Fwd: Re: Thanks Neal - Got an article for you to read here.

[neal@puckettfaraj.com]

X,
Can you give me a hand with this.  Roger's email is cute.  He has  
included his memo to HRC at Hoffman re: his characterization of  
service for separation.  Can you go through it with your commander's  
eye and suggest edits?  I'll then review your cut with a lawyer's eye  
and we'll get this back to him.
LUL,
N
Neal A. Puckett, Esq.
LtCol, USMC (Ret)
The Law Firm of Puckett & Faraj, PC
Washington DC - San Diego CA
www.puckettfaraj.com
888.970.0005





----- Forwarded message from hillrogert@yahoo.com -----
    Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2008 13:28:04 -0800 (PST)
    From: Roger Hill <hillrogert@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Roger Hill <hillrogert@yahoo.com>
 Subject: Re: Thanks Neal - Got an article for you to read here.
      To: Neal Puckett <neal@puckettfaraj.com>
      Cc: hmasten@gmail.com, lauren.f.hill@gmail.com, Kerry Frederick  
<Kerry.Frederick@northhighland.com>

Neal,

I had planned to win him over with charm, solid facing movements, a  
good haircutÂand fresh breath : )ÂDidn't really work out too well. I  
was well rehearsed, did not let him take me off my course (thought he  
tried a few times) and got what needed to be said out. The CG knew  
what he was going to do before I showed up tonight. He had an outline  
on his desk which he referred to and had about 20 minutes with COL  
Johnson on a video conference before I reported. COL Johnson was  
there to hear it all. I'm sure he had some choice words for the CG  
during the three intersessions we took over the 3.5 hours Larry and I  
were up there. The worst part is that he was pretty mean towards LT  
Kay. "LT,Âyou are wasting my time!"Â And he did not want to hear about  
any of the witness intimidation and unlawful command influence that  
went on. He attempted to brush it aside even after he agreed to listen  
to what Larry had to say and even after I signed the article 15
 stating that I wanted someone to speak on my behalf regarding that  
specific issue. I felt that a dialogue regarding how unobjective the  
investigation was as a whole was a legitimate topic. The CG thought  
otherwise, or at least did not want to admit to what had been going on  
under his nose. Whatever good feelings I had for division are now  
gone. 0 for 3 now from battalion, brigade and now division.

BelowÂis my draft plea for a general discharge.ÂÂMy computer isn't  
allowing attachments right now. I plan to submit this with  
appropriate enclosures tomorrow AM.Â

I want to use the draft plea as a white paper I can send "as is" toÂa  
lot of the folks (friends and family) that haveÂvolunteered to lend a  
handÂduring this time. I'd like to draft an email with the Post  
article as a part of that email, then attach this draft plea in  
memorandum format as a word document so that people can  
seeÂatÂfaceÂvalue the following: (1) what type of discharge I am  
fighting for and why I deserve it (the header includes and address to  
HRC for those that feel inclined to send fan mail in that direction :  
), (2)Âwhat led up to theÂevents in question and why I made the  
decisions I made andÂ(3) why Afghanistan is going so poorly for the  
lower level commands on the ground in order to better serve future  
units to be deployed to the OEF theater.
ÂÂ
I would appreciate any tips or talking points you think ought to be  
addressed in the email.ÂÂLength may appear to be an issue, but I  
personally think that the length of the memo is not a problem for the  
following reasons: (1) COL Christine Stark plans to send this to the  
War College to generate interest among senior leaders and faculty  
there (she just finished teaching there less than a year ago), (2) I  
plan to send this to all of my infantry classmates and former basic  
course students to generate interest, (3) it paints a complete picture  
(one shot one kill) and allows for dissemination to the widest  
audience to include thoseÂwho are interested in filing congressionals  
or senatorial inquiries on our behalf.Â

I saw P.J.Âtwo days ago. ÂHe's flying out back to Nashville today.  
He's pretty excited and I think he, Larry Kay and myselfÂmay work  
together for future publications over this situation.Â

LaurenÂand I have worked our budget. CG only took 4K from me.ÂÂAs it  
turns out, my bonus was paid off in May of 08. WeÂstill want to keep  
you on the pay roll and will find ways to make the payments work. The  
latest additions to the expense "roll up" yourÂbook keeper sent out  
should get paid offÂpretty quickly. Lauren'sÂall over that.Â

Thanks and talk to you soon. Memo/white paper for your comments  
below.. As soon as I get your comments I'll push it out for  
dissemination.

Roger

MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, CJTF-101, Bagram AB, Afghanistan, APO AE 09354
Â
FOR Commander, Human Resources Command (AHRC-OPD-A),
200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0478
Â
SUBJECT:Â Statement Regarding Characterization of ServiceâCPT Roger T. Hill
Â
Â
1. ÂI am respectfully requesting consideration for an upgraded  
discharge. I understand that the terms of my resignation to include  
the potential for an Other than Honorable Discharge (OTHD)  
characterization of service.. ÂÂIn short, I would ask that the five  
day period leading to this action not be used as the sole basis to  
characterize my nine years of active duty service, plus four years at  
the U.S. Military Academy.ÂÂ At a minimum, I am requesting a General  
characterization of service. Alternatively, I would ask you to  
consider suspending the action so that I may pass along my lessons  
learned to my peers. It is my hope that after reviewing the  
circumstances of my case, you will find that my actions were not done  
with malice, but rather as nothing short of honorable intentions with  
the end state of safeguarding my men.
Â
2. Prior Military Service: Three of my seven years of marriage have  
been spent overseas, to include a twelve month tour in Korea. ÂIn  
addition to my most recent tour as a company commander in support of  
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2008, I had also completed a  
twelve month combat tour as a part of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).  
For my duty and performance in Iraq, I was awarded the Bronze Star and  
the Combat Infantrymanâs Badge. While in Iraq, I served on multiple  
Transition Teams based out of Qayyarah of the Nineweh province and  
Ramadi of the Al Anbar province where I mentored and fought alongside  
Iraqi infantry units from the platoon level up to brigade level  
staff. ÂIn addition to the above awards, I am also Airborne, Air  
Assault and Ranger qualified. ÂI have been awarded the Expert  
Infantryman's Badge, three Army Commendation Medals, and three  
Overseas Ribbons as well as a number of other awards and medals during  
my over
 twelve years of collective Army Service. ÂI also served in the Old  
Guard as a platoon leader and executive officer from 2002 to 2004. I  
had the privilege of being hand selected to serve as the Officer in  
Charge (OIC) for the funerals of many dignitaries, to include serving  
as the Guard of Honor OIC for former President Reagan. My dress blues  
coat is currently on display at the Reagan Presidential Library in  
Simi Valley, California. I have also served as a platoon leader  
(mechanized and rifle), assistant S-3 and as an Infantry Officer Basic  
Course instructor. As reflected by all of my Officer Evaluation  
Reports (OERs), I was considered a top performer in every position  
that I held. Finally, I graduated with a Bachelorâs of Science degree  
in Environmental Engineering from the United States Military Academy.Â
Â
3. Current OEF Deployment (2008): After two separate rotations to the  
Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) my company, Dog Company 1-506th  
Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), deployed to Wardak, Afghanistan in  
early March of 2008. Three other companies from my battalion split  
the Ghazni province into three separate company areas of  
responsibility (AOR). My company, the smallest infantry company in  
the Brigade, was responsible for the entire province of Wardak.  
Wardak, a province the size of Connecticut, was geographically the  
largest AOR in the Brigade. Wardakâs total population was in excess  
of 525,000 people; consequently leaving our company and our  
partnership Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) with a 1:525 peace  
keeping force to population ratio, well beyond the guidelines for  
establishing a successful counterinsurgency in accordance with FM  
3-24. ÂWardak was also one of the most kinetic areas of  
responsibility in the brigade.Â
 Our company suffered thirty wounded in action (WIA) and two killed  
in action (KIA) during our six months in Wardak. The two KIAs  
occurred just days before the events in question. Our companyâs total  
combat power was just under ninety personnel and with those ninety  
Soldiers I was tasked to lead and bring unity to all International  
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts along the lines of: security,  
governance, development, and information operations throughout the  
province. Despite the emotional and physical toll on my company,  
camaraderie was highâwhich was reflected in my companyâs retention  
rate (the highest in the Brigade).
Â
a. The unit my company relieved had spent nearly six months in  
Wardak, and prior to that unitâs arrival to Wardak in fall of 2007,  
the U.S./NATO presence in the province of Wardak had been scarce at  
best. ÂSome of the most horrific combat action occurred in this AOR.  
In fact, it was the province of Wardak in which a platoon from the  
2-508 PIR had suffered the only loss in a decisive engagement to the  
Anti Afghan Forces (AAF) to date. This platoon had been chased out of  
a sub-valley in Wardak named Jalrez by over one hundred AAF in an  
eight kilometer long ambush resulting in fourteen U.S. WIA and two gun  
trucks destroyed. Our initial intelligence reports cited that the  
enemy forces that had been allowed safe haven in Wardak since the  
start of the war in 2001 and had unhampered in its ability to acquire  
nearly 2,000 fighters. My company experienced even greater enemy  
threats and activity during our six months in Wardak.
Â
b. In mid-August my company suffered the worst possible outcome in  
combat: two KIAs, 1LT Donnie Carwile and SPC Paul Conlon, as a result  
of an improvised explosive device (IED) initiated ambush along HWY 1.  
A mere week later, my company was tasked to serve in a battalion-led  
shaping effort with Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force  
(CJSOTF) in Jalrez Valley. The operation start time was delayed  
multiple times due to several confirmed intelligence leaks, all of  
which originated from forward operating base (FOB) Airborne. ÂAs the  
operation ORDU was being executed, a counter intelligence (CI) team,  
along with the Dog Company 1SG, conducted a FOB Airborne centric  
operation consisting of intelligence-based polygraph and cell phone  
inspection screenings for over seventy local nationals that worked on  
the FOB. ÂThe technology used to conduct these screenings was  
classified, but the information was readily provided to us by the CI  
team who
 advised our efforts. The number of local nationals on our FOB was  
nearly more than what existed in my company; a ratio of almost 1:1.  
The number of local nationals was necessary because, in addition to  
our combat mission, our battalion had also tasked our company with  
expanding the FOBâs capacity to fit a battalion plus in the near  
future. ÂThe expansion effort mirrored what one might see on any  
general industrial construction site. This was something that my  
infantry Soldiers were neither trained nor equipped to accomplish. We  
did our best to complete this mission, but were required to maintain a  
large local national workforce to assist our efforts. ÂMaintaining  
this large of a local national work force had obvious security risks  
associated with it, especially since we were not provided with an  
adequate means to conduct background checks. ÂThroughout our time in  
Wardak, my company was forced to man additional static locations  
throughout the
 province. In addition to FOB Airborne, my company was solely  
responsible for three other combat out posts (COPs). Consequently,  
and to our detriment, my four platoon company, with each platoon  
securing a COP or part of a FOB, meant that my company was tactically  
fixed. As a result, we had no real ability to react to the enemy,  
especially in terms of a quick reaction force (QRF). Our nearest  
route clearance package (RCP) and explosive ordinance disposal (EOD)  
teams were over 130 kilometers away at our battalion headquarters in  
Ghazni. Both of these teams specialized in finding, identifying and  
neutralizing improvised explosive device (IED) threats. This was  
contrary to what I learned in every Army school I ever attended: fix  
the enemy and not yourself. Upon confronting my battalion commander  
about the lack of tactical foresight and risks that resulted from his  
decisions to establish two additional platoon COPs, I was told by my  
battalion
 commander that he knew ââ exactly what he was doing to Dog  
Company.â My battalion commander followed that statement by saying,  
âI need to increase significant activities (SIGACTs), enemy activity,  
in your AOR so that the brigade commander will fight to have the  
battalion (1-506th PIR) headquarters placed at FOB Airborne instead of  
FOB Sharana.â Needless to say, I was shocked by what I had just  
heard, as it was apparent that my battalion commander wanted me to  
openly sacrifice my menâs safety and potentially their lives so that  
he could âsellâ the next move for his battalion headquarters. ÂI was  
more upset with this information because it was a cumulative train of  
thought by my battalion commander. Previously, my battalion commander  
took my company âtrollingâ for firefights in Wardak, at a significant  
risk to my men.ÂÂ The underlying purpose was to add to my battalion  
commanderâs desire to score both a Purple Heart and
 the ability to state that he has been in the most troops in contacts  
(TICs). It was at that precise moment that I realized I was now no  
longer protecting my men from just the enemy outside our gates.
Â
c. As the commander of Dog Company, I openly expressed my concerns  
with my commander by seeking a dialogue with him. However, this  
simply never occurred, despite my best attempts with both the brigade  
and battalion commanders. As ordered, I always executed his guidance  
when my commander finalized his decisions. It was not until brigadier  
general (BG) Milley, the deputy commanding general of operations  
(DCGO), stepped in that I received any relief or understanding of our  
manpower crisis. Not only was my company fixed in the largest and one  
of the most kinetic AORs, but three of those four platoons were not  
really platoons at all. Three of my four platoons were down to eleven  
to thirteen men each, a number which included medics and forward  
observers (FOs). ÂEvery mission was further constrained by manning  
requirements. For instance, the CJTF 101 policy regarding minimal  
convoy requirements provided that all convoys must have at least four
 gun trucks. While I understood the rationale for this policy (a  
National Guard crew that was mutilated in Tangi Valley, Wardak), the  
requirement was not ascertainable given my limited manpower. ÂI was  
given hard choices between securing FOBs and convoy requirements.  
Again, I brought this to my battalion commanderâs attention, but I was  
repeatedly told to simply âmake it happenâ with three gun trucks  
despite the divisionâs policy. ÂI feared the consequences of an  
ultimate Catch-22. ÂEach static location was at a high risk due to the  
limited number of U.S. Soldiers versus the number of enemy in the  
vicinity of each of those areas. 107 mm rockets, rocket propelled  
grenades (RPGs) and machine gun fire were frequently used against  
these COPs. The most kinetic of those COPs was the outpost located  
just inside the Jalrez Valley. It was in the Jalrez Valley that we  
had come to take most of our casualties, the same Jalrez Valley in  
which the
 unit before us had suffered so many casualties. I fought to close  
this COP on numerous occasions. I attempted to speak to both my  
battalion and brigade commanders regarding my growing concerns over  
the extremely high risks that we were assuming due to a gross lack of  
combat power and resources. ÂMy concerns were ignored until BG Milley  
visited COP Conlon. Even BG Milley recognized that the threat against  
that outpost was so great that it resulted in being closed down the  
next day due to its potential for being over run by the much larger  
enemy force in the area. ÂIronically, this was the position I  
attempted to take with my command long before BG Milleyâs visit. Soon  
after, my company was subjected to clear retaliation for openly  
agreeing with the decision to close the COP.Â
Â
d. As the month of August began, our human intelligence collection  
team (HCT) began to receive a number of reports citing recent efforts  
by the enemy to plan and execute a complex catastrophic attack against  
one of our four static locations. Most of the dozen or so source  
based intelligence reports put FOB Airborne and the COP in Jalrez as  
the enemyâs primary targets. Reliability of our past human  
intelligence (HUMINT) or source based intelligence was approximately  
eighty percent. As the commander, I determined that threat of a  
complex suicide attack was likely.Â
Â
e. Several factors played into my threat assessment at that time.  
(1) FOB Airborne and all its tenants were at an increased  
vulnerability because we were attempting to conduct relief in place  
(RIP) operations with another company in our battalion. Dog Company  
had only been given a total of fourteen days to conduct this RIP. The  
short amount of time allotted for this RIP only increased the amount  
of risk being assumed as we attempted to move our sister company, Able  
Company 1-506th PIR, into Airborne and prepare our company for  
movement to Khowst province. ÂAs we began to conduct RIP operations, I  
was reminded of a conversation with BG Milley and became similarly  
concerned about a possible repeat of patrol base Wanat  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/world/asia/04military.html?_r=1&ref=world or  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wanat where Afghan trusted  
agents were said to have assisted with coordinating the attack that  
led to nine KIA and
 twenty seven WIA. Â(2) We had also verified that both the Afghan  
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) had been  
effectively infiltrated by the enemy. Less than two weeks prior, we  
interdicted four vehicle born improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs),  
one of which causing five wounded in action alone.ÂÂ The suicide  
threat was proven to be alive and very real in the area just outside  
FOB Airborne. ÂThis threat was ultimately materialized in November at  
COP Sayad Abad, where a dump truck full of explosives detonated at the  
ECP. Nine Soldiers were WIA and Sayad Abad base was leveled. (3)  
Less than three weeks prior we also caught several ANA in the act of  
stealing night vision goggles (NVGs), government computers along with  
other personal electronic equipment that was assigned to or belonged  
to U.S. Soldiers on FOB Airborne. The Soldiers from this ANA  
battalion had just arrived to replace a previous ANA battalion we had  
worked with
 for over two months. The ANA stood guard on half of the eight guard  
towers that spanned the perimeter of FOB Airborne. We were forced to  
allocate combat power from our company just to ensure that the ANA  
were not vacating their towers during guard rotations, which was a  
common problem. This only served to enhance my overall concern of the  
enemy conducting a successful suicide attack on the FOB.
Â
f.ÂÂ Upon completion of Operation ORDU and the local national  
screenings as a part of that operation, a total of twelve detainees  
were taken due to confirmed ties to the Taliban. One of the most  
critical infiltrations included my own personal interpreter, and a  
person whom I considered a dear and close friend, Noori Noorula. ÂÂNot  
only was my unit betrayed, but I was as well. He was considered a  
trusted agent and a Dog Company member. ÂOnce the local nationals were  
determined to be infiltrators, my company executive officer (1LT Kay)  
reported these detainees to our battalion headquarters. Not only did  
he report the status of the detainees, but he also repeatedly asked  
for guidance on what to do with the local nationals in accordance with  
standard protocol. Simply put, Dog Company did not have the manpower  
or resources to handle these local national men. Our requests for  
assistance were responded with only excuses and delays. Initially, all
 of these detainees were meant to be Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)  
detainees because initially the commander of the CJSOTF operation had  
agreed to detain, process and transport all insider threats found on  
FOB Airborne as a part of the Operation ORDU. ÂOEF detainees are  
technically âbetterâ for everyone because it means that the U.S. has  
control of the detainees for interrogations. The decision to not  
take, process or transport these insider threat detainees was made by  
the CJSOTF commander just before all combat forces left Jalrez  
Valley. Literally, as they passed the entry control point (ECP) of  
FOB Airborne, Dog Company was left with all twelve detainees. As the  
commander, I had no choice but to order the detainment of all  
remaining confirmed insider threat local nationals on the FOB and  
begin processing them under ISAF guidelines. ÂI along with my company  
executive officer (XO) and our partnership Operational Detachment  
Alpha (ODA)
 team leader repeatedly attempted seek guidance and or assistance to  
finding a solution to the processing of the detainees. My XO made  
several attempts on a daily basis to battalion regarding the matter.  
Again, to no avail. Simultaneously, the ODA team leader did the same  
via his OEF contacts. The ODA team on FOB Airborne was also an ISAF  
unit. I consulted the battalionâs detainee operations officer (1LT  
Scheppler), who was on our FOB for the entirety of the operation. The  
detainee operations officer relayed to me that even if the detainees  
were sent up U.S. channels of the ISAF detainee chain of custody that  
it would ultimately result in their release. Dog Company had seen  
this happen at least a half a dozen times in the past. Orders from  
our higher command to release these detainees often meant taking  
fighters that we had captured in the act of ambushing our platoons  
back to where they were captured. Obviously, the point of capture
 was also often known ambush locations. This was a very sore point  
of contention for our company, especially after 1LT Carwile and SPC  
Conlonâs death.
Â
g. Our only hope was to garner support from our battalion  
headquarters or transfer the detainees to the NDS. Unfortunately, the  
national directorate of security (NDS), which is Afghanistanâs  
national intelligence agency, had already stated that they would  
release the detainees because the U.S. forces would not provide them  
with the classified information justifying their detention or their  
ties to AAF. Although CJTF sent the CI team down to Airborne, we  
didnât receive a follow-on team of OEF personnel to conduct detainment  
operations. This was despite the fact that the fragmentary order  
(FRAGO) from our division command clearly stated that the CI team  
would be complimented with physical detentions and interrogator  
personnel. None of the intelligence gathered by the CI team or the  
methods used to gain that intelligence was releasable to the ANSF due  
to its classification. Therefore, the NDS could not keep those  
detainees in accordance to
 their operational guidelines. As we approached the end of our  
ninety six hour window of custody, I grew very concerned about the  
possibility of having to free these detainees due to the ISAF  
ninety-six hour time standard. Once again, Dog Company was in a  
Catch-22 situation. Our calls to battalion resulted in zero progress.Â
Â
h. We had previously made contact with the NDS, but they did not show  
to pick up the detainees as promised. ÂWhile contemplating the thought  
of being forced to free these detainees who knew everything about our  
FOB, its inner workings and its security measures in addition to the  
already likely threat of a suicide attack on one of our COPs or FOB  
Airborne, I determined that the threat against my men at that time was  
imminent and decided to take action. By the last twenty-four hour  
period, we had given up on the possibility of our battalion  
headquarters retrieving the detainees. The battalion detainee  
operations OIC had even been on FOB Airborne for the entirety of the  
operation ORDU and his attempts to assistance in the matter made no  
difference. Desperation was setting in. It was in the last  
twenty-four hour period that I made the command decision that it was  
necessary to acquire some intelligence on the early warning network to  
which these
 detainees belonged. Giving these detainees to the NDS was equal to  
simply setting them free; free to attack U.S. forces. Again, I made a  
command decision that it was necessary to pull timely intelligence  
from the detainees myself. They all possessed intimate knowledge of  
the inner workings of our unit, in particular my interpreter Noori. I  
felt that releasing them created an imminent threat to those on our  
FOB and our three platoon COPs.. Approximately twelve different  
source based human intelligence in the last month stated that the AAF  
in our area was planning a catastrophic suicide attack on one of our  
four static locations. We were just spread too thin for me to take any  
more risks and battalion left me with no choice. I made the command  
decision to question these detainees in an effort to gain intelligence  
that would allow us to disrupt this imminent attack and prevent future  
ambushes. A passive approach was simply not feasible. My
 ultimate goal was to limit future casualties and at the very least  
give the NDS enough evidence to keep the twelve in the ANSF branch of  
the ISAF chain of custody until our operational tempo (OPTEMPO),  
mission load, and threat level were reduced.Â
Â
i. As the officer with overall responsible for the safety of all ISAF  
forces in Wardak, I felt that it was my duty to do anything within my  
power to maintain that safety in light of an impending attack. I made  
the command decision to utilize a variety of shock tactics to  
intimidate and scare those detainees into providing valuable  
intelligence that would allow U.S. forces to effectively disrupt the  
AAF who had inflicted so many casualties over the past year. In my  
mind, we escalated force as necessary to maintain the situation. In  
hindsight, we may have been too aggressive. ÂNot to excuse my actions  
completely, I will note that my actions result in obtaining valuable  
and potentially life saving intelligence on the AAFâs early warning  
network. An entire link analysis of the early warning network as it  
originated from FOB Airborne was obtained from multiple detainees as a  
result of my actions. This intelligence also gave the NDS enough
 evidence to maintain custody of and even transfer these detainees to  
their NDS headquarters in Kabul. Â
Â
j. Despite holding the detainees for ninety-six hours, the  
interrogations that we conducted lasted less than thirty minutes.  
Prior to and following this short time period, these twelve detainees  
were returned to their normal routine of sleeping, eating, smoking and  
restroom breaks. My men were not as fortunate. While the detainees  
slept in a hardened building, my men continued to secure the FOB and  
with missions. Although many slept in tents, they rarely had the  
occasion to utilize their bunks. My men frequently missed meals  
because the mission did not allow for even breaks. We were all  
fatigued, having worked 18+ hour days prior to Operation ORDU, and a  
full three days with little to no sleep leading up to and during the  
operation. Our mission was so demanding, most of my Soldiers were  
only afforded the short time at the Fallen Comrade Ceremony to grieve  
and recover from the loss of 1LT Carwile and SPC Conlon.
Â
k. ÂIt has since been decided that a brigade minus would be  
headquartered out of FOB Airborne. Now, over 1,200 Soldiers are being  
brought to Wardak to be headquartered out of FOB Airborneâin essence  
replacing what was once a mission conducted by the 89 dog-tired  
Soldiers of Dog Company 1-506th PIR for six brutal months. These  
numbers alone should serve as an obvious indicator as to how poorly  
resourced and dire the situation in Wardak was for the men of Dog  
Company 1-506th PIR.Â
Â
l. I am respectfully requesting that you not judge my entire career  
on my command decision that lasted no longer than thirty minutes.  
This five day period is only a short glimpse of my entire career.  
ÂUpon reading this synopsis of the events in question, it is my hope  
that you will see that my intentions were nothing short of honorable  
and in keeping with the principles of a United States Army officer. I  
know for a fact that the families of the men in my company appreciate  
my willingness to put their loved ones above my own career. I ask  
that you not view the actions I took during the five day period in  
question as the defining moments of my over twelve years of exemplary  
service to the Army. I readily admit to violating U.S. Army policy in  
order to safeguard my men. I understand that the U.S. Army cannot  
condone these violations on the whole; however; as the commander on  
the ground responsible for all the allied personnel in Wardak, I would
 ask you to fully consider the enemy situation and the facts in my  
case. I made a command decision based on the best information I had  
at the time, and was faced with seemingly limited options and no  
support.Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
m.ÂÂ Again, I ask that you consider my career as a wholeâand further  
ask for some level of understanding about the impossible mission that  
I was given in Wardak.ÂÂ I believe that I could remain a valuable  
asset for the U.S. Army.ÂÂ The U.S. taxpayer has invested a lot in my  
education and training; I owe them my experience.ÂÂ I have learned  
valuable lessons, but also know that my nine-year career will forever  
be impacted by a mere thirty minute time period.
Â
4. Request: ÂA General discharge characterization; or in the  
alternative, a suspended separation in order to fulfill my military  
obligation.
Â
5. If you have any questions or wish to discuss my request, my AKO  
account is roger.t.hill@us.army.mil.
Â
Â
Â
Â
Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ROGER T.  
HILL
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ CPT,  
IN

Â



________________________________
From: Neal Puckett <neal@puckettfaraj.com>
To: Roger Hill <hillrogert@yahoo.com>
Sent: Sunday, December 14, 2008 12:59:27 AM
Subject: Re: Thanks Neal - Got an article for you to read here.

Thanks, Roger. ÂGreat article! ÂAny questions on how to handle  
Tuesday's visit with the CG?
Neal

Neal A. Puckett, Esq
LtCol, USMC (Ret)
Puckett & Faraj, PC
Washington DC | San Diego
888.970.0005

The information contained in this electronic message is confidential,  
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If you are not the intended recipient of this message, you are hereby  
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communication is strictly prohibited. If you received this  
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On Dec 13, 2008, at 1:39 PM, Roger Hill wrote:


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/12/AR2008121203291.html?sub=new
Â
A War's Impossible Mission
Â
By P.J. Tobia
Sunday, December 14, 2008; Page B01
KHOST PROVINCE , AfghanistanÂCapt. Roger Hill stood behind a long  
wooden desk, reading from a piece of paper that trembled lightly in  
his hand.. "Please know that seeing your brothers whittled down one by  
one by a cowardly and ghost-like enemy is difficult," he said,  
glancing up only briefly at the team of military prosecutors assembled  
around him.
Hill is aÂU.S.. ArmyÂofficer in AfghanistanÂaccused of detainee  
abuse, including a mock execution, war crimes, dereliction of duty and  
other serious charges stemming from an incident last August at aÂU.S.  
militaryÂbase outside the capital city of Kabul . Members of his unit  
allegedly slapped Afghan detainees, and Hill himself is said to have  
fired his pistol into the ground near blindfolded Afghans to frighten  
them.
But after exploring the personalities and circumstances involved in  
this case, it's hard for me to condemn Hill or his first sergeant,  
Tommy Scott, who has been charged with assaulting the detainees. Stuck  
in the deadly middle ground between all-out war and nation- building,  
these men lashed out to protect themselves. To me, their story  
encapsulates the impossible role we've asked U.S.Âsoldiers to play in  
the reconstruction of this devastated country. They are part warrior,  
part general contractor, yet they are surrounded on all sides by a  
populace that wants nothing more than to kill or be rid of them.
The soldiers who have served at Hill's side call him heroic. Others  
describe the career that the 30-year-old West PointÂgraduate might  
have had if he and his men hadn't apparently crossed the line one day  
last summer. Instead, I watched Hill fight for that career -- and for  
his freedom -- earlier this month in a conference room at Forward  
Operating Base Salerno, a large U.S. military base near the Afghan  
town of Khost, about 17 miles from the Afghan-Pakistani border.
As Hill tried to defend his actions at a military hearing, his soft  
voice filled the small, bare room: "Know that sifting through the  
charred and crumbling remains of fellow service members in order to  
identify their bodies, or picking up the pieces of another after this  
ghost-like enemy has hacked off his arms and cut out his heart . . .  
only for you to later find out that his fingers are being distributed  
downtown amongst the locals, can somehow make a commander more  
protective. "
It was against this "ghost-like enemy" that Hill, Scott and the rest  
of their unit were fighting at Forward Operating Base Airborne in  
Wardak Province , west of Kabul , where Hill's company was the sole  
coalition force for miles around..
There are dozens of bases throughout the country like Airborne. They  
are full of soldiers who bear the dual and confounding burden of being  
both an army fighting theÂTaliban, with all the killing and dying that  
entails, and a corps of civil servants. They attend shuras (meetings  
with village leaders), construct roads and help train the Afghan  
police force. They are expected to work hand-in-glove with people who  
might have tea with them one moment and inform Taliban killers about  
U..S.Âtroop movements the next.. But talking with local leaders --  
even leaders who might be playing both sides -- is the only way to  
begin progress toward building institutions in Afghanistan .
I traveled here to work as an embedded reporter with the soldiers of  
theÂ101st Airborne Division, based atÂFort Campbell, Ky. , about an  
hour from my home in Nashville . I'd planned on spending most of my  
time with the 101st as they engaged the Taliban on the PakistanÂborder.
But while waiting at FOBÂ SalernoÂfor a helicopter ride to a smaller  
base, I heard talk about Hill and the Article 32 inquiry he was about  
to face -- the military justice version of a grand jury hearing. I  
learned that Hill and Scott could face life in prison if the matter  
proceeded to a court martial. Another half-dozen members of Hill's  
company will soon have Article 32 hearings of their own. One soldier  
is already being held in a military jail in KuwaitÂfor his role in  
the incident.
I decided to stay.
Hill's path to the hearing room in Khost began, according to witness  
testimony, when he received reliable intelligence late last August  
that Taliban agents were working on his unit's base, which is manned  
by no more than 200 coalition soldiers. One of these reported  
interlopers, a man identified only as "Noori," was Hill's personal  
interpreter. Two more purported Taliban informants were running the  
base's small, locally owned coffee shop. The intelligence said that  
all three, as well as some others, were relaying information about  
U.S.Âtroop movements and artillery positions to Taliban agents in  
Wardak, an area the size of ConnecticutÂwhere Hill's small company  
faced off against a large number of hostile locals.
The intelligence report detailing how these Afghan men were working  
with the Taliban is classified "top secret." But an Army spokesman who  
has seen it said that the evidence against them was incontrovertible.  
"There was a legitimate report saying that [Hill's translator] was a  
bad guy and was sharing information with the Taliban," said Marine  
Capt.ÂScott Miller, media liaison for the hearing. "He was providing  
information to recognized bad people."
Upon receiving the intelligence report, Hill's men immediately put the  
accused Afghans in plastic flex-cuffs and took them to the base's  
coffee shop. The total number of detainees is disputed; some witnesses  
testified that there were as many as 25, while most others put the  
number closer to 12 or 13.
In a statement through his lawyer, Neal Puckett, Hill said that on a  
number of occasions, the intelligence that the alleged informants  
provided to the Taliban could have had deadly consequences for his  
men. In one case, he said, he confirmed that information had been  
leaked to enemy forces, warning them of a major U.S. operation against  
them hours before the mission was due to begin. Hill added that  
several improvised explosive devices had been planted on the planned  
route, although they were neutralized without injury to his soldiers.  
"It is without a doubt that the detainees we took, all twelve of them,  
were involved in providing early warning to the enemy that injured and  
or killed thirty of my men during our six months in Wardak," Hill said  
in the statement.
U.S.Âforces detain Afghans for any number of reasons. But according to  
International Security and Assistance Force rules, by which all U.S.  
forces in Afghanistan must abide, these detentions can last no longer  
than 96 hours. The detainees must then be either released, handed over  
to Afghan security forces or formally arrested and placed in the  
custody of the unit's commanding battalion. Once in battalion custody,  
detainees may can be questioned by trained military or intelligence  
interrogators.
Requests to send detainees to battalion are a routine matter. Over the  
past year, Hill's company made at least 10 such requests, although  
none were approved, according to 1st Lt. Larry Kay, Hill's executive  
officer.. Kay, who is also facing charges related to the incident,  
added that other U..S.Âcompanies' detainees are routinely accepted by  
battalion and blames the repeated denials on friction between Hill and  
his battalion command.
As the 96-hour window began to close last August, Kay made frantic  
calls to battalion headquarters, trying to secure the arrest of the  
detainees his men were holding. The detainees "knew who everyone [on  
FOB Airborne] was," Kay said. "They knew where everyone slept, they  
knew where our artillery was placed, which then became the target of  
rocket attacks. . . . I didn't want to let these guys go." Kay said  
that his calls went unheeded.
Battalion commander Lt. Col. Tony DeMartino declined to discuss the  
specifics of the incident. He did say that generally, "We like to see  
the Afghans do the formal detainee process so that [the detainees] are  
in the Afghan chain of command."
Worried about the safety of their men, Hill and Scott resorted to  
drastic measures. Though it is unclear exactly who initially planned  
to detain the Afghans, Hill acknowledges that the ultimate  
responsibility is his. "I did wrongfully discharge my weapon and I did  
fail to maintain control of the situation," he said in his statement  
at the hearing.
According to testimony from a number of witnesses, it was Scott, the  
first sergeant, who began interrogating the bound detainees. He  
straddled their chests one at a time as they lay on the ground,  
pinning their shoulders with his knees and slapping their faces while  
shouting questions.
"My whole twenty-plus-year career in the military has been about  
taking care of soldiers," Scott said after the hearing concluded. "I  
couldn't let these men go just so that they could come back and kill  
some of my boys. It made no sense."
At some point during the interrogation, a few of the detainees were  
blindfolded and taken to an area just outside the coffee shop. Then,  
according to many who testified at the hearing, Hill removed his 9mm  
pistol from a leather shoulder-holster and fired at least once into  
the ground, about 20 yards from the nearest detainee. Inside the  
coffee shop, after the shot rang out, Scott asked the other detainees,  
"Do you want to die like your friend?"
Through his attorney, Scott denied that he had said any such thing.
Witnesses testified that the detainees were eventually released into  
the custody of Afghan intelligence officials. DeMartino, the battalion  
commander, said that when Afghans are detained by coalition forces,  
they are generally kept in the custody ofÂNATOÂforces or released.  
"Sometimes," he said, "we'll just release them, and we'll ask [the  
Afghan police or intelligence agency] to give them a ride home."
Before this group was handed over, a U.S. Army physician's assistant  
examined the men. At the hearing, I heard him say that they were  
unharmed and in fine physical condition. Other testimony indicated  
that these alleged Taliban operatives are now walking free in Wardak  
-- with full knowledge of the inner workings of FOB Airborne.
I was present for every unclassified minute of the Article 32 hearing.  
Prior to the incident last August, Hill was known as a promising young  
officer who had received a Bronze Star for valor and three Army  
commendation medals. He led his men through a bloody spring and summer  
of ambushes and IEDs. His company -- D Company of the 1st Battalion,  
506th Infantry Regiment -- numbered only about 100 men and suffered  
more than 30 casualties and at least two deaths. But their morale was  
high. "These guys wouldn't want to be anywhere else," Scott said of  
his men.
Scott also has an impressive rÃsumÃ. Career military, he won a Bronze  
Star of his own for a combat jump into PanamaÂin 1988 and fought for  
15 hours straight during the 1991 Gulf War.
Watching the prosecution destroy the reputations of Scott and Hill was  
heartbreaking, tragic -- and deeply conflicting. As an American who  
fiercely believes in the rule of law and due process, I understand  
that the actions of D Company are inexcusable. A mock execution, under  
almost any circumstance, is antithetical to the ideals and standards  
our nation aspires to.
And perhaps Hill's superiors had good reason not to take these  
particular men into custody. Maybe they were on the radar of  
U.S.Âintelligence and taking them out of circulation might have meant  
losing valuable information.
But the soldiers of D Company felt that they were out of options.
I fear that this kind of story will repeat itself in other parts of  
AfghanistanÂagain and again, if only because U.S.Âforces know that  
their enemy's mission is clearer than their own.
"They're Taliban," one soldier said in response to a prosecutor's  
question at the hearing. That soldier is facing charges of repeatedly  
hitting a detainee who bit him as he tried to put a gag into the man's  
mouth. "If it was us, they'd cut our heads off, videotape it and put  
it on al-Jazeera for our families to see."
pjtobia@gmail.com
P.J. Tobia is a staff writer and investigative reporter for NashvilleÂScene.




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