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THE LAW FIRM OF PUCKETT AND FARAJ, PC

May 18, 2011

By First Class mail

By email to Steven.Ely@miep.uscourts.gov

Mr. Steven Ely
United States Probation Officer
Theodore Levin U.S. Courthouse
231 W. Lafayette Blvd.
Probation Department
Room 901
Detroit, MI 48226

Re: United States v. Hamama, 08-20314; Reply to Government's offense letter and objections.

Dear Mr. Ely,

The following is submitted for your consideration and inclusion in the presentence report.

Shortly after the United States invaded Iraq based on faulty intelligence claiming the Iraqi government had Weapons of Mass Destruction, Mr. Hamama volunteered to work as a cultural advisor and translator with the Armed Forces of the United States.¹ Between 2004 and 2006 Mr. Hamama deployed three times and spent more than two years assisting the United States Army execute its mission in Iraq.

¹ The reference to faulty intelligence is not intended to critique political decisions but to demonstrate how the same U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies that failed to accurately assess the WMD situation now assure you with the assistance of the U.S. Attorney's office that they definitely have it right this time as opposed to the last time they assured the U.S. public that they definitely were right about the WMD analysis. In this case the evidence the Government relies on to make their point is more dubious because it is from the Iraqi Intelligence Service which was notorious for fabricating information.

In 2006, while serving in Iraq with an Army unit Mr. Hamama was told that he needed to return to the United States. He was unnecessarily lied to and deceived by agents of the FBI because, according to the FBI agent responsible for bringing him, they believed he would flee. Though they had no reason to believe that he would, and he gave them none.² This began a series of elaborate Government actions that were undertaken under the mistaken belief that Mr. Hamama is a spy, that he would flee, and that he is disloyal to the United States. None of those beliefs are true. Mr. Hamama is an Iraqi immigrant who fled Iraq in search of a better life. He came to the United States hoping to get away from the oppression experienced in Iraq, achieve some economic success, start a family, and secure his and his family's future. But like most immigrants, he continued to long for that which is familiar. He longed for home. He longed for his parents and siblings. He longed for friends and the comfortable familiarity of the place of his childhood. Upon arriving in the U.S. he and Amira began to attend a local Chaldean church where they met other Iraqi immigrants like themselves. They slowly assimilated and became used to life in the United States.

After the 1990 Gulf war and the devastating sanctions on Iraq that eventually resulted in the death of more than 500,00 Iraqi children.³ Mr. Hamama sought for a way to help out the people of his home country. He was then a radio and TV host. His job brought him into contact with the Iraqi community in the United States and Iraqi diplomats whom he befriended. Some and perhaps all of those diplomats turned out to be IIS agents who were in the U.S. specifically to take advantage of Iraqi immigrants' sentiments toward their fellow Iraqis in Iraq. Mr.

² Mr. Hamama has never attempted to flee or avoid law enforcement. The lies told by agents and the complex ruse used to bring him back to the U.S. appear to be nothing more than an attempt to cast Mr. Hamama as a pernicious person so as to make him appear criminally culpable and to prejudice his case. Mr. Hamama has always cooperated and has never demonstrated the remotest flight risk. While the Government argues that he lied to the FBI, they fail to mention that he agreed to an interview every time he was asked for one, in spite of being represented by counsel.

³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_sanctions#cite_note-unicef99-25 (as it appeared on May 17, 2011)

Hamama was one of those people who IIS officials befriended and began to use, unbeknownst to him. It is that relationship that became the bases for the offenses charged in this case. Mr. Hamama intended to assist people in need. His good intentions were manipulated by Iraqi officials who were in the U.S. legally and credentialed. He reached out to the Iraqi officials to seek their help in facilitating the delivery of medicines and toys donated by the Iraqi community in the United States and intended for Iraqi children and civilians. He did not know that these so called diplomats who carried diplomatic credentials granted by the United States Department of State are intelligence agents.

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Mr. Hamama saw a perfect opportunity to help the Armed Forces of his adopted country in freeing the people of his home country, while also assisting the people of his beloved Iraq. He joined U.S. forces deploying to Iraq as a contract linguist and cultural expert. He discharged his duties in a manner above and beyond the call of duty, throughout his deployments, until he returned to the United States and arrested by the FBI.

At the time he was removed from his military unit in Iraq and sent back to the United States, Mr. Hamama was a critical member of his unit and was frequently relied upon to assure mission success, enhance force protection and minimize risk to American personnel. Mr. Hamama's total dedication to the success of America's endeavor in Iraq betrays the Government's theory in this case. If Mr. Hamama were an agent of the Iraqi government, had divided loyalties or questionable patriotism, he would not have volunteered to work with U.S. military forces. And if he merely sought to earn a living by volunteering to serve, he would not have discharged his duties with such enthusiasm, loyalty, vigor and unwavering dedication. *See* Oliver, Chapin, and Coleman Transcripts (to be provided). *See also Enclosures* _____.

Objection #1

a. The applicable offense guideline level is 6

Pursuant §2B1.1. of the guidelines, the base offense level is 6. Because Mr. Hamama was convicted of offenses that are closely interrelated and essentially cover a repetitive course of conduct against the same victim –the United States- connected by a common theme, guideline §3D1.1.-§3D1.2(a)-(c), applies requiring that offenses be grouped together. When counts are grouped together, guideline §3D1.3(a) counsels that the offense level of the group is the offense level of the highest offense. The highest offense level of the three offenses of which Mr. Hamama was found guilty is 6.

b. The facts underlying the guilty charges are ineligible for the application of any cross referenced offenses.

The cross reference is misapplied. In count five of the indictment, Mr. Hamama was specifically found not guilty of having any foreign property, business connections, or financial interests. *See Jury Verdict Form.* Accordingly, the application of the cross reference that he engaged in financial transactions contradicts the Jury finding Mr. Hamama not guilty. The jury did find Mr. Hamama guilty of misrepresentation regarding receipt of a \$250 U.S. Postal Service money order and the value of a dinner from an Iraqi official assigned to Washington DC or New York posing as a diplomat. The jury made no finding regarding what the compensation was for; nor did the government present any competent evidence as to why Mr. Hamama received the money order, and certainly no evidence that it was for an unlawful purpose. The charge alleged that Mr. Hamama denied receiving compensation. There is no evidence indicating that the money order and dinner that Mr. Hamama received were for an improper purpose. The charge of false statement denying compensation requires no improper purpose for the compensation, but

merely denial of its receipt. The people that the Government accuses Mr. Hamama of financially transacting with were in the U.S. legally. They transacted in all sorts of financial and business transactions during the many years they lived in the United States as diplomats. Based on the Government's reasoning, every person, business, government official and organization that engaged in any financial transaction with those same Iraqi officials violated 18 U.S.C. 2332(d).

- c. Application of the cross reference is not mandatory and is unsupported by the facts of this case.

18 U.S.C. 2332(d) is misapplied. The facts alleged by the government to apply the cross reference guideline §2M5.1(a)(1) (Financial Transactions with countries supporting International Terrorism) fail to fit the definition of "financial transaction" under 18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(4). The term "financial transaction" within 18 U.S.C. 2332(d) is defined under 18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(4). 18 U.S.C. 1956(c)(4) defines "financial transaction" as:

(A) A transaction which in any or degree affects *interstate commerce or foreign commerce* (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments....

Id. (Emphasis added)

There has been not a scintilla of evidence that the money order received by Mr. Hamama was an interstate or foreign transaction, or that it affected interstate or foreign commerce in any way. Mr. Hamama received a U.S. Postal Service Money Order that he then cashed. There is no evidence that the transaction was a foreign or interstate transaction, nor any evidence that it affected interstate or foreign commerce. While there is an argument to be made that because the U.S. Postal Service engages in interstate commerce, purchase of the money order had an effect on interstate commerce. Mr. Hamama did not purchase the money order. He simply received

the money order and cashed it.⁴ Not unlike cash, a money order may only be negotiated by depositing in a bank or credit union. The money held by the U.S. Postal Service awaiting to be transferred to Mr. Hamama is not FDIC insured. Accordingly, no federal funds or bank funds implicating FDIC insured funds and hence interstate commerce were ever at stake. *See United States v. Peay*, 972 F.2d 71 (4th Cir. N.C. 1992). Likewise for the meal that Mr. Hamama allegedly consumed in Northern Virginia, there is no evidence of any affect on interstate of foreign commerce.

- d. Even if the transactions fit with within the definition of interstate commerce, they fail to satisfy the definition of “financial transaction” under 18 U.S.C.1956(c) as required by 18 U.S.C. 2332(d).

Seeking to apply 18 U.S.C. 2332(d) to the transactions in this case is a perverse abuse of the law. The two transactions at issue are the meal in Northern Virginia and a U.S. Postal Service Money Order for \$250. The dinner was with a person who carried legitimate diplomatic credentials issued by the U.S. government. There was no evidence presented that Mr. Hamama knew that the Iraqi officials were intelligence agents. Speculation, innuendo, and argument by the Government are insufficient to establish the scienter necessary to carry the burden that Mr. Hamama knew the Iraqi officials were IIS agents. Additionally, the jury found Mr. Hamama not guilty of being an IIS agent. The jury concluded that he was not truthful with the FBI and on his SF-86. The logical conclusion that may be drawn from the Jury’s findings is that they did not believe that Mr. Hamama knowingly worked as a source but that in 2006 he knew or had reason to know that he had been an IIS source and failed to disclose it.

In analyzing whether the cross reference should apply, the application notes to the Commentary of guideline §2M.5.1. are instructive. The application notes at paragraph 2, state

⁴ Mr. Hamama was found not guilty of the conspiracy charge. Accordingly, the actions of others cannot be attributed to him.

“[i]n determining the sentence within the applicable guideline range, the court may consider the degree to which the violation threatened a security interest of the United States, the volume of commerce involved, the extent of planning or sophistication, and whether there were multiple occurrences.” By the Government’s own evidence Mr. Hamama received \$250 and a meal, not \$825 as alleged in the Governments Objections Letter. Gov. Ex. 1.44-1.47. No evidence was ever presented, however, as to what that money order was for. Mr. Hamama is entitled to the presumption that the \$250 was for a legitimate purpose just as the Government is entitled to argue that the reasons were nefarious. In fact Mr. Hamama has a right to that presumption while the Government may only receive it if they present evidence of the fact. *See Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the defendant’s sentence above the otherwise applicable statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.) In its submission, the Government argues that Mr. Hamama is guilty of working as an unregistered foreign agent because the jury found that he made a false statement about receiving compensation from the Iraqi Government. But that is a disingenuous position. Mr. Hamama was specifically found NOT GUILTY of that charge. Moreover, and critically important, he was found not guilty of count five alleging foreign property, business connections or foreign interests. The logical explanation of the jury’s findings is that they believed that Mr. Hamama did not tell the truth to the FBI about receiving \$250 in compensation but that it was not a business transaction. *See Jury Verdict form Count Five*. The Government’s argument flips logic and the jury’s finding on their head. It convolutes the jury’s findings, conflates charges and fabricates facts that have no bases in evidence.

The Government’s evidence included a credit card receipt of 164.82 for a meal allegedly consumed by Mr. Hamama in Northern Virginia. The receipt is not signed by Mr. Hamama, nor

is the credit card his. Even assuming that Mr. Hamama attended and consumed the meal, the benefit inuring to Mr. Hamama from that transaction is the value of half of the receipt, \$82.41. Gov Ex. 1.47-1.49. The Government's best evidence even if considered in the light most favorable to the Government indicates that Mr. Hamama⁵, at most, received a benefit valued at \$332.41. After years of investigating, combing through hundreds of pages of Mr. Hamama's Bank records covering at least the last sixteen years, thousands of emails from two accounts spanning nearly two decades and millions of Iraqi Intelligence Service documents, the entirety of the Government's evidence as to any monetary transactions involving Mr. Hamama is a \$250.00 U.S. Postal Service Money Order and a dinner for at least two people in the amount of 164.82, paid for with the use of an American bank credit card, presumably lawfully obtained from a U.S. bank.

The use of a U.S. Postal Service Money Order and an American credit card beg the question, why the IIS is using payment methods that can so easily be traced if they are handling one of their alleged agents? Why not pay in cash? The Government's star witness and paid informant testified that IIS agents took extraordinary steps to ensure they are not discovered. They do not use telephones or emails to communicate IIS business but rely on couriers to move messages back and forth. Yet, the government now wants to peddle an argument that these same agents conducted their business by using credit cards and paying "informants" by using money orders.

The jury findings clearly indicate that they believed Mr. Hamama was not involved in any prohibited transactions with the Iraqi Government and that the money he received was not for a nefarious purpose but for something legitimate and permissible. Had they believed that Mr.

⁵ This is not the standard by which the Government's evidence is considered but is used here for the sake of argument.

Hamama was a paid informant. They would have found him guilty of the conspiracy charge. They did not. He was found guilty of denying that he received compensation. They made no finding as to the propriety or impropriety of the transaction and no evidence was presented on the matter. By declining to find him guilty of acting as a foreign agent, that is to find that the money was for certain compensation but not for work as an agent of the Government of Iraq nor to find that he was involved in any business or financial transactions, they implicitly decided that the transaction was for a proper and legitimate purpose.⁶

It must be kept in mind that the jury decided that Mr. Hamama did not tell the truth on an SF-86 or to the FBI. That finding could have easily led the jurors to find that he was not truthful about being an agent of the IIS or that he was involved in business or financial transactions. Yet they were unanimous in rejecting those charges. That is a powerful affirmation of Mr. Hamama's innocence on those charges, not merely lack of evidence as to guilt.

- e. The history of cases arising from the Government's discovery of IIS documents does not support the conclusion that Mr. Hamama engaged in any financial transactions.

The paltry sum of money of \$250 that the Government seeks to shoehorn the financial transaction with a country supporting international terrorism offense pales in comparison to other cases brought by the Government regarding IIS operations in the United States. In *U.S. v.*

⁶ The Government's position is difficult to reconcile. The Iraqi intelligence agents operated in the United States using legitimate diplomatic credentials. They rented places to live, paid their utilities, cable and telephone bills, engaged in various financial transactions such as purchasing groceries, food and drink at restaurants, and perhaps paid for household help or drivers. Based on the government's arguments regarding Mr. Hamama, everyone who ever received money from these Iraqis who lived in the United States with credentials issued by the U.S. Government, engaged in a financial transaction with a country that sponsors international terrorism. Even the most benign financial transaction between anyone and an Iraqi official operating under diplomatic cover in the United States becomes a nefarious act of engaging a country that sponsors international terrorism. By finding Mr. Hamama not guilty of being an agent, the jury decided that Mr. Hamama was an unwitting participant –not unlike the server at the Blue Parrot who received \$24 for serving a dinner to an alleged Iraqi IIS agent on July 30, 2000 or the owner of the Blue Parrot Grill who earned \$188.82; or the U.S. Postal Service that facilitated a transaction for a country that sponsors terrorism by receiving \$250 and issuing a money order to an unnamed agent of the IIS. But the jury also decided that Mr. Hamama should have disclosed that he received a money order and that he perhaps attended a dinner because he knew that the money order was from an Iraqi.


William Shaoul Benjamin, CR 06-221, the payments Mr. Benjamin received totaled \$8500 and were not made using U.S. Postal Service Money Orders. In *U.S. v. Sami Khoshaba Latchin*, 04 CR 661-1, the defendant was paid between \$10,000 and \$15,000. There was no evidence that any of his payments were by Money Order. In contrast to those two cases, Mr. Hamama's alleged payment stands as uniquely unfit to be included in the same category, as an example of a financial transaction. While the argument against characterizing the \$250 Money Order and meal as financial transactions with a country that sponsors terrorism certainly includes consideration of the small amount involved, the essence of the argument centers on the not guilty findings of the charges of working as a foreign agent and engaging in a financial or business transaction.⁷ The other part of the argument draws a distinction between the evidence presented by the Government in other cases of this sort as compared with this one, the amounts involved, and the methods in which funds were transferred to the recipient. In both the *Benjamin* and *Latchin* cases the evidence indicated that the defendants received funds totaling thousands of dollars. All or some of the transactions took place overseas, presumably in cash payments, and certainly not in U.S. Postal Service Money Orders. Mr. Hamama, in contrast, is accused of receiving a meal and \$250. The meal was in the United States and paid for using a credit card issued by a U.S. Bank. The money order was issued by the U.S. Postal Service.

f. No other offense guideline applies to the false statements offenses by Mr. Hamama

The False statements Mr. Hamama was found guilty of are not covered by any other guideline. He made the statements to the FBI and on an SF-86 regarding matters that were several years old. Completion of the SF-86 is required for him to deploy with the U.S. military. He eventually deployed to Iraq in 2004 with the U.S. Army at a risk to his own life. While


⁷Under 18 U.S.C. §1956, only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce is necessary. De minimis is not defined. The line of cases that embrace the de minimis effect from various circuits, all involve sums substantially higher than \$250.

deployed in support of several Army units, he was exposed to hostile fires and was nearly injured or killed in an IED attack on his unit in January of 2006. His service has been recognized by many of the most senior Officers and Staff Non-Commissioned Officers of the units in which he served. He is credited by those people with assisting his military unit in accomplishing its mission and the saving of American lives. Mr. Hamama's false statements may have resulted in him deploying overseas with the U.S. military. But his untruthful resulted in harm to anyone. On the contrary, his Army comrades credit him with success of their mission and the saving of American lives. *See Transcript of Coleman Interview.*

Sincerely,

Haytham Faraj, Esq.

Enclosures

1. Audio recording of interview with Command Sergeant Major Ronald Coleman conducted on September 28, 2010.
2. Certificate of Appreciation from Combined Joint Task Force 7
3. Letter of recommendation from Daniel J. Porvaznik, CACI site Lead, Iraqi Theater
4. Letter of recommendation from Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Jordan, Commander JIDC OPS
5. Letter of recommendation from LT Alan R. Wing, Operations Officer, Naval Special Warfare Task Unit North (SEALS).
6. Letter of recommendation from LCDR Paul Giberson, Commander, Task Unit North, Naval Special Warfare Task Unit-AP, North.
7. Letter of recommendation from GySgt James Crawford, Detachment Commander, Radio Reconnaissance, Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1,
8. Certificate of Appreciation awarded by SOSi International Ltd.
9. Transcript of testimony by LTC Jim Oliver (To be provided when received from the court reporter).
10. Transcript of testimony by LTC James Chapin (To be provided when received from the court reporter).
11. Transcript of testimony by CSM Coleman (To be provided when received from the court reporter).



Combined Joint Task Force 7
Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center



Abu Ghurayb
Baghdad, IRAQ

Certificate of Appreciation

is presented to:
Issam Hamama

FOR : Your support of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center in Baghdad, Iraq. You made an immediate impact on operations by providing language support during interrogations of several top Iraqi prisoners. Your dedication to duty reflects great credit upon yourself and the United States Army.

COLLECT AND EXPLOIT!

D. MATT PRICE
MAJ, MI, UTNG
Operations Officer

Enclosure (2)

CACI—AG OPERATIONS

14 December 2003


To Whom It May Concern:

I've had the pleasure of being associated with Issam "Sam" Hamama for the past two and a half months as he performed his duties in a superb manner at the JIDC-AG, Iraqi Theater of Operations. As the CACI Site Lead for the JIDC in Iraq, I have a regular and continuing relationship with all of our contractor linguists at the JIDC and can attest that Sam performs an excellent job under difficult circumstances.

Sam stands out as one of our finest performers. Our operations are often influenced by fluctuating circumstances and stress, the least of which are caused by the dangerous environment in which we work and the austere living conditions and isolation in which we live. Sam has demonstrated good judgment and maturity that assured consistent, professional operations. His performance has added greatly to the "jointness" of military and civilian contractors contributing to ongoing operations in Iraq and set a standard that is lauded by the military and civilian leadership here.

Sam possesses rare qualities, which engender confidence. He is a superb linguist and facilitator for key, strategic interviews in a busy organization. Sam's outstanding Arabic and English language capabilities are relied upon on a regular and consistent basis. His can-do attitude and in-depth understanding of cultural and theater issues has led to significant inroads in combating the threat to U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq, most notably in identifying foreign fighters—mujahadeen—networks and former regime loyalists operating in Iraq. Sam's enduring loyalty and perseverance of duty has made an outstanding contribution to the JIDC-AG, Iraqi Theater of Operations' and the National Intelligence Community's efforts to bring stability to the Iraqi people and ultimately, a much sought-after exit strategy for U.S. forces in Iraq.

Sam is extremely competent, calm, intelligent, and a real problem solver, he would make a tremendous contribution in any organization. In our operations in Iraq, he can always be relied upon to achieve first class results. Sam brings many outstanding attributes to any undertaking and I am certain he will succeed in any professional challenge. Please feel free to contact me at porvaznikaak@yahoo.com concerning any additional details.


DANIEL J. PORVAZNIK
CACI Site Lead
JIDC, Iraqi Theater of Operations

Enclosure (3)

CACI—AG OPERATIONS



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center
Abu Ghurayb, Iraq



December 15, 2003

COMMANDER, JIDC OPS

Mr. Issam Hamama
DoD Contracted Linguist

Dear Issam,

I want to express my appreciation to you for all your efforts while working at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center in Abu Ghurayb, Iraq. While serving as a linguist with the JIDC interrogators you worked with the United States Army in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

You assisted in conducting many mission critical interrogations. You made an immediate impact on military operations by providing language support during interrogations of several top Iraqi prisoners, and with your help we were able to extract important information that we would not have obtained otherwise.

Your dedication to accomplishing each task assigned to you contributed to the success of the Coalition. You performed all of your duties in an exemplary and highly professional manner. Issam, you are known among the interrogators for your "can-do" attitude and your skill as an interpreter. These qualities and your willingness to take on difficult missions at a moment's notice has made you a great asset to the JIDC. Your proficiency, expertise and dedication to duty reflect great credit upon yourself and the United States Army.

You are a Patriot and a Hero! Thank you for giving unselfishly of your time and talents to the Coalition soldiers and to the people of Iraq.

The point of contact for this action is LTC Steven Jordan at steve.l.jordan@us.army.mil.

Sincerely,

Steven L. Jordan
LTC, CA, USAR
Commanding

Enclosure (4)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
Naval Special Warfare Task Unit North
Mosul, Iraq

10 April 2004

To Whom It May Concern:


Issam Hamama has been an integral part of Naval Special Warfare Task Unit North (NSWTU-North) operations since his arrival in mid-February 2004 during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Issam conducted himself in a thoroughly professional manner as both an interpreter and interrogator in support of combat operations against former regime elements, foreign fighters, and anti-Coalition insurgents in the Northern Iraqi Theater of Operations.

Issam assisted NSWTU-North personnel in interpreting seized enemy documents to help garner actionable intelligence and to aid in the accumulation of evidence against anti-Coalition forces. He literally examined thousands of pages of documents, calendars, pamphlets, fliers, and assorted literature to help identify pertinent information. This effort was time-consuming, mind numbing, and often extended into the early morning hours, yet was always accomplished in a timely way without complaint. Issam's toils resulted in the quick identification of material for exploitation.

Another of Issam's vital roles was as a principal interrogator of suspected terrorists. On more than one occasion, Sam accompanied combat forces on missions to perform in-field interrogations, exposing himself to a hostile and inherently dangerous environment. These initial interviews were critical to revealing time-sensitive intelligence that enabled the capture of other insurgents before they had time to escape. Sam's exceptional language skills made the difference in such operations.

It has been a pleasure to work with Issam during our rotation in Iraq. He is hard working, amiable, and dedicated to the Coalition effort. His mastery of essential language skills was an important part of the success of NSWTU-North. I recommend him to any organization that has a need for the services he provides.

Sincerely,



Alan R. Wing
LT USN
NSWTU-North Operations Officer

Enclosure (5)

NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE TASK UNIT-AP, NORTH

30 June 2004


TO: WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

SUBJECT: LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION FOR MR. ISSAM G. HAMAMA

1. NSWRON TWO Task Unit NORTH would like to commend the work of Mr. Issam G. Hamama who worked as an interpreter for Coalition forces from 01 March 2004 to 05 July 2004 in Iraq. Mr. Hamama was integral to the operations and administration for a hundred-man operations unit. He was much more than an interpreter, contributing to the day-to-day activities by providing critical geographic and cultural awareness training as well as other administrative support. His incredible work ethic, timeliness, and attention-to-detail were unsurpassed by his contemporaries. He was by far the number one performer out of five extremely talented interpreters assigned to NSWRON TWO.

2. Mr. Hamama is highly recommended for any interpreter position, and should be considered for a managerial position due to his people and organizational skills.

3. POC: LCDR Paul G. Giberson, NSWRON TWO, DSN 312-253-4150 or Commercial: 757-462-4150.



Paul G. Giberson
LCDR USN
TU Commander

Enclosure (6)

Radio Reconnaissance Team
Marine Corps Special Operations Command Detachment 1
Iraq, 2004

To whom it may concern,

We have had the pleasurable opportunity to use the skills of Issam Hamama in assisting the translation efforts of our linguists. His abilities in Arabic and its nuanced dialects combined with his mastery of English assisted on several occasions to not only comprehend what was being said but also the derivation of the words chosen. His familiarity with the areas in which we worked and the people living there assisted in acquiring a broader context for our analysis efforts. His flexibility, professionalism and dedication to the tasks at hand assisted greatly in our intelligence gathering requirements. He truly is willing to operate in any clime and place. Sam's willingness to share his personal cultural background gave another perspective to aid in the understanding of Iraqis and their motivations. Any group he works with considers him one of the team, not just another civilian contractor. We hope to acquire the skills of Issam in the future, as any employer would.



James A. Crawford
GySgt USMC

Enclosure (7)

Certificate of Appreciation

This award is presented to

Issam Hamama

On This Third Day of August 2004

*For outstanding performance on the INSCOM Program.
Your efforts reflect a good image on all of us at
SOSi INTERNATIONAL, LTD.*

You make the Difference!


Don Crabtree - Program Manager


Mike James - Deputy Program Manager

Enclosure (8)