 weeks ago during the matting project at the fuel pits, Maj Eickenhorst was unhappy on the progress of the project. SSgt Wilson told him he didn't think they were going to make the timeline. Maj Eickenhorst said, "I've got 30 rounds". SSgt Wilson said, "Well I guess I need to start wearing a flak jacket".

I directed SSgt Wilson to go to the VMU CO and SgtMaj if at any time he felt threatened and call the command immediately. I told him to use a battle buddy and that I would get back to him. SSgt Wilson told me he was scared of this guy and didn't want to be anywhere around him. After hanging up, I briefed the CO on everything he told me and left for the evening.

  
D. C. Nicol

I Chief Warrant Officer 2 Joseph R. Szewczyk xxx-xx-9350/7002 am writing the following statement about my involvement in the incident concerning Major Eickenhorst and Staff Sergeant Wilson at FOB Dwyer on 110318.

At approximately 2000 on 110318, Master Sergeant Crowley came in my office and informed me of a conversation he had just had with Staff Sergeant Wilson at FOB Dwyer. He told me that Major Eickenhorst had pulled a pistol on Staff Sergeant Wilson after being confronted about an incorrect estimation regarding an upcoming matting project. At that point the Major had alluded to Staff Sergeant Wilson of reaching retirement early and how uncomfortable this made Staff Sergeant Wilson feel. When Master Sergeant Crowley completed giving as many details as possible I attempted to contact Captain Nicol, the Airfield Operations Company Commander. When he did not answer I had Master Sergeant Crowley speak with the Sergeant Major to see if our thoughts of the seriousness of the incident were an overreaction. Master Sergeant Crowley returned and said the Sergeant Major recommend we contact the Co Commander and see the Commanding Officer immediately. I again attempted to contact Capt Nicol. He then came to my office and we went over the conversation with MSgt Crowley again and then headed to the CO's office. MSgt Crowley went over the conversation with the CO and Sergeant Major present and the CO had then directed Capt Nicol to contact SSgt Wilson to have some questions answered. Capt Nicol, MSgt Crowley and I went to the EAF office where Captain Nicol contacted SSgt Wilson. Capt Nicol then went to see the CO with the information he had gathered from the conversation. At around 2200 Capt Nicol asked me to call SSgt Wilson to inform him to use the buddy system with GySgt Cassidy and if he felt threatened to go to the VMU CO and contact the MWSS-373 Commanding Officer or Watch Officer at Bastion. He also directed me to inform Staff Sergeant Wilson, Sergeant Rich and Sergeant Guererro not to speak of the details of the incident until directed to do so.



J. R. SZEWCZYK

ENCLOSURE (17)

23 Mar 2011

The following is a condensed transcript of an interview between LtCol Michael Van Nest, investigating officer 2D MAW(FWD) and CWO2 Szewczyk, EAF Officer MWSS 373. The purpose of the interview was to get a first witness account to the actions that the MWSS 373 chain of command took once notified of an alleged incident that took place on 18 Mar 2011, at the MWSS 373 Detachment FOB Dwyer, Afghanistan. This is not a complete transcript of the interview; the CWO wrote his statement post interview and has accurately captured the content of our discussion in respect to the chain of events once notification happened. The purpose of this transcript is to cover a prior event that the CWO witnessed in the company of Maj Eickenhorst.

Interview date/time: 1710 D+30 / 19 Mar 2011

Location: MWSS 373 HQ, Camp Leatherneck

Incident: An investigation has been initiated by CG 2D MAW(FWD) into the alleged allegation that Maj David Eickenhorst, DET OIC MWSS 373 detachment FOB Dwyer, un-holstered his weapon and made threatening remarks to SSgt Christopher Wilson, EAF SNCOIC MWSS 373 Camp Dwyer.

1. CWO2 Szewczyk is an Expeditionary Airfield and Emergency Services Officer (MOS 7002) and is the EAF OIC for MWSS 373. He has personally known SSgt Wilson since 2006 when CWO2 Szewczyk was a student at the EAF school house at Pensacola, Fl. The CWO described the SSgt as a Marine that does not like to make waves and has a non-confrontational personality.

2. At the end of the interview CWO2 Szewczyk was asked if he had anything to add about the incident or past interactions with Maj Eickenhorst. The CWO provided the following:

a. A couple weeks prior to incident CWO2 Szewczyk was at FOB Dwyer helping supervise a matting project. In his company was Maj Eickenhorst and Mr. Terry Frantz, a civilian from a civilian from NAVAIR EASU Field Office in 29 Palms Ca.

(1) The Marines working on the AM2 matting were listening to music which Mr. Frantz did not particularly enjoy. Mr. Frantz then made a joking comment to the CWO and Maj Eickenhorst that the Marines would (paraphrasing) "work faster and better with better music."


(2) Maj Eickenhorst responded by pulling his weapon out, holding it straight down and stating something like (paraphrasing) "we can take care of that" or "we can make that happen."


(3) CWO2 Szewczyk stated he knew the Maj was joking around but found it a little inappropriate pull out his weapon.

ENCLOSURE (18) 1/2

b. During the same matting project, the CWO talked about the large amount of stress there was to get the project done on time. The project had run into some unforeseen delays due to some foundation degradation and the SSgt had informed the Maj that the deadline was at risk. Maj Eickenhorst leaned pretty hard on SSgt Wilson to make the deadline they had set. SSgt had requested the CWO attend the nightly 2000 briefs (verbal SITREP) with him as the senior EAF officer but the Maj still was leaning very hard on the SSgt to get the project done.

The above transcript was drafted using the notes taken during the interview and have been reviewed and certified, best to their knowledge, by both LtCol Van Nest and CWO2 Szewczyk.

  
CWO2 SZEWZYK JTC  
24 Mar 11

  
24 Mar 11

From: MSgt Sean P. Crowley

Topic: Statement in regards to incident involving SSgt Wilson.

Sequence of events:

At approximately 1900 the afternoon of March 18, 2011, I walked into my office at the Camp Leatherneck, EAF shop and was told by GySgt Heimbegner that I had received a call from SSgt Wilson at Camp Dwyer, and that he needed to talk to me later that evening. I went ahead and called the SSgt back immediately in order to see what the issue was. The SSgt answered the phone and said he was in a place where he could talk about the incident. He stated that a situation had come up, and he did not know what to do about it, or how he should handle it. Upon further inquiry, he stated that earlier that afternoon, he had made a mistake while giving Major Eickenhorst, the Dwyer Det. OIC., some information in regards to an upcoming matting project. He stated the Major was clearly upset with the mistake and pulled his pistol out of his holster and made the comment to the SSgt, "do you want to start your retirement plan early?" He said it was in the Camp Dwyer COC, that the Major never pointed his weapon at him, or said he was planning on shooting him, but the feeling the SSgt had made him very uncomfortable.

SSgt Wilson said that in an earlier case, specifically during the matting project ending on the 28<sup>th</sup> of February, that while he was briefing the Major on possibly missing the deadline for the project, due to trouble with the earthwork, the Major made a statement somewhere along the lines of "Well I have 15 rounds that can help that out" referring to the (15) 9mm rounds issued to him.

The SSgt made the statement that he did not feel safe there as he did not know if the Major was joking or serious anymore and that he did not want to come home in a "box" after so much time on this deployment. He also stated he was not trying to get anyone relieved, or names involved, he was at a loss for what to do, and was genuinely confused on how to handle this. I told him this was going to have to be brought up to the chain of command, and I would try everything I could to minimize any backlash on him by the Major due to the command reacting to this incident.


Immediately after hanging up the phone with SSgt Wilson I talked to CWO2 Szewczyk, the EAF OIC, and told him what the SSgt had briefed me. I told the CWO I was going to talk to SgtMaj Mack to get some guidance on how to deal with this situation, and when I got back, we could brief the Company Commander, Capt Nicol. I called the SgtMaj, and he was in his office and available, so I went to brief him. (Approx 1930). After briefing the SgtMaj with the previous information, he advised me to go back, get with the CWO and inform the Company Commander, then go see the CO. Upon return to my office, the CWO called the Capt. over to our office to brief him. Again, after briefing the previous info, Capt. Nicol, CWO Szewczyk, and I went to see the Squadron CO, LtCol Fahy. (Approx 2010).

ENCLOSURE (19) 1/2

LtCol Fahy was in his office expecting us. We passed the information we knew to the CO. The CO then tasked Capt. Nicol to return to the shop, contact the SSgt directly and get all of the details leading up to the incident, who was there, where he was, and let him know some actions he could take if the Major started acting irrationally. Some actions included getting with another command out at Dwyer and calling back to the Command here, and he gave direction to the SgtMaj to contact one of the commands at Dwyer to let them know that the SSgt may be stopping by to make some phone calls to us.

The three of us returned to the EAF office where I contacted SSgt Wilson on the phone, let him know he was not in any trouble but that Capt Nicol had to ask him some specifics on the incident. The conversation lasted approx 15 min, in which time Capt. Nicol went back to the Sqd. CO's office alone to brief him on what the SSgt had told him.

That was the last information I have in regards to this case.



S.P.CROWLEY



**VOLUNTARY SWORN STATEMENT**

I, LCDR Joe Douglas Haines, Jr., do hereby make the following  
(Rank/Full Name)  
sworn/unsworn, and voluntary statement to LtCol Michael Van Nest, whom  
(Rank/Full Name)  
I know to be the Investigating Officer.

SEE ATTACHED.

Pages 1 of 2 Initials/Date JDH / 21 Mar 2011

Statement of LCDR Joe Douglas Haines  
(Rank/Full Name)

The attached sworn statement consists of 2 page(s). I have reviewed it  
for accuracy in the presence of LtCol Michael Van Nest, the Investigating  
(Rank/Full Name)  
Officer. It is true and complete.

JDH 22 MAR 2011  
Signature/Date of Statement Provider

LCDR Joe Douglas Haines, Jr.  
Print Rank/Full Name

Subscribed and sworn before me at \_\_\_\_\_, this \_\_\_\_ day of  
(Unit)  
\_\_\_\_\_, in the year of \_\_\_\_\_.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature of Investigating Officer

\_\_\_\_\_  
Print Rank/Full Name

ENCLOSURE (20) 1/2



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
MARINE WING HEADQUARTERS SQUADRON 2 (FORWARD)  
2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING (FORWARD)  
CAMP LEATHERNECK, AFGHANISTAN  
UNIT 78091  
FPO AE 09510-8091

REPLY REFER TO:

21MAR2011

In re: Major David I. Eickenhorst

This is a voluntary sworn statement submitted at the request of LtCol Michael Van Nest in regards to my observations of Major David I. Eickenhorst's evaluation in the emergency room of the Role III facility of Camp Bastion, Afghanistan, on 19MAR2011 at approximately 0100.

I observed the emergency room evaluation of Major Eickenhorst in my capacity of Wing Surgeon, 2d Marine Aircraft Group (Forward). Major Eickenhorst, a Det OIC of MACG-28, related an incident at Camp Dwyer earlier in the day involving his interaction with one of his Staff Sergeants. He stated that while discussing some allegedly unreliable information that was presented by the Staff Sergeant, he "partially" withdrew his M-9 pistol from his holster in order to emphasize a point he was trying to make to the Staff Sergeant. He maintained that his weapon did not clear its holster.

Major Eickenhorst denied that his gesture with his weapon was a threat, but was made with the intent to remind the Staff Sergeant that the fact that they were carrying weapons signified that they were deployed in a combat zone, and that increased diligence was necessary as their deployment drew to a close. The Staff Sergeant reportedly had two Sergeants witness the incident.


In my professional medical opinion, Major Eickenhorst presented a normal appearance and demonstrated a calm and very controlled behavior. His answers to questions were well-formulated. He specifically mentioned a general lack of support from his Commanding Officer over the course of his deployment. He was alert and fully oriented. His speech was normal, and his affect also appeared to be normal. His thought content was coherent and negative for suicidal or homicidal ideation.

Major Eickenhorst was found by the emergency room physician not to be a danger to himself or others, however I recommended a 24 hour watch by a fellow officer in the event that his mental status changed.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J.D. Haines".

J.D. Haines

ENCLOSURE (20) 2/2



ENCLOSURE ( 21)

MMSS 373 DET Fob Dwyer SOC

Capt Dimoh

