Neal,
I had planned to win him over with charm, solid facing movements, a
good haircutÂand fresh breath : )ÂDidn't really work out too well. I
was well rehearsed, did not let him take me off my course (thought
he tried a few times) and got what needed to be said out. The CG
knew what he was going to do before I showed up tonight. He had an
outline on his desk which he referred to and had about 20 minutes
with COL Johnson on a video conference before I reported. COL
Johnson was there to hear it all. I'm sure he had some choice words
for the CG during the three intersessions we took over the 3.5
hours Larry and I were up there. The worst part is that he was
pretty mean towards LT Kay. "LT,Âyou are wasting my time!"Â And he
did not want to hear about any of the witness intimidation and
unlawful command influence that went on. He attempted to brush it
aside even after he agreed to listen to what Larry had to say and
even after I signed the article 15
stating that I wanted someone to speak on my behalf regarding that
specific issue. I felt that a dialogue regarding how unobjective
the investigation was as a whole was a legitimate topic. The CG
thought otherwise, or at least did not want to admit to what had
been going on under his nose. Whatever good feelings I had for
division are now gone. 0 for 3 now from battalion, brigade and now
division.
BelowÂis my draft plea for a general discharge.ÂÂMy computer isn't
allowing attachments right now. I plan to submit this with
appropriate enclosures tomorrow AM.Â
I want to use the draft plea as a white paper I can send "as is"
toÂa lot of the folks (friends and family) that haveÂvolunteered to
lend a handÂduring this time. I'd like to draft an email with the
Post article as a part of that email, then attach this draft plea in
memorandum format as a word document so that people can
seeÂatÂfaceÂvalue the following: (1) what type of discharge I am
fighting for and why I deserve it (the header includes and address
to HRC for those that feel inclined to send fan mail in that
direction : ), (2)Âwhat led up to theÂevents in question and why I
made the decisions I made andÂ(3) why Afghanistan is going so poorly
for the lower level commands on the ground in order to better serve
future units to be deployed to the OEF theater.
ÂÂ
I would appreciate any tips or talking points you think ought to be
addressed in the email.ÂÂLength may appear to be an issue, but I
personally think that the length of the memo is not a problem for
the following reasons: (1) COL Christine Stark plans to send this to
the War College to generate interest among senior leaders and
faculty there (she just finished teaching there less than a year
ago), (2) I plan to send this to all of my infantry classmates and
former basic course students to generate interest, (3) it paints a
complete picture (one shot one kill) and allows for dissemination to
the widest audience to include thoseÂwho are interested in filing
congressionals or senatorial inquiries on our behalf.Â
I saw P.J.Âtwo days ago. ÂHe's flying out back to Nashville today.
He's pretty excited and I think he, Larry Kay and myselfÂmay work
together for future publications over this situation.Â
LaurenÂand I have worked our budget. CG only took 4K from me.ÂÂAs
it turns out, my bonus was paid off in May of 08. WeÂstill want to
keep you on the pay roll and will find ways to make the payments
work. The latest additions to the expense "roll up" yourÂbook
keeper sent out should get paid offÂpretty quickly. Lauren'sÂall
over that.Â
Thanks and talk to you soon. Memo/white paper for your comments
below.. As soon as I get your comments I'll push it out for
dissemination.
Roger
MEMORANDUM THRU Commander, CJTF-101, Bagram AB, Afghanistan, APO AE 09354
Â
FOR Commander, Human Resources Command (AHRC-OPD-A),
200 Stovall Street, Alexandria, VA 22332-0478
Â
SUBJECT:Â Statement Regarding Characterization of ServiceâCPT Roger T. Hill
Â
Â
1. ÂI am respectfully requesting consideration for an upgraded
discharge. I understand that the terms of my resignation to include
the potential for an Other than Honorable Discharge (OTHD)
characterization of service.. ÂÂIn short, I would ask that the five
day period leading to this action not be used as the sole basis to
characterize my nine years of active duty service, plus four years
at the U.S. Military Academy.ÂÂ At a minimum, I am requesting a
General characterization of service. Alternatively, I would ask you
to consider suspending the action so that I may pass along my
lessons learned to my peers. It is my hope that after reviewing the
circumstances of my case, you will find that my actions were not
done with malice, but rather as nothing short of honorable
intentions with the end state of safeguarding my men.
Â
2. Prior Military Service: Three of my seven years of marriage
have been spent overseas, to include a twelve month tour in Korea.
ÂIn addition to my most recent tour as a company commander in
support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in 2008, I had also
completed a twelve month combat tour as a part of Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF). For my duty and performance in Iraq, I was awarded
the Bronze Star and the Combat Infantrymanâs Badge. While in Iraq,
I served on multiple Transition Teams based out of Qayyarah of the
Nineweh province and Ramadi of the Al Anbar province where I
mentored and fought alongside Iraqi infantry units from the platoon
level up to brigade level staff. ÂIn addition to the above awards,
I am also Airborne, Air Assault and Ranger qualified. ÂI have been
awarded the Expert Infantryman's Badge, three Army Commendation
Medals, and three Overseas Ribbons as well as a number of other
awards and medals during my over
twelve years of collective Army Service. ÂI also served in the Old
Guard as a platoon leader and executive officer from 2002 to 2004.Â
I had the privilege of being hand selected to serve as the Officer
in Charge (OIC) for the funerals of many dignitaries, to include
serving as the Guard of Honor OIC for former President Reagan. My
dress blues coat is currently on display at the Reagan Presidential
Library in Simi Valley, California. I have also served as a platoon
leader (mechanized and rifle), assistant S-3 and as an Infantry
Officer Basic Course instructor. As reflected by all of my Officer
Evaluation Reports (OERs), I was considered a top performer in every
position that I held. Finally, I graduated with a Bachelorâs of
Science degree in Environmental Engineering from the United States
Military Academy.Â
Â
3. Current OEF Deployment (2008): After two separate rotations to
the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) my company, Dog Company
1-506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), deployed to Wardak,
Afghanistan in early March of 2008. Three other companies from my
battalion split the Ghazni province into three separate company
areas of responsibility (AOR). My company, the smallest infantry
company in the Brigade, was responsible for the entire province of
Wardak. Wardak, a province the size of Connecticut, was
geographically the largest AOR in the Brigade. Wardakâs total
population was in excess of 525,000 people; consequently leaving our
company and our partnership Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)
with a 1:525 peace keeping force to population ratio, well beyond
the guidelines for establishing a successful counterinsurgency in
accordance with FM 3-24. ÂWardak was also one of the most kinetic
areas of responsibility in the brigade.Â
Our company suffered thirty wounded in action (WIA) and two killed
in action (KIA) during our six months in Wardak. The two KIAs
occurred just days before the events in question. Our companyâs
total combat power was just under ninety personnel and with those
ninety Soldiers I was tasked to lead and bring unity to all
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts along the
lines of: security, governance, development, and information
operations throughout the province. Despite the emotional and
physical toll on my company, camaraderie was highâwhich was
reflected in my companyâs retention rate (the highest in the Brigade).
Â
a. The unit my company relieved had spent nearly six months in
Wardak, and prior to that unitâs arrival to Wardak in fall of 2007,
the U.S./NATO presence in the province of Wardak had been scarce at
best. ÂSome of the most horrific combat action occurred in this
AOR. In fact, it was the province of Wardak in which a platoon from
the 2-508 PIR had suffered the only loss in a decisive engagement
to the Anti Afghan Forces (AAF) to date. This platoon had been
chased out of a sub-valley in Wardak named Jalrez by over one
hundred AAF in an eight kilometer long ambush resulting in fourteen
U.S. WIA and two gun trucks destroyed. Our initial intelligence
reports cited that the enemy forces that had been allowed safe
haven in Wardak since the start of the war in 2001 and had
unhampered in its ability to acquire nearly 2,000 fighters. My
company experienced even greater enemy threats and activity during
our six months in Wardak.
Â
b. In mid-August my company suffered the worst possible outcome in
combat: two KIAs, 1LT Donnie Carwile and SPC Paul Conlon, as a
result of an improvised explosive device (IED) initiated ambush
along HWY 1. A mere week later, my company was tasked to serve in a
battalion-led shaping effort with Combined Joint Special Operations
Task Force (CJSOTF) in Jalrez Valley. The operation start time was
delayed multiple times due to several confirmed intelligence leaks,
all of which originated from forward operating base (FOB) Airborne.
ÂAs the operation ORDU was being executed, a counter intelligence
(CI) team, along with the Dog Company 1SG, conducted a FOB Airborne
centric operation consisting of intelligence-based polygraph and
cell phone inspection screenings for over seventy local nationals
that worked on the FOB. ÂThe technology used to conduct these
screenings was classified, but the information was readily provided
to us by the CI team who
advised our efforts. The number of local nationals on our FOB was
nearly more than what existed in my company; a ratio of almost 1:1.Â
The number of local nationals was necessary because, in addition to
our combat mission, our battalion had also tasked our company with
expanding the FOBâs capacity to fit a battalion plus in the near
future. ÂThe expansion effort mirrored what one might see on any
general industrial construction site. This was something that my
infantry Soldiers were neither trained nor equipped to accomplish.Â
We did our best to complete this mission, but were required to
maintain a large local national workforce to assist our efforts.
ÂMaintaining this large of a local national work force had obvious
security risks associated with it, especially since we were not
provided with an adequate means to conduct background checks.
ÂThroughout our time in Wardak, my company was forced to man
additional static locations throughout the
province. In addition to FOB Airborne, my company was solely
responsible for three other combat out posts (COPs). Consequently,
and to our detriment, my four platoon company, with each platoon
securing a COP or part of a FOB, meant that my company was
tactically fixed. As a result, we had no real ability to react to
the enemy, especially in terms of a quick reaction force (QRF). Our
nearest route clearance package (RCP) and explosive ordinance
disposal (EOD) teams were over 130 kilometers away at our battalion
headquarters in Ghazni. Both of these teams specialized in finding,
identifying and neutralizing improvised explosive device (IED)
threats. This was contrary to what I learned in every Army school I
ever attended: fix the enemy and not yourself. Upon confronting my
battalion commander about the lack of tactical foresight and risks
that resulted from his decisions to establish two additional platoon
COPs, I was told by my battalion
commander that he knew ââ exactly what he was doing to Dog
Company.â My battalion commander followed that statement by saying,
âI need to increase significant activities (SIGACTs), enemy
activity, in your AOR so that the brigade commander will fight to
have the battalion (1-506th PIR) headquarters placed at FOB Airborne
instead of FOB Sharana.â Needless to say, I was shocked by what I
had just heard, as it was apparent that my battalion commander
wanted me to openly sacrifice my menâs safety and potentially their
lives so that he could âsellâ the next move for his battalion
headquarters. ÂI was more upset with this information because it
was a cumulative train of thought by my battalion commander.Â
Previously, my battalion commander took my company âtrollingâ for
firefights in Wardak, at a significant risk to my men.ÂÂ The
underlying purpose was to add to my battalion commanderâs desire to
score both a Purple Heart and
the ability to state that he has been in the most troops in
contacts (TICs). It was at that precise moment that I realized I
was now no longer protecting my men from just the enemy outside our
gates.
Â
c. As the commander of Dog Company, I openly expressed my concerns
with my commander by seeking a dialogue with him. However, this
simply never occurred, despite my best attempts with both the
brigade and battalion commanders. As ordered, I always executed his
guidance when my commander finalized his decisions. It was not
until brigadier general (BG) Milley, the deputy commanding general
of operations (DCGO), stepped in that I received any relief or
understanding of our manpower crisis. Not only was my company fixed
in the largest and one of the most kinetic AORs, but three of those
four platoons were not really platoons at all. Three of my four
platoons were down to eleven to thirteen men each, a number which
included medics and forward observers (FOs). ÂEvery mission was
further constrained by manning requirements. For instance, the CJTF
101 policy regarding minimal convoy requirements provided that all
convoys must have at least four
gun trucks. While I understood the rationale for this policy (a
National Guard crew that was mutilated in Tangi Valley, Wardak), the
requirement was not ascertainable given my limited manpower. ÂI was
given hard choices between securing FOBs and convoy requirements.Â
Again, I brought this to my battalion commanderâs attention, but I
was repeatedly told to simply âmake it happenâ with three gun trucks
despite the divisionâs policy. ÂI feared the consequences of an
ultimate Catch-22. ÂEach static location was at a high risk due to
the limited number of U.S. Soldiers versus the number of enemy in
the vicinity of each of those areas. 107 mm rockets, rocket
propelled grenades (RPGs) and machine gun fire were frequently used
against these COPs. The most kinetic of those COPs was the outpost
located just inside the Jalrez Valley. It was in the Jalrez Valley
that we had come to take most of our casualties, the same Jalrez
Valley in which the
unit before us had suffered so many casualties. I fought to close
this COP on numerous occasions. I attempted to speak to both my
battalion and brigade commanders regarding my growing concerns over
the extremely high risks that we were assuming due to a gross lack
of combat power and resources. ÂMy concerns were ignored until BG
Milley visited COP Conlon. Even BG Milley recognized that the
threat against that outpost was so great that it resulted in being
closed down the next day due to its potential for being over run by
the much larger enemy force in the area. ÂIronically, this was the
position I attempted to take with my command long before BG Milleyâs
visit. Soon after, my company was subjected to clear retaliation
for openly agreeing with the decision to close the COP.Â
Â
d. As the month of August began, our human intelligence collection
team (HCT) began to receive a number of reports citing recent
efforts by the enemy to plan and execute a complex catastrophic
attack against one of our four static locations. Most of the dozen
or so source based intelligence reports put FOB Airborne and the COP
in Jalrez as the enemyâs primary targets. Reliability of our past
human intelligence (HUMINT) or source based intelligence was
approximately eighty percent. As the commander, I determined that
threat of a complex suicide attack was likely.Â
Â
e. Several factors played into my threat assessment at that time.Â
(1) FOB Airborne and all its tenants were at an increased
vulnerability because we were attempting to conduct relief in place
(RIP) operations with another company in our battalion. Dog Company
had only been given a total of fourteen days to conduct this RIP.Â
The short amount of time allotted for this RIP only increased the
amount of risk being assumed as we attempted to move our sister
company, Able Company 1-506th PIR, into Airborne and prepare our
company for movement to Khowst province. ÂAs we began to conduct RIP
operations, I was reminded of a conversation with BG Milley and
became similarly concerned about a possible repeat of patrol base
Wanat
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/04/world/asia/04military.html?_r=1&ref=world
or http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Wanat where Afghan trusted
agents were said to have assisted with coordinating the attack that
led to nine KIA and
twenty seven WIA. Â(2) We had also verified that both the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) had been
effectively infiltrated by the enemy. Less than two weeks prior, we
interdicted four vehicle born improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs),
one of which causing five wounded in action alone.ÂÂ The suicide
threat was proven to be alive and very real in the area just outside
FOB Airborne. ÂThis threat was ultimately materialized in November
at COP Sayad Abad, where a dump truck full of explosives detonated
at the ECP. Nine Soldiers were WIA and Sayad Abad base was
leveled. (3) Less than three weeks prior we also caught several ANA
in the act of stealing night vision goggles (NVGs), government
computers along with other personal electronic equipment that was
assigned to or belonged to U.S. Soldiers on FOB Airborne. The
Soldiers from this ANA battalion had just arrived to replace a
previous ANA battalion we had worked with
for over two months. The ANA stood guard on half of the eight guard
towers that spanned the perimeter of FOB Airborne. We were forced
to allocate combat power from our company just to ensure that the
ANA were not vacating their towers during guard rotations, which was
a common problem. This only served to enhance my overall concern
of the enemy conducting a successful suicide attack on the FOB.
Â
f.ÂÂ Upon completion of Operation ORDU and the local national
screenings as a part of that operation, a total of twelve detainees
were taken due to confirmed ties to the Taliban. One of the most
critical infiltrations included my own personal interpreter, and a
person whom I considered a dear and close friend, Noori Noorula.
ÂÂNot only was my unit betrayed, but I was as well. He was
considered a trusted agent and a Dog Company member. ÂOnce the local
nationals were determined to be infiltrators, my company executive
officer (1LT Kay) reported these detainees to our battalion
headquarters. Not only did he report the status of the detainees,
but he also repeatedly asked for guidance on what to do with the
local nationals in accordance with standard protocol. Simply put,
Dog Company did not have the manpower or resources to handle these
local national men. Our requests for assistance were responded with
only excuses and delays. Initially, all
of these detainees were meant to be Operation Enduring Freedom
(OEF) detainees because initially the commander of the CJSOTF
operation had agreed to detain, process and transport all insider
threats found on FOB Airborne as a part of the Operation ORDU. ÂOEF
detainees are technically âbetterâ for everyone because it means
that the U.S. has control of the detainees for interrogations. The
decision to not take, process or transport these insider threat
detainees was made by the CJSOTF commander just before all combat
forces left Jalrez Valley. Literally, as they passed the entry
control point (ECP) of FOB Airborne, Dog Company was left with all
twelve detainees. As the commander, I had no choice but to order
the detainment of all remaining confirmed insider threat local
nationals on the FOB and begin processing them under ISAF
guidelines. ÂI along with my company executive officer (XO) and our
partnership Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA)
team leader repeatedly attempted seek guidance and or assistance to
finding a solution to the processing of the detainees. My XO made
several attempts on a daily basis to battalion regarding the
matter. Again, to no avail. Simultaneously, the ODA team leader
did the same via his OEF contacts. The ODA team on FOB Airborne was
also an ISAF unit. I consulted the battalionâs detainee operations
officer (1LT Scheppler), who was on our FOB for the entirety of the
operation. The detainee operations officer relayed to me that even
if the detainees were sent up U.S. channels of the ISAF detainee
chain of custody that it would ultimately result in their release.Â
Dog Company had seen this happen at least a half a dozen times in
the past. Orders from our higher command to release these detainees
often meant taking fighters that we had captured in the act of
ambushing our platoons back to where they were captured. Obviously,
the point of capture
was also often known ambush locations. This was a very sore point
of contention for our company, especially after 1LT Carwile and SPC
Conlonâs death.
Â
g. Our only hope was to garner support from our battalion
headquarters or transfer the detainees to the NDS. Unfortunately,
the national directorate of security (NDS), which is Afghanistanâs
national intelligence agency, had already stated that they would
release the detainees because the U.S. forces would not provide them
with the classified information justifying their detention or their
ties to AAF. Although CJTF sent the CI team down to Airborne, we
didnât receive a follow-on team of OEF personnel to conduct
detainment operations. This was despite the fact that the
fragmentary order (FRAGO) from our division command clearly stated
that the CI team would be complimented with physical detentions and
interrogator personnel. None of the intelligence gathered by the CI
team or the methods used to gain that intelligence was releasable
to the ANSF due to its classification. Therefore, the NDS could
not keep those detainees in accordance to
their operational guidelines. As we approached the end of our
ninety six hour window of custody, I grew very concerned about the
possibility of having to free these detainees due to the ISAF
ninety-six hour time standard. Once again, Dog Company was in a
Catch-22 situation. Our calls to battalion resulted in zero
progress.Â
Â
h. We had previously made contact with the NDS, but they did not
show to pick up the detainees as promised. ÂWhile contemplating the
thought of being forced to free these detainees who knew everything
about our FOB, its inner workings and its security measures in
addition to the already likely threat of a suicide attack on one of
our COPs or FOB Airborne, I determined that the threat against my
men at that time was imminent and decided to take action. By the
last twenty-four hour period, we had given up on the possibility of
our battalion headquarters retrieving the detainees. The battalion
detainee operations OIC had even been on FOB Airborne for the
entirety of the operation ORDU and his attempts to assistance in the
matter made no difference. Desperation was setting in. It was in
the last twenty-four hour period that I made the command decision
that it was necessary to acquire some intelligence on the early
warning network to which these
detainees belonged. Giving these detainees to the NDS was equal to
simply setting them free; free to attack U.S. forces. Again, I made
a command decision that it was necessary to pull timely
intelligence from the detainees myself. They all possessed
intimate knowledge of the inner workings of our unit, in particular
my interpreter Noori. I felt that releasing them created an
imminent threat to those on our FOB and our three platoon COPs..Â
Approximately twelve different source based human intelligence in
the last month stated that the AAF in our area was planning a
catastrophic suicide attack on one of our four static locations. We
were just spread too thin for me to take any more risks and
battalion left me with no choice. I made the command decision to
question these detainees in an effort to gain intelligence that
would allow us to disrupt this imminent attack and prevent future
ambushes. A passive approach was simply not feasible. My
ultimate goal was to limit future casualties and at the very least
give the NDS enough evidence to keep the twelve in the ANSF branch
of the ISAF chain of custody until our operational tempo (OPTEMPO),
mission load, and threat level were reduced.Â
Â
i. As the officer with overall responsible for the safety of all
ISAF forces in Wardak, I felt that it was my duty to do anything
within my power to maintain that safety in light of an impending
attack. I made the command decision to utilize a variety of shock
tactics to intimidate and scare those detainees into providing
valuable intelligence that would allow U.S. forces to effectively
disrupt the AAF who had inflicted so many casualties over the past
year. In my mind, we escalated force as necessary to maintain the
situation. In hindsight, we may have been too aggressive. ÂNot to
excuse my actions completely, I will note that my actions result in
obtaining valuable and potentially life saving intelligence on the
AAFâs early warning network. An entire link analysis of the early
warning network as it originated from FOB Airborne was obtained from
multiple detainees as a result of my actions. This intelligence
also gave the NDS enough
evidence to maintain custody of and even transfer these detainees
to their NDS headquarters in Kabul. Â
Â
j. Despite holding the detainees for ninety-six hours, the
interrogations that we conducted lasted less than thirty minutes.Â
Prior to and following this short time period, these twelve
detainees were returned to their normal routine of sleeping, eating,
smoking and restroom breaks. My men were not as fortunate. While
the detainees slept in a hardened building, my men continued to
secure the FOB and with missions. Although many slept in tents,
they rarely had the occasion to utilize their bunks. My men
frequently missed meals because the mission did not allow for even
breaks. We were all fatigued, having worked 18+ hour days prior to
Operation ORDU, and a full three days with little to no sleep
leading up to and during the operation. Our mission was so
demanding, most of my Soldiers were only afforded the short time at
the Fallen Comrade Ceremony to grieve and recover from the loss of
1LT Carwile and SPC Conlon.
Â
k. ÂIt has since been decided that a brigade minus would be
headquartered out of FOB Airborne. Now, over 1,200 Soldiers are
being brought to Wardak to be headquartered out of FOB Airborneâin
essence replacing what was once a mission conducted by the 89
dog-tired Soldiers of Dog Company 1-506th PIR for six brutal
months. These numbers alone should serve as an obvious indicator as
to how poorly resourced and dire the situation in Wardak was for
the men of Dog Company 1-506th PIR.Â
Â
l. I am respectfully requesting that you not judge my entire career
on my command decision that lasted no longer than thirty minutes.Â
This five day period is only a short glimpse of my entire career.
ÂUpon reading this synopsis of the events in question, it is my hope
that you will see that my intentions were nothing short of
honorable and in keeping with the principles of a United States
Army officer. I know for a fact that the families of the men in my
company appreciate my willingness to put their loved ones above my
own career. I ask that you not view the actions I took during the
five day period in question as the defining moments of my over
twelve years of exemplary service to the Army. I readily admit to
violating U.S. Army policy in order to safeguard my men. I
understand that the U.S. Army cannot condone these violations on the
whole; however; as the commander on the ground responsible for all
the allied personnel in Wardak, I would
ask you to fully consider the enemy situation and the facts in my
case. I made a command decision based on the best information I had
at the time, and was faced with seemingly limited options and no
support.Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ
m.ÂÂ Again, I ask that you consider my career as a wholeâand further
ask for some level of understanding about the impossible mission
that I was given in Wardak.ÂÂ I believe that I could remain a
valuable asset for the U.S. Army.ÂÂ The U.S. taxpayer has invested a
lot in my education and training; I owe them my experience.ÂÂ I
have learned valuable lessons, but also know that my nine-year
career will forever be impacted by a mere thirty minute time period.
Â
4. Request: ÂA General discharge characterization; or in the
alternative, a suspended separation in order to fulfill my military
obligation.
Â
5. If you have any questions or wish to discuss my request, my AKO
account is roger.t.hill@us.army.mil.
Â
Â
Â
Â
Â
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ ROGER T.
HILL
ÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂÂ CPT,
IN
Â
________________________________
From: Neal Puckett <neal@puckettfaraj.com>
To: Roger Hill <hillrogert@yahoo.com>
Sent: Sunday, December 14, 2008 12:59:27 AM
Subject: Re: Thanks Neal - Got an article for you to read here.
Thanks, Roger. ÂGreat article! ÂAny questions on how to handle
Tuesday's visit with the CG?
Neal
Neal A. Puckett, Esq
LtCol, USMC (Ret)
Puckett & Faraj, PC
Washington DC | San Diego
888.970.0005
The information contained in this electronic message is
confidential, and is intended for the use of the individual or
entity named above. If you are not the intended recipient of this
message, you are hereby notified that any use, distribution, copying
of disclosure of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you
received this communication in error, please notify Puckett & Faraj,
P.C. at 888-970-0005 or via a return the e-mail to sender.ÂÂYou are
required to purge this E-mail immediately without reading or making
any copy or distribution.
On Dec 13, 2008, at 1:39 PM, Roger Hill wrote:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/12/AR2008121203291.html?sub=new
Â
A War's Impossible Mission
Â
By P.J. Tobia
Sunday, December 14, 2008; Page B01
KHOST PROVINCE , AfghanistanÂCapt. Roger Hill stood behind a long
wooden desk, reading from a piece of paper that trembled lightly in
his hand.. "Please know that seeing your brothers whittled down one
by one by a cowardly and ghost-like enemy is difficult," he said,
glancing up only briefly at the team of military prosecutors
assembled around him.
Hill is aÂU.S.. ArmyÂofficer in AfghanistanÂaccused of detainee
abuse, including a mock execution, war crimes, dereliction of duty
and other serious charges stemming from an incident last August at
aÂU.S. militaryÂbase outside the capital city of Kabul . Members of
his unit allegedly slapped Afghan detainees, and Hill himself is
said to have fired his pistol into the ground near blindfolded
Afghans to frighten them.
But after exploring the personalities and circumstances involved in
this case, it's hard for me to condemn Hill or his first sergeant,
Tommy Scott, who has been charged with assaulting the detainees.
Stuck in the deadly middle ground between all-out war and nation-
building, these men lashed out to protect themselves. To me, their
story encapsulates the impossible role we've asked U.S.Âsoldiers to
play in the reconstruction of this devastated country. They are
part warrior, part general contractor, yet they are surrounded on
all sides by a populace that wants nothing more than to kill or be
rid of them.
The soldiers who have served at Hill's side call him heroic. Others
describe the career that the 30-year-old West PointÂgraduate might
have had if he and his men hadn't apparently crossed the line one
day last summer. Instead, I watched Hill fight for that career --
and for his freedom -- earlier this month in a conference room at
Forward Operating Base Salerno, a large U.S. military base near the
Afghan town of Khost, about 17 miles from the Afghan-Pakistani border.
As Hill tried to defend his actions at a military hearing, his soft
voice filled the small, bare room: "Know that sifting through the
charred and crumbling remains of fellow service members in order to
identify their bodies, or picking up the pieces of another after
this ghost-like enemy has hacked off his arms and cut out his heart
. . . only for you to later find out that his fingers are being
distributed downtown amongst the locals, can somehow make a
commander more protective. "
It was against this "ghost-like enemy" that Hill, Scott and the rest
of their unit were fighting at Forward Operating Base Airborne inÂ
Wardak Province , west of Kabul , where Hill's company was the sole
coalition force for miles around..
There are dozens of bases throughout the country like Airborne. They
are full of soldiers who bear the dual and confounding burden of
being both an army fighting theÂTaliban, with all the killing and
dying that entails, and a corps of civil servants. They attend
shuras (meetings with village leaders), construct roads and help
train the Afghan police force. They are expected to work
hand-in-glove with people who might have tea with them one moment
and inform Taliban killers about U..S.Âtroop movements the next..
But talking with local leaders -- even leaders who might be playing
both sides -- is the only way to begin progress toward building
institutions in Afghanistan .
I traveled here to work as an embedded reporter with the soldiers of
theÂ101st Airborne Division, based atÂFort Campbell, Ky. , about
an hour from my home in Nashville . I'd planned on spending most of
my time with the 101st as they engaged the Taliban on theÂ
PakistanÂborder.
But while waiting at FOBÂ SalernoÂfor a helicopter ride to a smaller
base, I heard talk about Hill and the Article 32 inquiry he was
about to face -- the military justice version of a grand jury
hearing. I learned that Hill and Scott could face life in prison if
the matter proceeded to a court martial. Another half-dozen members
of Hill's company will soon have Article 32 hearings of their own.
One soldier is already being held in a military jail in KuwaitÂfor
his role in the incident.
I decided to stay.
Hill's path to the hearing room in Khost began, according to witness
testimony, when he received reliable intelligence late last August
that Taliban agents were working on his unit's base, which is manned
by no more than 200 coalition soldiers. One of these reported
interlopers, a man identified only as "Noori," was Hill's personal
interpreter. Two more purported Taliban informants were running the
base's small, locally owned coffee shop. The intelligence said that
all three, as well as some others, were relaying information aboutÂ
U.S.Âtroop movements and artillery positions to Taliban agents in
Wardak, an area the size of ConnecticutÂwhere Hill's small company
faced off against a large number of hostile locals.
The intelligence report detailing how these Afghan men were working
with the Taliban is classified "top secret." But an Army spokesman
who has seen it said that the evidence against them was
incontrovertible. "There was a legitimate report saying that [Hill's
translator] was a bad guy and was sharing information with the
Taliban," said Marine Capt.ÂScott Miller, media liaison for the
hearing. "He was providing information to recognized bad people."
Upon receiving the intelligence report, Hill's men immediately put
the accused Afghans in plastic flex-cuffs and took them to the
base's coffee shop. The total number of detainees is disputed; some
witnesses testified that there were as many as 25, while most others
put the number closer to 12 or 13.
In a statement through his lawyer, Neal Puckett, Hill said that on a
number of occasions, the intelligence that the alleged informants
provided to the Taliban could have had deadly consequences for his
men. In one case, he said, he confirmed that information had been
leaked to enemy forces, warning them of a major U.S. operation
against them hours before the mission was due to begin. Hill added
that several improvised explosive devices had been planted on the
planned route, although they were neutralized without injury to his
soldiers. "It is without a doubt that the detainees we took, all
twelve of them, were involved in providing early warning to the
enemy that injured and or killed thirty of my men during our six
months in Wardak," Hill said in the statement.
U.S.Âforces detain Afghans for any number of reasons. But according
to International Security and Assistance Force rules, by which all
U.S. forces in Afghanistan must abide, these detentions can last no
longer than 96 hours. The detainees must then be either released,
handed over to Afghan security forces or formally arrested and
placed in the custody of the unit's commanding battalion. Once in
battalion custody, detainees may can be questioned by trained
military or intelligence interrogators.
Requests to send detainees to battalion are a routine matter. Over
the past year, Hill's company made at least 10 such requests,
although none were approved, according to 1st Lt. Larry Kay, Hill's
executive officer.. Kay, who is also facing charges related to the
incident, added that other U..S.Âcompanies' detainees are routinely
accepted by battalion and blames the repeated denials on friction
between Hill and his battalion command.
As the 96-hour window began to close last August, Kay made frantic
calls to battalion headquarters, trying to secure the arrest of the
detainees his men were holding. The detainees "knew who everyone [on
FOB Airborne] was," Kay said. "They knew where everyone slept, they
knew where our artillery was placed, which then became the target
of rocket attacks. . . . I didn't want to let these guys go." Kay
said that his calls went unheeded.
Battalion commander Lt. Col. Tony DeMartino declined to discuss the
specifics of the incident. He did say that generally, "We like to
see the Afghans do the formal detainee process so that [the
detainees] are in the Afghan chain of command."
Worried about the safety of their men, Hill and Scott resorted to
drastic measures. Though it is unclear exactly who initially planned
to detain the Afghans, Hill acknowledges that the ultimate
responsibility is his. "I did wrongfully discharge my weapon and I
did fail to maintain control of the situation," he said in his
statement at the hearing.
According to testimony from a number of witnesses, it was Scott, the
first sergeant, who began interrogating the bound detainees. He
straddled their chests one at a time as they lay on the ground,
pinning their shoulders with his knees and slapping their faces
while shouting questions.
"My whole twenty-plus-year career in the military has been about
taking care of soldiers," Scott said after the hearing concluded. "I
couldn't let these men go just so that they could come back and
kill some of my boys. It made no sense."
At some point during the interrogation, a few of the detainees were
blindfolded and taken to an area just outside the coffee shop. Then,
according to many who testified at the hearing, Hill removed his
9mm pistol from a leather shoulder-holster and fired at least once
into the ground, about 20 yards from the nearest detainee. Inside
the coffee shop, after the shot rang out, Scott asked the other
detainees, "Do you want to die like your friend?"
Through his attorney, Scott denied that he had said any such thing.
Witnesses testified that the detainees were eventually released into
the custody of Afghan intelligence officials. DeMartino, the
battalion commander, said that when Afghans are detained by
coalition forces, they are generally kept in the custody
ofÂNATOÂforces or released. "Sometimes," he said, "we'll just
release them, and we'll ask [the Afghan police or intelligence
agency] to give them a ride home."
Before this group was handed over, a U.S. Army physician's assistant
examined the men. At the hearing, I heard him say that they were
unharmed and in fine physical condition. Other testimony indicated
that these alleged Taliban operatives are now walking free in Wardak
-- with full knowledge of the inner workings of FOB Airborne.
I was present for every unclassified minute of the Article 32
hearing. Prior to the incident last August, Hill was known as a
promising young officer who had received a Bronze Star for valor and
three Army commendation medals. He led his men through a bloody
spring and summer of ambushes and IEDs. His company -- D Company of
the 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry Regiment -- numbered only about
100 men and suffered more than 30 casualties and at least two
deaths. But their morale was high. "These guys wouldn't want to be
anywhere else," Scott said of his men.
Scott also has an impressive rÃsumÃ. Career military, he won a
Bronze Star of his own for a combat jump into PanamaÂin 1988 and
fought for 15 hours straight during the 1991 Gulf War.
Watching the prosecution destroy the reputations of Scott and Hill
was heartbreaking, tragic -- and deeply conflicting. As an American
who fiercely believes in the rule of law and due process, I
understand that the actions of D Company are inexcusable. A mock
execution, under almost any circumstance, is antithetical to the
ideals and standards our nation aspires to.
And perhaps Hill's superiors had good reason not to take these
particular men into custody. Maybe they were on the radar ofÂ
U.S.Âintelligence and taking them out of circulation might have
meant losing valuable information.
But the soldiers of D Company felt that they were out of options.
I fear that this kind of story will repeat itself in other parts ofÂ
AfghanistanÂagain and again, if only because U.S.Âforces know that
their enemy's mission is clearer than their own.
"They're Taliban," one soldier said in response to a prosecutor's
question at the hearing. That soldier is facing charges of
repeatedly hitting a detainee who bit him as he tried to put a gag
into the man's mouth. "If it was us, they'd cut our heads off,
videotape it and put it on al-Jazeera for our families to see."
pjtobia@gmail.com
P.J. Tobia is a staff writer and investigative reporter for NashvilleÂScene.